ALL THE

WORKS

OF

EPICTETUS,

Which are now Extant;

CONSISTING OF

His DISCOURSES, preſerved by ARRIAN,

IN FOUR BOOKS,

The ENCHIRIDION, and FRAGMENTS.

Tranſlated from the Original GREEK,

By *ELIZABETH CARTER*.

WITH

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THE

THE DISCOURSES OF *EPICTETUS.*

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Finery in Dreſs.

§. 1. A Certain young Rhetorician coming to him, with his Hair too curiouſly ornamented, and his Dreſs very fine; Tell me, ſays *Epictetus*, whether you do not think ſome Horſes and Dogs beautiful; and ſo of all other Animals?

I do.

Are ſome Men then likewiſe beautiful, and others deformed?

Certainly,

Do we call each of theſe beautiful then in its Kind, on the ſame Account, or on ſome Account, peculiar to itſelf? You will judge of it, by this: ſince we ſee a Dog naturally formed for one thing, a Horſe for another, and a Nightingale, for Inſtance, for another; in general, it will not be abſurd to pronounce each of them beautiful, ſo far as it is in the Condition moſt ſuitable to its own Nature: but, ſince the Nature of each is different, I think each of them muſt be beautiful, in a different Way. Is it not ſo?

Agreed.

Then, what makes a Dog beautiful, makes a Horſe deformed; and what makes a Horſe beautiful, a Dog deformed; if their Natures are different.

So it ſeems probable.

For, I ſuppoſe, what makes a good Pancratiaſt (*a*) makes no good Wreſtler, and a very ridiculous Racer; and the very ſame Perſon who appears beautiful as a Pentathlete (*a*), would make a very ill Figure, in Wreſtling.

Very

(*a*) Theſe are the Names of Combatants in the *Olympic* Games. A Pancratiaſt was one who united the Exerciſes of Wreſtling and Boxing. A Pentathlete, one who contended in all the Five Games of Leaping, Running, Throwing the Diſcus, Darting, and Wreſtling. See POTTER's *Grecian Antiquities*, Vol. I. ch. 21.

Very true.

What then, makes a Man beautiful? Is it the ſame, in general, that makes a Dog or a Horſe ſo?

The ſame.

What is it then, that makes a Dog beautiful?

That Excellency which belongs to a Dog.

What, a Horſe?

The Excellency of a Horſe.

What, a Man? Muſt it not be the Excellency belonging to a Man? If then you would appear beautiful, young Man, ſtrive for human Excellency.

What is that?

Conſider, when you praiſe, without partial Affection, whom you praiſe: Is it the Honeſt, or Diſhoneſt?

The Honeſt.

The Sober, or the Diſſolute?

The Sober.

The Temperate, or the Intemperate?

The Temperate.

Then, if you make yourſelf ſuch a Character, you know that you will make yourſelf beautiful: but, while you neglect theſe Things, though you uſe every Contrivance to appear beautiful, you muſt neceſſarily be deformed.

§. 2. I know not how to ſay any thing further to you: for if I ſpeak what I think, you will be vexed, and perhaps go away, and return no more.

And if I do not ſpeak, conſider how I ſhall act: if you come to me to be improved, and I do not improve you; and you come to me as to a Philoſopher, and I do not ſpeak like a Philoſopher. (*b*) Beſides: how could it be conſiſtent with my Duty towards yourſelf, to overlook, and leave you uncorrected? If hereafter you ſhould come to have Senſe, you will accuſe me, with Reaſon: "What did *Epictetus* obſerve in me, that, when "he ſaw me come to him, in ſuch a ſhameful Con-"dition, he overlooked it, and never ſaid ſo much "as a Word of it? Did he ſo abſolutely deſpair "of me? Was not I young? Was not I able to "hear Reaſon? How many young Men, at that "Age, are guilty of many ſuch Errors? I am "told of one *Polemo*, who, from a moſt diſſolute "Youth, became totally changed (*c*). Suppoſe "he

(*b*) *Epictetus* had been before conſidering the Propriety of his own Character as a Philoſopher: but, according to Mr. *Upton*'s very probable Conjecture, the Tranſlation muſt be—would it not be cruel, *&c.*

(*c*) *Polemo* was a profligate young Rake of *Athens*, and even diſtinguiſhed by the Diſſoluteneſs of his Manners. One Day, after a riotous Entertainment, he came reeling, with a Chaplet on his Head, into the School of *Xenocrates*. The Audience were greatly offended at his ſcandalous Appearance: but the Philoſopher went on, without any Emotion, in a Diſcourſe upon Temperance and Sobriety. *Polemo* was ſo ſtruck by his Arguments, that he ſoon threw away his Chaplet; and, from that Time, became a Diſciple of *Xenocrates*;

" he did not think I ſhould become a *Polemo*;
" he might however have ſet my Locks to rights:
" he might have ſtript off my Bracelets and
" Rings: he might have prevented my picking
" off the Hairs from my Perſon. But when he
" ſaw me dreſſed like a—what ſhall I ſay?—he
" was ſilent." I do not ſay like what; when you come to your Senſes, you will ſay it yourſelf, and will know what it is, and who they are who ſtudy ſuch a Dreſs.

§. 3. If you ſhould hereafter lay this to my Charge, what Excuſe could I make; — Ay: but if I do ſpeak, he will not regard me. Why, did *Laius* regard *Apollo?* Did not he go and get drunk, and bid farewel to the Oracle? What then? Did this hinder *Apollo* from telling him the Truth? Now, I am uncertain, whether you will regard *me*, or not; but *Apollo* poſitively knew, that *Laius* would not regard *him*, and yet He ſpoke (*d*). " And
" why did he ſpeak?" You may as well aſk, Why is he *Apollo*; why doth he deliver Oracles; why hath he placed himſelf in ſuch a Poſt as a Prophet, and the Fountain of Truth, to whom the Inhabi-

nocrates; and profited ſo well by his Inſtructions, that he afterwards ſucceeded him in the *Socratic* School.

(*d*) *Laius*, King of *Thebes*, petitioned *Apollo* for a Son. The Oracle anſwered him, That, if *Laius* became a Father, he ſhould periſh by the Hand of his Son. The Prediction was fulfilled by *Oedipus*. UPTON.

tants of the World ſhould reſort? Why is KNOW THYSELF inſcribed on the Front of his Temple, when no one minds it?

§. 4. Did *Socrates* prevail on all who came to him, to take care of themſelves? Not on the thouſandth Part: but, however, being as he himſelf declares, divinely appointed to ſuch a Poſt, he never deſerted it. What doth he ſay, even to his Judges? "If you would acquit me, on Conditi-"on, that I ſhould no longer act as I do now, "I will not accept it, nor deſiſt: but I will ac-"coſt all I meet whether young or old, and in-"terrogate them juſt in the ſame Manner: but "particularly you, my Fellow-citizens; as you "are more nearly related to me."—"Are you "ſo curious and officious, *Socrates?* What is it "to you how we act?"—"What do you ſay? "While you are of the ſame Community, and "the ſame Kindred, with me, ſhall you be care-"leſs of yourſelf, and ſhow yourſelf a bad Citi-"zen to the City, a bad Kinſman to your Kin-"dred, and a bad Neighbour to your Neighbour-"hood?"—"Why, who are *you?*"—Here it is a great Thing to ſay, "I am He who ought to "take care of Mankind;" for it is not every little paultry Heifer that dares reſiſt the Lion: but if the Bull ſhould come up, and reſiſt him, ſay to *him*, if you think proper, *Who are you? What Buſineſs is it of yours?* In every Species, Man, there is

is ſome one Part which by Nature excels; in Oxen, in Dogs, in Bees, in Horſes. Do not ſay to what excels, *Who are you?* If you do, it will, ſome-how or other, find a Voice to tell you; "I "am like the purple Thread in a Garment (*e*). "Do not expect me to be like the reſt; or find "fault with my Nature, which hath diſtinguiſhed "me from others."

§. 5. What then, am *I* ſuch a one? How ſhould *I?* Indeed, are *you* ſuch a one as to be able to bear the Truth? I wiſh you were. But however, ſince I am condemned to wear a grey Beard and a Cloke, and you come to me as to a Philoſopher, I will not treat you cruelly, nor as if I deſpaired of you; but will aſk you — Who is it, young Man, whom you would render beautiful? Know, firſt, who you are; and then adorn yourſelf accordingly. You are a Man; that is, a mortal Animal, capable of a rational Uſe of the Appearances of Things. And what is this rational Uſe? A perfect Conformity to Nature. What have you then, particularly excellent? Is it the animal Part? No. The mortal? No. That which is capable of the (*f*) Uſe of the Appearances of Things? No. The Excellence lies in the

(*e*) See P. 11. §. 3.

(*f*) The bare *Uſe* of Objects belongs to all Animals; a *rational* Uſe of them is peculiar to Man. See Introduction, §. 7.

rational Part. Adorn and beautify this; but leave your Hair to Him who formed it, as he thought good. Well; what other Denominations have you? Are you a Man, or a Woman? A Man. Then adorn yourſelf as a Man, not a Woman. A Woman is naturally ſmooth and delicate; and, if hairy, is a Monſter, and ſhown among the Monſters at *Rome*. It is the ſame in a Man, not to be hairy; and, if he is by Nature not ſo, he is a Monſter. But, if he clips and picks off his Hairs, what ſhall we do with him? Where ſhall we ſhow him; and how ſhall we advertiſe him? *A Man to be ſeen, who would rather be a Woman.* What a ſcandalous Show! Who would not wonder at ſuch an Advertiſement? I believe indeed, that theſe very Pickers themſelves would; not apprehending, that it is the very Thing of which they are guilty.

§. 6. Of what have you to accuſe your Nature, Sir? That it hath made you a Man? Why; were all to be born Women then? In that Caſe, what would have been the Uſe of your Finery? For whom would you have made yourſelf fine, if all were Women? But the whole Affair diſpleaſes you. Go to work upon the Whole then. Remove what is the Cauſe of theſe Hairs; and make yourſelf a Woman entirely, that we may be no longer deceived, nor you be half Man, half Woman. To whom would you be agreeable? To the Women? Be agreeable to them as a Man. Ay:

Ay: but they are pleaſed with ſmooth pretty Fellows.

Go hang yourſelf. Suppoſe they were pleaſed with Pathics, would you become one? Is this your Buſineſs in Life? Were you born to pleaſe diſſolute Women? Shall we make ſuch a one as you, in the *Corinthian* Republic, for Inſtance, Governor of the City, Maſter of the Youth, Commander of the Army, or Director of the public Games? Will you pick your Hairs, when you are married? For whom, and for what? Will you be the Father of Children, and introduce them into the State, picked, like yourſelf? O what a fine Citizen, and Senator, and Orator! For Heaven's ſake, Sir, ought we to pray for a Succeſſion of young Men, diſpoſed and bred like you!

§. 7. Now, when you have once heard this Diſcourſe, go home, and ſay to youſelf; It is not *Epictetus* who hath told me all theſe Things (for how ſhould he?) but ſome propitious God, by him (*g*); for it would never have entered the Head of *Epictetus*, who is not uſed to diſpute with any one. Well; let us obey God then, that we may not incur the divine Diſpleaſure. If a Crow had ſignified any thing to you, by his Croaking; it is not the Crow that ſignifies it, but God, by him. And, if you have any thing ſignified to you by the

(*g*) *For it is not ye that ſpeak, but the Spirit of your Father which ſpeaketh in you.* Matt. x. 20.

human Voice, doth he not cauſe the Man to tell it you; that you may know the divine Efficacy, which declares its Significations to different Perſons in different Manners; and ſignifies the greateſt and principal Things, by the nobleſt Meſſengers (*b*). What elſe doth the Poet mean, when he ſays,

Hermes *I ſent, his Purpoſe to reſtrain.*

Hermes, deſcending from Heaven, was to warn *Him*; and the Gods now, likewiſe, ſend a *Hermes* to warn *You*, not to invert the well-appointed Order of Things; nor be curiouſly trifling: but ſuffer a Man to be a Man; and a Woman, a Woman: a beautiful Man, to be beautiful, as a Man; a deformed Man, to be deformed, as a Man: for you do not conſiſt of Fleſh and Hair, but of the Faculty of Choice. If you take care to have *this* beautiful, you will be beautiful. But all this while, I dare not tell you, that you are deformed; for I fancy you would rather hear any thing than this. But conſider what *Socrates* ſays to the moſt beautiful and blooming of all Men, *Alcibiades*. "Endeavour to make yourſelf beautiful. What doth "he mean to ſay to him; Curl your Locks, and "pick the Hairs from your Legs?" Heaven forbid!

(*b*) This Paſſage hath a remarkable Likeneſs to *Heb.* i. 1, 2. *God, who, at ſundry Times and in diverſe Manners, ſpake in Times paſt unto the Fathers by the Prophets, hath, in theſe laſt Days ſpoken unto us by his Son.*

bid! But, Ornament your Choice: Throw away your wrong Principles.

What is to be done with the poor Body then?

Leave it to Nature. Another hath taken care of ſuch Things. Give them up to Him.

What! then, muſt one be a Sloven?

By no means: but be neat, conformably to your Nature. A Man ſhould be neat, as a Man; a Woman, as a Woman; a Child, as a Child. If not, let us pick out the Mane of a Lion, that he may not be ſlovenly; and the Comb of a Cock; for he ought to be neat too. Yes; but let it be as a Cock; and a Lion, as a Lion; and a Hound, as a Hound.

CHAP. II.

In what a Proficient ought to be exerciſed; and that we neglect the principal Things.

§. 1. THERE are Three Topics in Philoſophy, in which he, who would be wiſe and good, muſt be exerciſed (*a*). That of the *Deſires*, and *Averſions*; that he may not be diſappointed of the one, nor incur the other. That of the *Purſuits*, and *Avoidances*; and, in general, the Duties of Life; that he may act with Order and Conſideration, and not careleſsly. The Third Topic

(*a*) See Introduction, §. 3, 4, 5, 6.

belongs to Circumſpection, and a Freedom from Deception; and, in general, whatever belongs to the Aſſent.

§. 2. Of theſe Topics, the principal and moſt urgent, is that of the Paſſions: for Paſſion is produced no otherwiſe, than by a Diſappointment of the Deſires, and an incurring of the Averſions. It is this which introduces Perturbations, Tumults, Misfortunes, and Calamities: this is the Spring of Sorrow, Lamentation, and Envy: this renders us envious, and emulous; and incapable of hearing Reaſon.

§. 3. The next Topic regards the Duties of Life. For I am not to be undiſturbed by Paſſions, in the ſame Senſe as a Statue is; but as one who preſerves the natural and acquired Relations; as a pious Perſon, as a Son, as a Brother, as a Father, as a Citizen.

§. 4. The Third Topic belongs to thoſe who are now making a Proficiency; and is a Security to the other Two, that no unexamined Appearance may ſurprize us, either in Sleep, or Wine, or in the Spleen. This, ſay you, is above us. But our preſent Philoſophers, leaving the Firſt and Second Topics [the Affections, and moral Duties], employ themſelves wholly about the Third; Convertible, definitive, hypothetical Propoſitions [and other logical Subtilties]. For, they ſay, that we muſt,

muſt, by engaging even in theſe Subjects, take care to guard againſt Deception. Who muſt? A wiſe and good Man. Is this Security from Deception, then, the Thing you want? Have you maſtered the other Subjects? Are you not liable to be deceived by Money? When you ſee a fine Girl, do you oppoſe the Appearance which is raiſed in your Mind? If your Neighbour inherits an Eſtate, do you feel no Vexation? Do you, at preſent, want nothing more than Perſeverance? You learn even theſe very Things, Wretch, with Trembling, and a ſolicitous Dread of Contempt; and are inquiſitive to know, what is ſaid of you; and, if any one comes and tells you, that, in a Diſpute which was the beſt of the Philoſophers, one of the Company ſaid, that ſuch a one was the only Philoſopher, that little Soul of yours grows to the Size of two Cubits, inſtead of an Inch: but if another ſhould come, and ſay, "You are miſta-"ken, he is not worth hearing; for what doth "he know? He hath the firſt Rudiments, but "nothing more;" you are Thunderſtruck; you preſently turn pale, and cry out, "I will ſhow "him; what a Man, and how great a Philoſo-"pher I am." It is evident [what you are], by theſe very Things; why do you aim to ſhow it by others? Do not you know, that *Diogenes* ſhowed ſome Sophiſt in this Manner, by extending his middle

middle Finger (*b*); and, when he was mad with Rage, This, ſays *Diogenes*, is *He:* I have ſhowed him to you. For a Man is not ſhowed in the ſame Senſe as a Stone, or a Piece of Wood, by the Finger; but whoever ſhows his Principles, ſhows him as a Man.

§. 5. Let us ſee *your* Principles too. For is it not evident, that you conſider your own Choice as nothing; but look out for ſomething external, and independent on it? As, what ſuch a one will ſay of you, and what you ſhall be thought; whether a Man of Letters; whether to have read *Chryſippus*, or *Antipater*; for, if *Archedemus* too, you have every thing you wiſh. Why are you ſtill ſolicitous, leſt you ſhould not ſhow us what you are? Will you let me tell you, what you have ſhowed us, that you are? A mean, diſcontented, paſſionate, cowardly Fellow; complaining of every thing; accuſing every body; perpetually reſtleſs; good for nothing. This you have ſhowed us. Go now and read *Archedemus:* and then, if you hear but the Noiſe of a Mouſe, you are a dead Man; for you will die ſome ſuch Kind of Death as — Who was it? *Crinis* (*c*); who valued himſelf extremely too, that he underſtood *Archedemus*.

§. 6.

(*b*) Extending the middle Finger, with the Antients, was a Mark of the greateſt Contempt.

(*c*) *Crinis* was a Stoic Philoſopher. The Circumſtances of his Death are not now known.

§. 6. Wretch, why do not you let alone Things, that do not belong to you? Theſe Things become ſuch as are able to learn them, without Perturbation; who can ſay, "I am not ſubject to Anger, "or Grief, or Envy. I am not reſtrained; I am "not compelled. What remains for me to do? "I am at Leiſure; I am at Eaſe. Let us ſee "how convertible Propoſitions are to be treated: "Let us conſider, when an Hypotheſis is laid "down, how we may avoid a Contradiction." To ſuch Perſons do theſe Things belong. They who are ſafe may light a Fire; go to Dinner, if they pleaſe; and ſing, and dance: but you come and hoiſt a Flag, when your Veſſel is juſt ſinking.

CHAP. III.

What is the Subject-matter of a good Man; and in what we chiefly ought to be Practitioners.

§. 1. THE Subject-matter of a wiſe and good Man is, his own governing Faculty. The Body is the Subject-matter of a Phyſician, and of a Maſter of Exerciſe; and a Field, of the Huſbandman. The Buſineſs of a wiſe and good Man is, an Uſe of the Appearances of Things, conformable to Nature. Now, every Soul, as it is naturally formed for an Aſſent to Truth, a Diſſent from Falſhood, and a Suſpence with regard to Uncertainty;

tainty; ſo it is moved by a Deſire of Good, an Averſion from Evil, and an Indifference to what is neither good nor evil. For, as a Money-changer, or a Gardener, is not at Liberty to reject *Cæſar's* Coin; but when once it is ſhown, is obliged, whether he will or not, to deliver what is ſold for it; ſo is it in the Soul. Apparent Good at firſt Sight attracts, and Evil repels. Nor will the Soul any more reject an evident Appearance of Good, than [they will] *Cæſar's* Coin.

§. 2. Hence depends every Movement, both of God and Man; and hence *Good* is preferred to every Obligation, however near. My Connexion is not with my Father; but with Good. — Are you ſo hard-hearted? — Such is my Nature, and ſuch is the Coin which God hath given me. If, therefore, *Good* is made to be any thing but Fair and Juſt, away go Father, and Brother, and Country, and every thing. What! Shall I overlook my own Good, and give it up to *you?* For what? "I am your Father." But not my *Good*. "I "am your Brother." But not my *Good*. But, if we place it in a right Choice, *Good* will conſiſt in an Obſervance of the ſeveral Relations of Life; and then, he who gives up ſome Externals, acquires *Good*. Your Father deprives you of your Money; but he doth not hurt you. Your Brother will poſſeſs as much larger a Portion of Land than you, as he pleaſes; but will he poſſeſs more

Honour? More Fidelity? More fraternal Affection? Who can throw you out of this Poſſeſſion? Not even *Jupiter:* for, indeed, it is not his Will; but he hath put this Good into my own Power, and given it me, like his own, uncompelled, unreſtrained, and unhindered. But, when any one hath a Coin different from this, [for his Coin,] whoever ſhows it to him, may have whatever is ſold for it, in return. A thieviſh Proconſul comes into the Province: What Coin doth he uſe? Silver. Show it him, and carry off what you pleaſe. An Adulterer comes: What Coin doth he uſe? Women. Take the Coin, ſays one, and give me this Trifle. "Give it me, and it is yours." Another is addicted to Boys: give him the Coin, and take what you pleaſe. Another is fond of hunting: give him a fine Nag, or a Puppy; and, though with Sighs and Groans, he will ſell you for it, what you will; for he is inwardly compelled by another, who hath conſtituted this Coin.

§. 3. In this manner, ought every one chiefly to exerciſe himſelf. When you go out in a Morning, examine whomſoever you ſee, or hear: anſwer, as to a Queſtion. What have you ſeen? A handſome Perſon? Apply the Rule. Is this dependent, or independent, on Choice? Independent. Throw it away. What have you ſeen? One grieving for the Diſeaſe of a Child? Apply the Rule. Death is independent on Choice.

Throw

Throw it by. Hath a Conſul met you? Apply the Rule. What Kind of thing is the Conſular Office? dependent, or independent, on Choice? Independent. Throw aſide this too. It is not Proof. Caſt it away. It is nothing to *you*.

§. 4. If we acted thus, and practiſed in this manner, from Morning till Night, by Heaven, ſomething would be done. Whereas now, on the contrary, we are caught by every Appearance, half-aſleep; and, if we ever do awake, it is only a little in the School: but, as ſoon as we go out, if we meet any one grieving, we ſay, "He is undone." If a Conſul, "How Happy is He!" If an Exile, "How miſerable." If a poor Man, "How "wretched; he hath nothing to eat!"

§. 5. Theſe vicious Principles then are to be lopped off: and here is our whole Strength to be applied. For what is Weeping and Groaning? Principle. What is Misfortune? Principle. What is Sedition, Diſcord, Complaint, Accuſation, Impiety, Trifling? All theſe are Principles, and nothing more: and Principles concerning Things independent on Choice, as if they were either good or evil. Let any one transfer theſe Principles to Things dependent on Choice, and I will engage, that he will preſerve his Conſtancy, whatever be the State of Things about him.

§. 6. The Soul reſembles a Veſſel filled with Water: the Appearances of Things reſemble a Ray,

Ray falling upon its Surface. If the Water is moved, the Ray will ſeem to be moved likewiſe, though it is in reality without Motion. Whenever therefore, any one is ſeized with a Swimming in his Head, it is not the Arts and Virtues that are confounded, but the Mind, in which they are: and, if this recover its Compoſure, ſo will they likewiſe.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning one who exerted himſelf, with indecent Eagerneſs in the Theatre.

§. 1. WHEN the Governor of *Epirus* had exerted himſelf indecently, in favour of a Comedian, and was, upon that Account, publicly railed at; and, when he came to hear it, was highly diſpleaſed with thoſe who railed at him: Why: what Harm, ſays *Epictetus*, have theſe People done? They have favoured a Player; which is juſt what you did.

Is this a proper Manner then, of expreſſing their Favour?

Seeing you, their Governor, and the Friend and Vicegerent of *Cæſar*, expreſs it thus, was it not to be expected, that they would expreſs it thus too? For, if it is not right to expreſs Favour, in this Manner to a Player, be not guilty of it yourſelf; and,

and, if it is, why are you angry at them, for imitating you? For whom have the Many to imitate, but *you*, their Superiors? From whom are they to take Example, when they come into the Theatre, but from *you*? "Do but look how *Cæſar*'s Vice-"gerent ſees the Play? Hath he cried out? I will "cry out too. Hath he leaped up from his Seat? "I too will leap up from mine. Do his Slaves ſit "in different Parts of the Houſe, making an Up-"roar? I indeed have no Slaves; but I will make "as much Uproar as I can myſelf, inſtead of ever "ſo many."

§. 2. You ought to conſider then, that when you appear in the Theatre, you appear as a Rule and Example to others, how they ought to ſee the Play. Why is it, that they have railed at you? Becauſe every Man hates what hinders him. *They* would have one Actor crowned; *you* another. They hindered you; and you, them. You proved the ſtronger. They have done what they could: they have railed at the Perſon who hindered them. What would you have then? Would you *do* as you pleaſe, and not have them even *talk* as they pleaſe? Where is the Wonder of all this? Doth not the Huſbandman rail at *Jupiter*, when he is hindered by him? Doth not the Sailor? Do Men ever ceaſe railing at *Cæſar*? What then, is *Jupiter* ignorant of this? Are not the Things that are ſaid, reported to *Cæſar*? How then doth he

he act? He knows, that, if he was to puniſh all Railers, he would have nobody left to command.

§. 3. When you enter the Theatre then, ought you to ſay, "Come, let *Sophron* (*a*) be crowned?" No. But, "Come, let me preſerve my Choice, "in a Manner conformable to Nature, upon this "Occaſion. No one is dearer to me than my-"ſelf. It is ridiculous then, that, becauſe ano-"ther Man gains the Victory as a Player, *I* "ſhould be hurt. Whom do I wiſh to gain the "Victory? Him who doth gain it; and thus he "will always be victorious, whom I wiſh to be "ſo." — But I would have *Sophron* crowned. — Why, celebrate as many Games as you will, at your own Houſe; *Nemean*, *Pythian*, *Iſthmian*, *Olympic*; and proclaim him Victor in all: but, in public, do not arrogate more than your Due, nor ſeize to yourſelf what lies in common; otherwiſe, bear to be railed at: for, if you act like the Mob, you reduce yourſelf to an Equality with them.

CHAP.

(*a*) The Name of a Player. UPTON.

CHAP. V.

(*b*) *Concerning thoſe who pretend Sickneſs, as an Excuſe to return home.*

§. 1. I Am ſick here, ſaid one of the Scholars. I will return home.

Were you never ſick at home then? Conſider, whether you are doing any thing here, conducive to the Regulation of your Choice: for, if you make no Improvement, it was to no Purpoſe that you came. Go home. Take care of your domeſtic Affairs. For, if your ruling Faculty cannot be brought to a Conformity to Nature, your Land may. You may increaſe your Money, ſupport the old Age of your Father, mix in the public Aſſemblies, and make a bad Governor, as you are a bad Man, and do other Things of that ſort. But, if you are conſcious to yourſelf, that you are caſting off ſome of your wrong Principles, and taking up different ones in their room, and that you have transferred your Scheme of Life from Things not dependent on Choice, to thoſe which are; and that, if you do ſometimes cry *alas*, it is not

(*b*) The *Greek* Title to this Chapter is defective. Νοσου ſeems to be the Word wanting. Or, if Διαπλαττω ſignifies, to pretend, as πλαττω doth, the true Reading of the Text may be, περι τους νοσον διαπλαττομενους.

not upon the Account of your Father, or your Brother, but yourſelf; why do you any longer plead Sickneſs (*c*)? Do not you know, that both Sickneſs and Death muſt overtake us? At what Employment? The Huſbandman, at his Plow; the Sailor, on his Voyage. At what Employment would you be taken? For, indeed, at what Employment ought you to be taken? If there is any better Employment, at which you can be taken, follow that. For my own Part, I would be taken engaged in nothing, but in the Care of my own Faculty of Choice; how to render it undiſturbed, unreſtrained, uncompelled, free. I would be found ſtudying this, that I may be able to ſay to God, "Have I tranſgreſſed thy Commands? "Have I perverted the Powers, the Senſes, the "Pre-conceptions, which thou haſt given me? "Have I ever accuſed Thee, or cenſured Thy "Diſpenſations? I have been ſick, becauſe it was "Thy Pleaſure; and ſo have others; but *I* will-"ingly. I have been poor, it being thy Will; "but with Joy. I have not been in Power; be-"cauſe it was not thy Will; and Power I have "never deſired. Haſt thou ever ſeen me out of "Humour, upon this Account? Have I not al-"ways approached Thee, with a chearful Coun-"tenance; prepared to execute Thy Commands, "and the Significations of thy Will? Is it thy "Plea-

(*c*) Εμε, Ετι, probably, ſhould be, Εμε, Τι ετι.

" Pleaſure, that I ſhould depart from this Aſſem-
" bly? I depart. I give Thee all Thanks, that
" Thou haſt thought me worthy to have a Share
" in it, with Thee; to behold Thy Works, and
" to join with Thee, in comprehending Thy Ad-
" miniſtration." Let Death overtake me while I am thinking, while I am writing, while I am reading, ſuch Things as theſe.

§. 2. But I ſhall not have my Mother, to hold my Head, when I am ſick.

Get home then to your Mother; for you are fit to have your Head held, when you are ſick.

But I uſed at home, to lie on a fine Couch.

Get to this Couch of yours; for you are fit to lie upon ſuch a one, even in Health: ſo do not loſe the doing what you are qualified for. But what ſays *Socrates?* " As one Man rejoices in the
" Improvement of his Eſtate, another of his
" Horſe, ſo do I daily rejoice in apprehending
" myſelf to grow better."

In what? In pretty Speeches?

Good Words, I intreat you.

In trifling Theorems? What do they ſignify? Yet indeed I do not ſee, that the Philoſophers are employed, in any thing elſe.

Do you think it nothing, never to accuſe or cenſure any one, either God or Man? Always to carry abroad, and bring home, the ſame Countenance?

tenance? Theſe were the Things which *Socrates* knew; and yet he never profeſſed to know, or to teach any thing; but if any one wanted pretty Speeches, or little Theorems, he brought him to *Protagoras*, to *Hippias:* juſt as if any one had come for Pot-herbs, he would have taken him to a Gardener. Who of you then hath ſuch an [earneſt] Intention as this? If you had, you would bear Sickneſs, and Hunger, and Death, with Chearfulneſs. If any of you hath been in Love, he knows that I ſpeak Truth.

CHAP. VI.

Miſcellaneous.

§. 1. WHEN he was aſked, How (*a*) it came to paſs, that, though the Art of Reaſoning is more ſtudied now, yet the Improvements were greater, formerly? In what Inſtance, anſwered he, is it more ſtudied *now*; and in what were the Improvements greater, *then?* For in what is ſtudied, at preſent, in that will be found likewiſe the Improvements, at preſent. The preſent Study is the Solution of Syllogiſms; and in *this*, Improvements are made. But formerly, the Study was to

(*a*) By changing τῶν into πῶς, and, as Mr. *Upton* propoſes, πρότερον into πρώτερον, the whole Difficulty of this corrupted Paſſage is removed.

preſerve the governing Faculty conformable to Nature; and Improvement was made in *that*. Therefore do not confound Things; nor when you ſtudy one, expect Improvement in another; but ſee whether any of us, who applies himſelf to think and act conformably to Nature, ever fails of Improvement. Depend upon it, you will not find one.

§. 2. A good Man is invincible; for he doth not contend, where he is not ſuperior. If you would have his Land, take it: take his Servants; take his public Poſt; take his Body. But you will never fruſtrate his Deſire, nor make him incur his Averſion. He engages in no Combat, but what concerns the Objects of his own Choice. How can he fail then to be invincible?

§. 3. Being aſked, what common Senſe was? he anſwered: As that may be called a common Ear, which diſtinguiſhes only Sounds; but that, which diſtinguiſhes Notes, an artificial one: ſo there are ſome Things, which Men, not totally perverted, diſcern by their common natural Powers; and ſuch a Diſpoſition is called common Senſe.

§. 4. It is not eaſy to gain the Attention of effeminate young Men; for you cannot take Cuſtard by a Hook: but the Ingenuous, even if you diſcourage them, are the more eager for Learning. Hence *Rufus*, for the moſt part, did diſcourage

them; and made uſe of that, as a Criterion of the Ingenuous and Diſingenuous. For he uſed to ſay, as a Stone, even if you throw it up, will, by its own Propenſity, be carried downward; ſo an ingenuous Mind, the more it is forced from its natural Bent, the more ſtrongly will it incline towards it.

CHAP. VII.

Concerning a Governor of the Free States, who was an Epicurean.

§. 1. WHEN the Governor, who was an *Epicurean*, came to him; It is fit, ſays he, that we ignorant People ſhould enquire of you Philoſophers, what is the moſt valuable Thing, in the World; as thoſe who come into a ſtrange City do of the Citizens, and ſuch as are acquainted with it; that, after this Enquiry, we may go and take a View of it, as they do in Cities. Now, ſcarcely any one denies, but that there are three Things belonging to Man; Soul, Body, and Externals. It remains for you to anſwer which is the beſt. What ſhall we tell Mankind? Is it Fleſh?

And was it for this, that *Maximus* took a Voyage in Winter as far as *Caſſiope*, to accompany his Son? Was it to to gratify the Fleſh?

No, ſurely.

Is it not fit then, to employ our chief Study on what is beſt?

Yes, beyond all other Things.

What have we, then, better than Fleſh?

The Soul.

Are we to prefer the Good of the Better, or of the Worſe?

Of the Better.

Doth the Good of the Soul conſiſt in what is dependent, or independent, on Choice?

In what is dependent on it.

Doth the Pleaſure of the Soul then depend on Choice?

It doth.

And whence doth this Pleaſure ariſe? From itſelf? This is unintelligible. For there muſt ſubſiſt ſome principal Eſſence of Good, in the Attainment of which, we ſhall enjoy this Pleaſure of the Soul.

This too is granted.

In what then conſiſts this Pleaſure of the Soul? For if it be in mental Objects, the Eſſence of Good is found (*a*). For it is impoſſible, that we ſhould be reaſonably elated with Pleaſure, unleſs by Good; or that, if the leading Cauſe is not Good, the

(*a*) The Tranſlation follows Lord *Shafteſbury*'s Correction of ψυχικοις, for αγαθοις; which ſeems abſolutely neceſſary to the Senſe of the Paſſage.

the Effect ſhould be good. For, to make the Effect reaſonable, the Cauſe muſt be good. But this, if you are in your Senſes, you will not allow; for it would be to contradict both *Epicurus*, and the reſt of your Principles. It remains then, that the Pleaſures of the Soul muſt conſiſt in bodily Objects; and that *there* muſt be the leading Cauſe, and the Eſſence of Good. *Maximus* therefore did fooliſhly, if he took a Voyage for the Sake of any thing but Body; that is, for the Sake of what is beſt. He doth fooliſhly too, if he refrains from what is another's, when he is a Judge, and able to take it. But let us conſider only this, if you pleaſe, how it may be done ſecretly, and ſafely, and ſo that no one may know it. For *Epicurus* himſelf doth not pronounce Stealing to be evil, only the being found out in it: and ſays, "Do not ſteal;" for no other Reaſon, but becauſe it is impoſſible to inſure ourſelves againſt a Diſcovery. But I ſay to you, That, if it be done dextrouſly and cautiouſly, we ſhall not be diſcovered. Beſides: we have powerful Friends, of both Sexes, at *Rome*; and the *Greeks* are weak; and nobody will dare to go up to *Rome*, on ſuch an Affair. Why do you refrain from your own proper Good? It is Madneſs; it is Folly. But if you were to tell me, that you do refrain I would not believe you. For, as it is impoſſible to aſſent to an apparent Falſhood, or to deny an apparent

Truth, ſo it is impoſſible to abſtain from an apparent Good. Now, Riches are a Good; and, indeed, the chief Inſtrument of Pleaſures. Why do not you acquire them? And why do not we corrupt the Wife of our Neighbour, if it can be done ſecretly? And, if the Huſband ſhould happen to be impertinent, why not cut his Throat too? if you have a mind to be ſuch a Philoſopher as you ought to be, a complete one, to be conſiſtent with your own Principles. Otherwiſe you will not differ from us, who are called Stoics. For we too ſay one Thing, and do another: we talk well, and act ill: but you will be perverſe in a contrary Way; teach bad Principles, and act well.

§. 2. For Heaven's ſake repreſent to yourſelf a City of *Epicureans* (*b*). "I do not marry." "Nor "I. For we are not to marry, nor have Children; "nor to engage in public Affairs." What will be the Conſequence of this? Whence are the Citizens to come? Who will educate them? Who will be the Governor of the Youth? Who, the Maſter of their Exerciſes? What then, will he teach them? Will it be what uſed to be taught at *Athens*, or *Lacedemon?* Take a young Man; bring him up, according to your Principles. Theſe Principles are wicked; ſubverſive of a State; pernicious

(*b*) The Tranſlation follows the Reading of *Wolfius*. Επιυοει.

nicious to Families; nor becoming, even to Women. Give them up, Sir. You live in a capital City. You are to govern, and judge uprightly, and to refrain from what belongs to others. No one's Wife, or Child, or ſilver or gold Plate, is to have any Charms for you; but your own. Provide yourſelf with Principles, conſonant to theſe Truths; and ſetting out from thence, you will with Pleaſure refrain from Things ſo perſuaſive to miſlead, and get the better. But, if to their own perſuaſive Force, we add ſuch a Philoſophy, as hurries us upon them, and confirms us in them, what will be the Conſequence?

§. 3. In a ſculptured Vaſe, which is the beſt; the Silver, or the Workmanſhip? In the Hand, the Subſtance is Fleſh: but its Operations are the principal Thing. Accordingly, the Duties, relative to it, are likewiſe threefold; ſome have reſpect to mere Exiſtence; others, to the manner of Exiſtence; and a third Sort are the leading Operations themſelves. Thus likewiſe, do not ſet a Value on the Materials of Man, mere paultry Fleſh; but on the principal Operations belonging to him.

What are theſe?

Engaging in public Buſineſs; Marrying; the Production of Children; the Worſhip of God; the Care of our Parents; and, in general, the having our Deſires and Averſions, our Purſuits and

Avoidances, ſuch as each of them ought to be, conformable to our Nature.

What is our Nature?

To be free, noble ſpirited, modeſt. (For what other Animal bluſhes? What other hath the Idea of Shame?) But Pleaſure muſt be ſubjected to theſe, as an Attendant and Handmaid, to call forth our Activity, and to keep us conſtant in natural Operations.

But I am rich, and want nothing.

Then why do you pretend to philoſophize? Your gold and ſilver Plate is enough for you. What need have you of Principles?

Beſides, I am Judge of the *Greeks*.

Do you know how to judge? Who hath imparted this Knowledge to you?

Cæſar hath given me a Commiſſion.

Let him give you a Commiſſion to judge of Muſic; and what Good will it do you? But how were you made a Judge? Whoſe Hand have you kiſſed? That of *Symphorus*, or *Numenius* (*c*)? Before whoſe Bed-chamber have you ſlept? To whom have you ſent Preſents? After all, do you perceive, that the Office of Judge is of the ſame Value as *Numenius*?

But I can throw whom I pleaſe into Priſon.

As

(*c*) Of *Symphorus* and *Numenius* there is no Account; and their Names ſerve only to ſhow, that Perſons once of ſuch Power are now totally forgot.

As you may a Stone.

But I can beat whom I will too.

As you may an Aſs. This is not a Government over Men. Govern us like reaſonable Creatures. Show us what is for our Intereſt, and we will purſue it: ſhow us what is againſt our Intereſt, and we will avoid it. Like *Socrates*, make us Imitators of yourſelf. He was properly a Governor of Men, who ſubjected their Deſires and Averſions, their Purſuits, their Avoidances, to himſelf. "Do this; do not do that, or I will "throw you into Priſon." Going thus far only, is not governing Men, like reaſonable Creatures. But — "Do as *Jupiter* hath commanded, or you "will be puniſhed. You will be a Loſer."

What ſhall I loſe?

Nothing more, than the not doing what you ought. You will loſe your Fidelity, Honour, Decency. Look for no greater Loſſes than theſe.

CHAP. VIII.

How we are to exerciſe ourſelves, againſt the Appearances of Things.

§. 1. IN the ſame manner, as we exerciſe ourſelves, againſt ſophiſtical Queſtions, we ſhould exerciſe ourſelves likewiſe, in relation to ſuch Appearances, as every Day occur: for theſe

too offer Queſtions to us. — Such a one's Son is dead. What do you think of it? Anſwer: it is independent on Choice: it is not an Evil.—Such a one is diſinherited by his Father. What do you think of it? It is independent on Choice: it is not an Evil. — *Cæſar* hath condemned him. — This is independent on Choice: it is not an Evil. — He hath been afflicted by it. — This is dependent on Choice: it is an Evil.—He hath ſupported it bravely. — This is dependent on Choice: it is a Good.

§. 2. If we accuſtom ourſelves in this manner, we ſhall make an Improvement; for we ſhall never aſſent to any thing, but what the Appearance itſelf comprehends. A Son is dead.—What hath happened? — A Son is dead. — Nothing more? — Nothing. — A Ship is loſt. — What hath happened? — A Ship is loſt. He is carried to Priſon. — What hath happened? — He is carried to Priſon. That he is *unhappy*, is an Addition, that every one makes of his own. — "But *Jupiter* "doth not order theſe Things right."—Why ſo? Becauſe he hath made you patient? Becauſe he hath made you brave? Becauſe he hath made them to be no Evils? Becauſe it is permitted you, while you ſuffer them, to be happy? Becauſe he hath opened you the Door, whenever they do not

not ſuit you? Go out, Man, and do not complain (*a*).

§. 3. If you would know how the *Romans* treat Philoſophers, hear. *Italicus*, eſteemed one of the greateſt Philoſophers among them, being in a Paſſion with his own People, as if he had ſuffered ſome intolerable Evil, ſaid once when I was by, "I cannot bear it? you are the Ruin of me; "you will make me juſt like *him*;" pointing to me.

CHAP. IX.

Concerning a certain Orator, who was going to Rome *on a Law Suit.*

§ 1. WHEN a Perſon came to him, who was going to *Rome*, on a Law Suit, in which his Dignity was concerned; and, after telling him the Occaſion of his Journey, aſked him, what he thought of the Affair? If you aſk me,

(*a*) It is plain, the Stoics could not deny many of thoſe Things to be very ſeverely painful, which they maintain to be no Evils; ſince they ſo continually point at Self-murder as the Remedy. The lenient reviving Medicine, Future Hope, they knew nothing of; and their only Alternative, was an unfeeling Contempt, or a blind Deſpair. To feel tenderly the Loſs of a Son, and yet with meek Piety ſupport it, and *give Thanks always, for all Things, unto God, and the Father*, in humble Faith of their *working together for our Good*, was an Effort, beyond Stoiciſm to teach.

ſays *Epictetus*, what will happen to you at *Rome*, and whether you ſhall gain, or loſe your Cauſe, I have no Theorem for *this*. But if you aſk me, how you ſhall fare; I can anſwer, If you have right Principles, well; if wrong ones, ill. For Principle is to every one, the Cauſe of Action. For what is the Reaſon, that you ſo earneſtly deſired to be voted Governor of the *Gnoſſians?* Principle. What is the Reaſon, that you are now going to *Rome?* Principle. And in Winter too; and with Danger, and Expence? Why: becauſe it is neceſſary. What tells you ſo? Principle. If then, Principles are the Cauſes of all our Actions, where-ever any one hath bad Principles, the Effect will be anſwerable to the Cauſe. Well then: are all our Principles ſound? Are both yours, and your Antagoniſts? How then do you differ? Or are yours better than his? Why? You think ſo; and ſo doth he, that his are better; and ſo do Madmen. This is a bad Criterion. But ſhow me, that you have made ſome Examination, and taken ſome Care of your Principles. As you now take a Voyage to *Rome*, for the Government of the *Gnoſſians*, and are not contented to ſtay at home, with the Honours you before enjoyed, but deſire ſomething greater, and more illuſtrious; did you ever take ſuch a Voyage, in order to examine your own Principles; and to throw away the bad ones, if you happened

to have any? Did you ever apply to any one, upon this Account? What Time did you ever ſet yourſelf? What Age? Run over your Years. If you are aſhamed of me, do it to yourſelf. Did you examine your Principles, when you were a Child? Did you not *then* do every thing, juſt as you do every thing, *now?* When you were a Youth, and frequented the Schools of the Orators, and made Declamations yourſelf, did you ever imagine, that you were deficient in any thing? And when you became a Man, and entered upon public Buſineſs, pleaded Cauſes, and acquired Credit, who, any longer, appeared to be equal to you? How would you have borne, that any one ſhould examine, whether your Principles were bad? What, then, would you have me ſay to you?

Aſſiſt me in this Affair.

I have no Theorem for that. Neither are you come to me, if it be upon that Account you came, as to a Philoſopher; but as you would come to an Herb-ſeller, or a Shoe-maker.

To what Purpoſes then, have the Philoſophers Theorems?

For preſerving and conducting the ruling Faculty conformably to Nature, whatever happens. Do you think this a ſmall Thing?

No: but the greateſt.

Well: and doth it require but a ſhort time? and may it be taken, as you paſs by? If you can, take it then: and ſo you will ſay, "I have viſited

"*Epictetus.*"

" *Epictetus.*" — Ay: juſt as you would a Stone, or a Statue. For you have *ſeen* me, and nothing more. But he viſits a Man, as a Man, who learns his Principles; and, in return, ſhows his own. Learn my Principles. Show me yours. *Then* ſay, you have viſited me. Let us confute each other. If I have any bad Principle, take it away. If you have any, bring it forth. This is viſiting a Philoſopher. No. But " It lies in our Way; " and, while we are about hiring a Ship, we may " call on *Epictetus*. Let us ſee what it is he " ſays." And then, when you are gone, you ſay, " *Epictetrs* is nothing. His Language was " inaccurate, was barbarous." For what elſe did you come to judge of? " Well: but if I em- " ploy (*a*) myſelf in theſe Things, I ſhall be " without an Eſtate, like you; without Plate, " without Equipage, like you." — Nothing perhaps is neceſſary to be ſaid to this, but that I do not want them. But, if you poſſeſs many Things, you ſtill want others: ſo that, whether you will or not, you are poorer than I.

§. 2. What then do I want?

What you have not: Conſtancy; a Mind conformable to Nature; and a Freedom from Perturbation. Patron, or no Patron, what care *I*? But *you* do. I am richer than you. I am not anxious what *Cæſar* will think of me. I flatter no one, on that

(*a*) The firſt ω; I apprehend ſhould be ὁ, and is ſo tranſlated.

that Account. This I have, inſtead of ſilver and gold Plate. You have your Veſſels, of Gold; but your Diſcourſe, your Principles, your Aſſents, your Purſuits, your Deſires, of mere Earthen Ware. When I have all theſe conformable to Nature, why ſhould not I beſtow ſome Study upon my Reaſoning too? I am at Leiſure. My Mind is under no Diſtraction. In this Freedom from Diſtraction, what ſhall I do? Have I any thing more becoming a Man, than this? You, when you have nothing [to do], are reſtleſs; you go to the Theatre, or perhaps to bathe (*b*). Why ſhould not the Philoſopher poliſh his Reaſoning? You have fine (*c*) cryſtal and myrrhine Vaſes; I have acute Forms of Reaſoning. To *you*, all you have appears, little; to *me*, all I have, great. Your Appetite is unſatiable; mine is ſatisfied. When Children thruſt their Hand into a narrow Jar of Nuts and Figs, if they fill it, they cannot get it out again; then they fall a crying. Drop a few of them, and you will get out the reſt. And do you too drop your Deſire: do not covet many Things, and you will get [ſome].

CHAP.

(*b*) I can find no Senſe of αναλυτης, which ſuits this Place. Perhaps the Reading ſhould be παρα λουτρον; and it is ſo tranſlated. Bathing was a common Amuſement of idle People. See B. III. c. 24. p. 495. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition.

(*c*) ——— *and how they quaff in Gold,*
Cryſtal *and* myrrhine *Cups, imboſs'd with Gems.*
Paradiſe Regained, B. IV. v. 118.

CHAP. X.

In what Manner we ought to bear Sickneſs.

§. 1. WE ſhould have all our Principles ready, to make uſe of, on every Occaſion. At Dinner, ſuch as relate to Dinner; in the Bath, ſuch as relate to the Bath; in the Bed, ſuch as relate to the Bed.

Let not the ſtealing God of Sleep ſurpriſe,
Nor creep in Slumbers, on thy weary Eyes,
Ere ev'ry Action of the former Day
Strictly thou doſt, and righteouſly ſurvey,
What have I done? In what have I tranſgreſs'd?
What Good, or Ill, has this Day's Life expreſs'd?
Where have I fail'd, in what I ought to do?
If Evil were thy Deeds, repent and mourn,
If Good, rejoice ———

ROWE's Pythagoras.

We ſhould retain theſe Verſes, ſo as to apply them to our Uſe: not merely to repeat them aloud, as we do the Verſes in Honour of *Apollo*, [without minding what we are about] (*a*).

§. 2. Again: In a Fever, we ſhould have ſuch Principles ready, as relate to a Fever; and not, as ſoon as we are taken ill, to loſe and forget all. Provided I do but act like a Philoſopher, let what will

(*a*) This Place is either corrupt, as Mr. *Upton* thinks; or alludes to ſome ancient Cuſtom not ſufficiently underſtood now.

will happen. Some Way or other depart I muſt, from this frail Body, whether a Fever comes, or not (*b*). What is it to be a Philoſopher? Is it not to be prepared againſt Events? Do not you comprehend, that you ſay, in Effect, if I am but prepared to to bear all Events with Calmneſs, let what will happen; otherwiſe, you are like a Pancratiaſt, who, after receiving a Blow, ſhould quit the Combat. In that Caſe indeed you may allowably leave off, and not [run the Hazard] of being whipt (*c*). But what ſhall we get by leaving off Philoſophy? What then ought each of us to ſay upon every difficult Occaſion? "It "was for this, that I exerciſed: it was for this, "that I prepared myſelf." God ſays to you, give me a Proof if you have gone through the preparatory Combats, according to Rule (*d*): if you have

(*b*) This is a corrupt Paſſage, and the Tranſlation conjectural. Perhaps the true Reading might be ϖϖ ϖοτ' απελθοντα τϖ σωματιϖ δει απελθειν με; and it is ſo tranſlated. There is a ſimilar Turn of Expreſſion, in the fifth Chapter of the ſecond Book, which ſeems to favour this Notion. See Page 189. L. 1. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition.

(*c*) Which was the Puniſhment of thoſe, who preſented themſelves, as Candidates at the *Olympic* Games, and did not comply with the Rules, which were to be obſerved, upon that Occaſion. *Epictetus* is here ſpeaking of the preparatory Exerciſes, which laſted for ten Months before the Combat.

(*d*) St. *Paul* hath made uſe of this very Expreſſion, νομιμως αθλειν, 2 *Tim.* ii. 5.

have followed a proper Diet; and proper Exerciſe; if you have obeyed your Maſter: and, after this, do you faint, at the very Time of Action? Now is the proper Time for a Fever. Bear it well: for Thirſt: bear it well: for Hunger: bear it well. Is it not in your Power? Who ſhall reſtrain you? A Phyſician may reſtrain you from drinking; but he cannot reſtrain you from bearing your Thirſt, well. He may reſtrain you from eating; but he cannot reſtrain you from bearing Hunger, well.—But I cannot follow my Studies. —And for what End do you follow them, Wretch? Is it not that you may be proſperous? That you may be conſtant? that you may think and act conformably to Nature? What reſtrains you, but that in a Fever, you may preſerve your ruling Faculty conformable to Nature? Here is the Proof of the Matter. Here is the Trial of the Philoſopher: for a Fever is a Part of Life, juſt as a Walk, a Voyage, or a Journey. Do you read, when you are walking? No: nor in a Fever. But when you walk well, you have every thing belonging to a Walker: ſo, if you bear a Fever well, you have every thing belonging to one in a Fever. What is it to bear a Fever well? Not to blame either God, or Man: not to be afflicted at what happens: to expect Death in a right and becoming Manner; and to do what is to be done.

When

When the Phyſician enters, not to dread what he may ſay; nor, if he ſhould tell you, that you are in a fair Way, to be too much rejoiced: for what Good hath he told you? When you were in Health, what Good did it do you? Not to be dejected, when he tells you, that you are very ill: for what is it to be very ill? To be near the Separation of Soul and Body. What Harm is there in this, then? If you are not near it now, will you not be near it hereafter? What, will the World be quite overſet when you die? Why then, do you flatter your Phyſician? Why do you ſay, "If you pleaſe, Sir, I ſhall do well (*e*)?" Why do you furniſh an Occaſion to his Pride? Why do not you treat a Phyſician, with regard to an inſignificant Body, which is not yours, but by Nature mortal, as you do a Shoemaker, about your Foot; or a Carpenter, about a Houſe? Theſe are the Things neceſſary, to one in a Fever. If he fulfils theſe, he hath what belongs to him. For it is not the Buſineſs of a Philoſopher to take care of theſe mere Externals; of his Wine, his Oil, or his Body; but his ruling Faculty: And how, with regard to Externals? So as not to behave inconſiderately, about them. What Occaſion then, is there for Fear? What Occaſion for Anger,

(*e*) See *Matth.* viii. 2. Κυριε, εαν θελης, δυναται με καθαρισαι. UPTON.

ger *(f)*, about what belongs to others, and what is of no Value? For, two Rules we ſhould always have ready: That nothing is good or evil, but Choice: and, That we are not to lead Events, but to follow them. "My Brother ought not to "have treated me ſo." Very true; but *he* muſt ſee to that. However he treats me, I am to act right, with regard to him: for the one is my own Concern; the other is not: the one cannot be reſtrained; the other may.

CHAP. XI.

Miſcellaneous.

§. 1. THERE are ſome Puniſhments appointed, as by a Law, for ſuch as diſobey the divine Adminiſtration. Whoever ſhall eſteem any thing good, except what depends on Choice, let him envy, let him covet, let him flatter, let him be full of Perturbation. Whoever eſteems any thing elſe to be evil, let him grieve, let him mourn, let him lament, let him be wretched.—And yet, though thus ſeverely puniſhed, we cannot deſiſt.

Remember what the Poet ſays, of a Stranger.

A worſe than thou might enter here ſecure:
No rude Affront ſhall drive him from my Door;
For

(f) φοβου, in the *Greek*, ſeems to have crept in from the preceeding φοβεισθαι: Therefore it is omitted in the Tranſlation.

For Strangers come from Jove—

HOMER.

§. 2. This too you ſhould be prepared to ſay, with regard to a Father: It is not lawful for me to affront you, Father; even if a worſe than you ſhould have come: for all are from paternal *Jove*. And ſo of a Brother; for all are from kindred *Jove*. And thus we ſhall find *Jove* to be the Inſpector of all the other Relations.

CHAP. XII.

Of Aſcetic Exerciſe.

§. 1. WE are not to carry our Exerciſes beyond Nature; nor merely to attract Admiration: for thus we, who call ourſelves Philoſophers, ſhall not differ from Jugglers. For it is difficult too, to walk upon a Rope; and not only difficult, but dangerous. Ought *we* too, for that Reaſon, to make it our Study to walk upon a Rope, or ſet up a Palm-Tree (*a*), or graſp a Statue?

(*a*) A Tree remarkable for its being ſtrait and high. I ſhould imagine therefore, that to *ſet up the Palm-Tree* meant ſome Act of Dexterity, not unlike, perhaps, to that of our modern Balance-maſters: and that the Artiſt not only ſet up, but aſcended to its Top, and there exhibited himſelf in various Attitudes. What confirms me in this Notion is, that theſe Palm-Tree Artiſts are joined with the Rope-dancers; their Profeſſions being alike formed on the Difficulty and

Statue (*b*)? By no means. It is not every thing difficult, or dangerous, that is a proper Exerciſe; but ſuch Things as are conducive, to what lies before us to do.

And what is it, that lies before us to do?

To have our Deſires and Averſions free from Reſtraint.

How is that?

Not to be diſappointed of our Deſire, nor incur our Averſion. To this ought our Exerciſe to be turned. For, without ſtrong and conſtant Exerciſe, it is not poſſible to preſerve our Deſire undiſappointed, and our Averſion unincurred; and therefore, if we ſuffer it to be externally employed on Things independent on Choice, be aſſured, that your Deſire will neither gain its Object, nor your Averſion avoid it.

§. 2. And, becauſe Habit hath a powerful Influence, and we are habituated to apply our Deſire and Averſion to Externals only, we muſt oppoſe one Habit to another; and, where the Appearances

and Danger. In LUCIAN's *Treatiſe de Syria Dea*, we meet with theſe Men, under the Name of the φοινικοβατοντες; who, it ſeems, were frequent in *Arabia* and *Syria*; Countries where the Palm is known to flouriſh. See the new Edition of LUCIAN. Tom. III. p. 475. I am obliged for this Note to Mr. HARRIS.

(*b*) *Diogenes* uſed, in Winter, to graſp Statues, when they were covered with Snow, as an Exerciſe, to enure himſelf to Hardſhip. DIOGENES LAERTIUS.

ces are moſt ſlippery, there oppoſe Exerciſe. I am inclinable to Pleaſure. I will (*c*) bend myſelf beyond a due Proportion to the other Side, for the ſake of Exerciſe. I am averſe to Pain. I will break and exerciſe the Appearances [which ſtrike my Mind], that I may withdraw my Averſion, from every ſuch Object. For who is the Practitioner in Exerciſe? He who endeavours totally to reſtrain Deſire, and to apply Averſion only to Things dependent on Choice; and endeavours it moſt in the moſt difficult Caſes. Hence different Perſons are to be exerciſed, in different Ways. What ſignifies it, to this Purpoſe, to ſet up a Palm-Tree, or carry about a Tent (*d*) of Skins, or a Peſtle and Mortar (*d*)? If you are haſty, Man, let it be your Exerciſe, to bear ill Language patiently; and, when you are affronted, not to be angry.

(*c*) Αν ατυχησω is variouſly read. Perhaps the right Word may be αναστοιχησω derived from στοιχος; which ſignifies, among other Things the Side of a Ship, or Boat. It appear from *Julius Pollux*, and *Phrynicus*, in *Stephens*'s Lexicon, and *Scot*'s Appendix, that αναστοιχειν is a Word uſed by the Vulgar, to ſignify being ſometimes on one Side of the Veſſel, and ſometimes on the other; which agrees very well here: *I will lean to the oppoſite Side*, &c. *i. e.* to keep the Veſſel even. I am obliged for this Note to a Friend.

(*d*) Theſe Particulars are not now underſtood; but ſhow, in general, that the antient Philoſophers had their abſurd and oſtentatious Auſterities, and Mortifications, as well as the Monks, and *Indian* Philoſophers ſince.

angry. Thus, at length, you may arrive at ſuch a Proficiency, as, when any one ſtrikes you, to ſay to yourſelf, "Let me ſuppoſe this, to be graſping "a Statue." Next, exerciſe yourſelf to make a decent Uſe of Wine: not to drink a great deal; for even in this, there are ſome ſo fooliſh as to exerciſe themſelves: but at firſt to abſtain from it; and to abſtain from a Girl, and from Delicacies in Eating. Afterwards you will venture into the Liſts, at ſome proper Seaſon, by Way of Trial, if at all, to ſee whether Appearances get the better of you, as much as they uſed to do. But at firſt, fly from what is ſtronger than you. The Conteſt of a fine Girl, with a young Man, juſt initiated into Philoſophy, is unequal. The Braſs Pot and the Earthen Pitcher, as the Fable ſays, are an unſuitable Match.

§. 3. Next to the Deſires and Averſions, is the Second Claſs, of the Purſuits and Avoidances; that they may be obedient to Reaſon; that nothing may be done improperly in Point of Time or Place, or in any other Reſpect.

§. 4. The Third Claſs relates to Aſſent, and what is plauſible and perſuaſive. As *Socrates* ſaid, that we are not to lead an unexamined Life; ſo neither are we to admit an unexamined Appearance; but to ſay, "Stop: let me ſee what you are, "and whence you come." (As the Watch ſay, Show me the Ticket.) "Have you that Signal

"from

" from Nature, which is neceſſary to the Admiſſi-
" on of every Appearance?"

§. 5. In ſhort, whatever Things are applied to the Body, by thoſe who exerciſe it, if they any way affect Deſire or Averſion, they may be uſed in aſcetic Exerciſe. But, if this be done for mere Oſtentation, it belongs to one who looks out and hunts for ſomething external, and ſeeks for Spectators to exclaim, " What a great Man!" Hence *Apollonius* ſaid well. " If you have a mind to ex-
" erciſe yourſelf, for your own Benefit, when you
" are choaking with Heat, take a little cold Water
" in your Mouth; and ſpirit it out again, and tell
" nobody."

CHAP. XIII.

What Solitude is; and what a ſolitary Perſon.

§. 1. SOLITUDE is the State of a helpleſs Perſon. For not he who is alone, is therefore *ſolitary*, any more than one in a Crowd, the contrary. When therefore we loſe a Son, or a Brother, or a Friend, on whom we have been uſed to repoſe, we often ſay, we are left *ſolitary*, even in the midſt of *Rome*, where ſuch a Crowd is continually meeting us; where we live among ſo many, and when we have, perhaps, a numerous Train of Servants. For he is underſtood to be

ſolitary, who is helpleſs and expoſed to ſuch as would injure him. Hence, in a Journey eſpecially, we call ourſelves ſolitary, when we fall among Thieves: for it is not the Sight of a *Man* that removes our Solitude, but of an *honeſt* Man; a Man of Honour, and a helpful Companion. If merely being alone is ſufficient for Solitude, *Jupiter* may be ſaid to be ſolitary at the Conflagration, and bewail himſelf, that he hath neither *Juno* nor *Pallas*, nor *Apollo*, nor Brother, nor Son, nor Deſcendant, nor Relation. This, ſome indeed ſay, he doth, when he is alone at the Conflagration *(a)*. Such as theſe, moved by ſome natural Principle, ſome natural Deſire of Society, and mutual Love, and by the Pleaſure of Converſation, do not rightly conſider the State of a Perſon who is alone. We ought, however, to be prepared in ſome manner for this alſo, to be ſelf-ſufficient, and able to bear our own Company. For as *Jupiter* converſes with himſelf, acquieſces in himſelf, and contemplates his own Adminiſtration, and is employed in Thoughts worthy of himſelf; ſo ſhould we too be able to talk with ourſelves, and not to need the Converſation of others; nor be at a Loſs [for Employment]: to attend to the divine Adminiſtration; to conſider our Relation to other Beings: how we

(a) The Stoics held ſucceſſive Conflagrations, at deſtined Periods; in which all Beings were reſorbed into the Deity.

we have formerly been affected by Events; how we are affected now: what are the Things that ſtill preſs upon us: how theſe too may be cured; how removed: if any thing wants completing, to complete it, according to Reaſon. You ſee, that *Cæſar* hath procured us a profound Peace: there are neither Wars nor Battles, nor great Robberies nor Piracies; but we may travel at all Hours, and ſail from Eaſt to Weſt. But can *Cæſar* procure us Peace from a Fever too? From a Shipwreck? From a Fire? From an Earthquake? From a Thunder Storm? Nay, even from Love? He cannot. From Grief? From Envy? No: not from any one of theſe. But the Doctrine of Philoſophers promiſes to procure us Peace, from theſe too. And what doth it ſay? "If you will "attend to me, O Mortals, where-ever you are, "and whatever you are doing, you ſhall neither "grieve, nor be angry, nor be compelled, nor "reſtrained: but you ſhall live impaſſive, and "free from all." Shall not he who enjoys this Peace, proclaimed, not by *Cæſar* (for how ſhould *he* have it to proclaim?) but by God, through Reaſon, be contented, when he is alone reflecting, and conſidering; "To me there can now no Ill "happen: there is no Thief, no Earthquake. "All is full of Peace, all full of Tranquillity; "every Road, every City, every Aſſembly. My "Neighbour, my Companion, unable to hurt

"me." Another, whoſe Care it is, provides you with Food, with Clothes, with Senſes, with Preconceptions. Whenever he doth not provide what is neceſſary, he ſounds a Retreat: He opens the Door, and ſays to you; "Come." Whither? To nothing dreadful; but to that, whence you were made; to what is friendly and congenial, to the Elements (*b*). What in you was Fire, goes away to Fire; what was Earth, to Earth; what Air, to Air; what Water, to Water. There is no *Hades*, nor *Acheron*, nor *Cocytus*, nor *Pyriphlegethon*; but all is full of Gods and Demons. He who can have ſuch Thoughts; and can look upon the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and enjoy the Earth and Sea, is no more ſolitary, than he is helpleſs. — Well: but ſuppoſe any one ſhould come and murder me, when I am alone.—Fool: not *you*; but that inſignificant *Body* of yours.

§. 2.

(*b*) What a melancholy Deſcription of Death, and how gloomy the Ideas in this *conſolatory* Chapter! All Beings reduced to mere Elements, in ſucceſſive Conflagrations! A noble Contraſt to the Stoic Notions upon this Subject, may be produced from ſeveral Paſſages in the Scripture. — *Then ſhall the Duſt return to the Earth, as it was; and the Spirit ſhall return to God, who gave it.* Eccleſ. xii. 7. *For, if we believe that* Jeſus *died, and roſe again, even ſo them alſo, which ſleep in* Jeſus, *will God bring with him.* 1 Theſſ. iv. 14. See *Job* vi. 39, 40. xi. 25, 26. 1 *Cor.* vi. 14. xv. 53. 2 *Cor.* v. 14, &c.

§. 2. What Solitude is there then left? What Deſtitution? Why do we make ourſelves worſe than Children? What do they do, when they are left alone? They take up Shells and Duſt: they build Houſes; then pull them down: then build ſomething elſe: and thus never want Amuſement. Suppoſe you were all to fail away; am I to ſit, and cry, becauſe I am left alone, and ſolitary? Am I ſo unprovided with Shells and Duſt? But Children do this from Folly; and *we* are wretched from Wiſdom.

§. 3. Every great Faculty is dangerous to a Beginner (*c*). Study firſt how to live like a Perſon in Sickneſs; that in time you may know how to live like one in Health. Abſtain from Food. Drink Water. Totally repreſs your Deſire, for ſome time, that you may at length uſe it according to Reaſon; and, if according to Reaſon, [as you may,] when you [come to] have ſome Good in you, you will uſe it well. No: but we would live immediately as Men already wiſe; and be of Service to Mankind. — Of what Service? What are you doing? Why: have you been of Service to yourſelf? but you would exhort them. *You* exhort! Would you be of Service to them, ſhow

(*c*) The *Greek*, from φησιν ουν δει to φθαναι, is ſo corrupted and unintelligible, that it is totally rejected. Indeed, the Connexion of this Paragraph with what precedes, is by no means clear.

them, by your own Example, what kind of Men Philoſophy makes; and be not impertinent. When you eat, be of Service to thoſe who eat with you; when you drink, to thoſe who drink with you. Be of Service to them, by giving way to all, yielding to them, bearing with them; and not by throwing out your own ill Humour upon them.

CHAP. XIV.

Miſcellaneous.

§. 1. AS bad Performers cannot ſing alone, but in a Chorus; ſo ſome Perſons cannot walk alone. If you are any thing, walk alone: talk by yourſelf; and do not ſkulk in the Chorus. Think a little at laſt: look about you: ſift yourſelf, that you may know what you are.

§. 2. If a Perſon drinks Water, or doth any thing elſe, for the ſake of Exerciſe, upon every Occaſion he tells all he meets; "I drink Wa-"ter." Why: do you drink Water merely for the ſake of drinking it? If it doth you any Good to drink it, drink it; if not, you act ridiculouſly. But, if it is for your Advantage, and you drink it, ſay nothing about it before thoſe who are apt to take Offence. What then? Theſe are the very People you wiſh to pleaſe.

§. 3.

§. 3. Of Actions ſome are performed on their own Account; others occaſioned by Circumſtances: ſome proceed from Motives of Prudence: ſome from Complaiſance to others; and ſome are done in purſuance of a Manner of Life, which we have taken up.

§. 4. Two Things muſt be rooted out of Men; Conceit and Diffidence. Conceit lies in thinking you want nothing: and Diffidence, in ſuppoſing it impoſſible, that, under ſuch adverſe Circumſtances, you ſhould ever ſucceed. Now, Conceit is removed by Confutation: and of this *Socrates* was the Author. And [in order to ſee] that the Undertaking is not impracticable, conſider and enquire. The Enquiry itſelf will do you no Harm: and it is almoſt being a Philoſopher, to enquire, How it is poſſible to make uſe of our Deſire and Averſion, without Hindrance.

§. 5. I am better than you; for my Father hath been Conſul. I have been a Tribune, ſays another, and not you. If we were Horſes, would you ſay, My Father was ſwifter than yours? I have Abundance of Oats and Hay, and fine Trappings? What now, if, while you were ſaying this I ſhould anſwer; "Be it ſo. Let us run a Race "then." Is there nothing in Man analogous to a Race in Horſes, by which it may be known, which is better or worſe? Is there not Honour, Fidelity, Juſtice? Show yourſelf the better in

theſe; that you may be the better, as a Man. But if you tell me, you can kick violently; I will tell you again, that you value yourſelf on the Property of an Aſs.

CHAP. XV.

That every Thing is to be undertaken with Circumſpection.

§. 1. (*a*) IN every Affair conſider what precedes and follows; and then undertake it. Otherwiſe you will begin with Spirit; but, not having thought of the Conſequences, when ſome of them appear, you will ſhamefully deſiſt. "I "would conquer at the *Olympic* Games." But conſider what precedes and follows, and then, if it be for your Advantage, engage in the Affair. You muſt conform to Rules; ſubmit to a Diet; refrain from Dainties; exerciſe your Body, whether you chuſe it or not, at a ſtated Hour, in Heat

(*a*) This XVth Chapter makes the XXIXth of the *Enchiridion*; but with ſome Varieties of Reading. Particularly, for εν τω αγωνι παρορυσσεσθαι here, is εις τον αγωνα παιξσχεσθαι there.

This Chapter has a great Conformity to *Luke* xiv. 28, &c. But it is to be obſerved, that *Epictetus*, both here, and elſewhere, ſuppoſes ſome Perſons incapable of being Philoſophers; that is, virtuous and pious Men: but Chriſtianity requires and enables all, to be ſuch.

Heat and Cold: you muſt drink no cold Water; nor, ſometimes even Wine (*b*). In a Word, you muſt give yourſelf up to your Maſter, as to a Phyſician. Then, in the Combat, you may be thrown into a Ditch, diſlocate your Arm, turn your Ankle, ſwallow Abundance of Duſt, be whipt (*c*); and, after all, loſe the Victory. When you have reckoned up all this, if your Inclination ſtill holds, ſet about the Combat. Otherwiſe, take notice, you will behave like Children, who ſometimes play Wreſtlers, ſometimes Gladiators; ſometimes blow a Trumpet, and ſometimes act a Tragedy; when they happen to have ſeen and admired theſe Shows. Thus you too will be, at one Time, a Wreſtler; at another, a Gladiator; now, a Philoſopher; then, an Orator: but, with your whole Soul, nothing at all. Like an Ape, you mimic All you ſee; and one thing after another is ſure to pleaſe you; but is out of Favour, as ſoon as it becomes familiar. For you have never entered upon any thing conſiderately, nor after having viewed the whole Matter on all Sides, or made any Scrutiny into it; but raſhly, and with a cold Inclination. Thus ſome, when they have ſeen a Philoſopher, and heard a Man

(*b*) St *Paul* hath a ſimilar Alluſion to the public Games, 1 *Cor.* ix. 25. Both Writers have them frequently in view.

(*c*) Which was the Caſe, in any Violation of the Laws of the Games.

ſpeaking like *Euphrates* (*d*), (though indeed, who can ſpeak like him,) have a Mind to be Philoſophers too. Conſider firſt, Man, what the Matter is, and what your own Nature is able to bear. If you would be a Wreſtler, conſider your Shoulders, your Back, your Thighs: for different Perſons are made for different Things. Do you think, that you can act as you do, and be a Philoſopher? That you can eat (*e*), and drink, and be angry, and diſcontented, as you are now? You muſt watch; you muſt labour; you muſt get the better of certain Appetites: muſt quit your Acquaintance; be deſpiſed by your Servant; be laughed at by thoſe you meet: come off worſe than others, in every thing; in Magiſtracies; in Honours; in Courts of Judicature. When you have conſidered all theſe Things round, approach, if you pleaſe: if, by parting with them, you have a Mind to purchaſe Apathy, Freedom, and Tranquillity. If not, do not come hither: do not, like Children, be one while a Philoſopher, then a Publican, then an Orator, and then one of *Cæſar*'s Officers. Theſe Things are not conſiſtent. You muſt be one Man, either good or bad. You muſt

(*d*) The Tranſlation doth not follow the Pointing of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition in this Place.

Euphrates was a Philoſopher of *Syria*, whoſe Character is deſcribed, with the higheſt Encomiums, by *Pliny*. See L. I. Ep. x.

(*e*) Ταῦτα in this Place ſhould be τ'αυτά.

muſt cultivate either your own ruling Faculty, or Externals; and apply yourſelf either to Things within or without you; that is, be either a Philoſpher, or one of the Vulgar *(f)*.

CHAP. XVI.

That Caution is neceſſary in Condeſcenſion and Complaiſance.

§. 1. HE who frequently converſes with others, either in Diſcourſe, or Entertainments, or in any familiar Way of Living, muſt neceſſarily either become like his Companions, or bring them over to his own Way. For, if a dead Coal be applied to a live one, either the firſt will quench the laſt, or the laſt kindle the firſt. Since then, the Danger is ſo great, Caution muſt be uſed in entering into theſe Familiarities with the Vulgar; remembering, that it is impoſſible to touch a Chimney-Sweeper, without being Partaker of his Soot. For what will you do, if you are to talk of Gladiators, of Horſes, of Wreſtlers, and what is worſe, of Men? "Such a one is good; another, bad: "this was well, that ill done." Beſides: what if any one ſhould ſneer, or ridicule, or be ill-natured?

(f) What is omitted at the End of this Chapter, is placed at the End of the XVIIth; to which Lord *Shafteſbury* thinks it belongs, or to one of the Miſcellaneous Chapters; which is the more probable Opinion.

Is any of you prepared, like a Harper; who, when he takes his Harp, and tries the Strings, finds out which Notes are diſcordant, and knows how to put the Inſtrument in Tune? Hath any of you ſuch a Faculty as *Socrates* had; who, in every Converſation, could bring his Companions to his own Purpoſe? Whence ſhould you have it? You muſt therefore be carried along by the Vulgar. And why are they more powerful than you? Becauſe they utter their corrupt Diſcourſes, from Principle, and you your good ones, only from your Lips. Hence they are without Strength, or Life; and it would turn one's Stomach to hear your Exhortations, and poor miſerable Virtue, celebrated up-hill and down: Thus it is, that the Vulgar get the better of you: for Principle is always ſtrong, always invincible. Therefore, before theſe good Opinions are fixed in you, and you have acquired ſome Faculty for your Security, I adviſe you to be cautious, in your Familiarity with the Vulgar: otherwiſe, if you have any Impreſſions made on you in the Schools, they will melt away daily, like Wax before the Sun. Get away then, far from the Sun, while you have theſe waxen Opinions.

§. 2. It is for this Reaſon, that the Philoſophers adviſe us to leave our Country; becauſe inveterate Manners draw the Mind aſide, and prevent the Beginning of a new Habit. We cannot bear thoſe, who

who meet us, to ſay, "Hey-day! ſuch a one is "turned Philoſopher; who was ſo and ſo." Thus Phyſicians ſend Patients, with lingering Diſtempers, to another Place, and another Air: and they do right. Do you too import other Manners, inſtead of thoſe you carry out. Fix your Opinions, and exerciſe yourſelf in them. No: but from hence to the Theatre, to the Gladiators, to the Walks, to the *Circus*; then hither again; then back again; juſt the ſame Perſons all the while. No good Habit, no Attention, no Animadverſion, upon ourſelves. No Obſervation what Uſe we make of the Appearances preſented to our Minds; whether it be conformable, or contrary, to Nature; whether we anſwer them right, or wrong; (*a*) whether we ſay to Things independent on Choice, "You are nothing to "me." If this be not (*b*) yet your Caſe, fly from your former Habit: fly from the Vulgar, if you would ever begin to be any thing.

CHAP.

(*a*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture, δει. Εει επιλεγω, &c.

(*b*) Μητιω, Mr. *Upton*'s Manuſcript.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Providence.

§. 1. WHENEVER you lay any thing to the Charge of Providence, do but reflect; and you will find, that it hath happened agreeably to Reaſon.

Well: but a diſhoneſt Man hath the Advantage.

In what?

In Money.

Why: he is better [qualified] for it (*c*) than you: becauſe he flatters, he throws away Shame, he keeps awake: and where is the Wonder? But look whether he hath the Advantage of you in Fidelity, or in Honour. You will find he hath not: but, that where-ever it is beſt for you to have the Advantage of him, there you have it. I once ſaid to one who was full of Indignation, at the good Fortune of *Philoſtorgus*, "Why: would you be "willing

(*c*) "*But ſometimes Virtue ſtarves, while Vice is fed.*"
What then? Is the Reward of Virtue, Bread?
That, Vice may merit; 'tis the Price of Toil:
The Knave deſerves it, when he tills the Soil;
The Knave deſerves it, when he tempts the Main.
Eſſay on Man, L. IV.

" willing to ſleep with *Sura* (*d*)? Heaven forbid, ſaid he, that Day ſhould ever come! — Why then are you angry, that he is paid for what he ſells: or how can you call him happy, in Poſſeſſions acquired by Means, which you deteſt? Or what Harm doth Providence do, in giving the beſt Things to the beſt Men? Is it not better to have a Senſe of Honour, than to be rich? — Granted. — Why then are you angry, Man, if you have what is beſt? Always remember then, and have it ready, That a better Man hath the Advantage of a worſe, in that Inſtance, in which he is better; and you will never have any Indignation.

But my Wife treats me ill.

Well: if you are aſked, what is the Matter: anſwer; " My Wife treats me ill."

Nothing more?

Nothing.

My Father gives me nothing. — What is the Matter? — My Father gives me nothing. To denominate this an Evil, ſome external and falſe Addition muſt be made. We are not therefore to get rid of Poverty; but of our Principle concerning it; and we ſhall do well.

When

(*d*) This Perſon is not known. One of his Name is mentioned in the *Acts of Ignatius*, as being Conſul at the Time when he ſuffered Martyrdom.

When *Galba* was killed, ſomebody ſaid to *Rufus*, "Now, indeed, the World is governed by "Providence." I never thought, anſwered *Rufus*, of bringing the ſlighteſt Proof, that the World was governed by Providence, from *Galba*.

CHAP. XVIII.

That we ought not to be alarmed, by any News that is brought us.

§. 1. WHEN any alarming News is brought you, always have it at Hand, that no News can be brought you, concerning what is in your own Choice. Can any one bring you News, that your Opinions or Deſires are ill conducted? By no means: but that ſomebody is dead. What is that to *you* then? That ſomebody ſpeaks ill of you. And what is that to *you* then? That your Father is forming ſome Contrivance, or other. Againſt what? Againſt your Choice? How can he? Well: but againſt your Body; againſt your Eſtate? You are very ſafe: this is not againſt *you*. —But the Judge [perhaps] hath pronounced you guilty of Impiety. And did not the Judges pronounce the ſame of *Socrates*? Is his pronouncing a Sentence, any Buſineſs of yours? No. Then why do you, any longer, trouble yourſelf about it? There is a Duty incumbent on your Father; which unleſs

unleſs he performs, he loſes the Character of a Father, of natural Affection, of Tenderneſs. Do not want him to loſe any thing elſe, by this: for no Perſon is ever guilty in one Inſtance, and a Sufferer in another. Your Duty, on the other Hand, is to make your Defence, with Conſtancy, Modeſty, and Mildneſs: otherwiſe you loſe the Character of filial Piety; of Modeſty, and Generoſity of Mind. Well: and is your Judge free from Danger? No. He runs an equal Hazard. Why then, are you ſtill afraid of his Deciſion? What have you to do with the Evil of another? Making a bad Defence would be your own Evil. Let it be your only Care to avoid that: but whether Sentence is paſſed on you, or not, as it is the Buſineſs, ſo it is the Evil, of another. "Such a "one threatens you." — *Me?* No. — "He cen-"ſures you." — Let him look to it, how he doth his own Buſineſs. — "He will give an unjuſt Sen-"tence againſt you. — Poor Wretch!"

CHAP. XIX.

What is the Condition of the Vulgar; and what of a Philoſopher.

§. 1. THE firſt Difference between one of the Vulgar, and a Philoſopher, is this: the one ſays, I am undone, on the Account of my Child,

Child, my Brother, my Father: but the other, if ever he be obliged to ſay, I am undone! reflects, and adds, on Account of myſelf. For Choice cannot be reſtrained, or hurt, by any thing to which Choice doth not extend; but only by itſelf. If therefore we always would incline this Way, and, whenever we are unſucceſsful, would lay the Fault on ourſelves, and remember, that there is no Cauſe of Perturbation and Inconſtancy, but Principle, I engage we ſhould make ſome Proficiency. But we ſet out in a very different Way, from the very Beginning. In Infancy, for Example, if we happen to ſtumble, our Nurſe doth not chide *us*, but beats the Stone. Why: what Harm hath the Stone done? Was it to move out of its Place, for the Folly of your Child? Again: if we do not find ſomething to eat, when we come out of the Bath, our Governor doth not try to moderate our Appetite, but beats the Cook. Why: did we appoint you Governor of the Cook, Man? No: but of our Child. It is he whom you are to correct and improve. By theſe Means, even when we are grown up, we appear Children. For an unmuſical Perſon is a Child in Muſic; an illiterate Perſon, a Child in Learning; and an untaught one, a Child in Life.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

That ſome Advantage may be gained, from every external Circumſtance.

§. 1. IN Appearances that are merely Objects of Contemplation, almoſt all Perſons have allowed Good and Evil to be in ourſelves, and not in Externals. No one ſays, it is good, to be Day; evil, to be Night; and the greateſt Evil, that Three ſhould be Four: but what? That Knowledge is good, and Error evil. So that, concerning Falſhood itſelf, there exiſts one (*a*) good Thing; the Knowledge, that it is Falſhood. Thus then, ſhould it be, in Life alſo. Health is a Good; Sickneſs, an Evil. No, Sir. But what? A right Uſe of Health is a Good; a wrong one, an Evil. So that, in truth, it is poſſible to be a Gainer, even by Sickneſs. And is it not poſſible, by Death too? By Mutilation? Do you think (*b*) *Menæceus* an inconſiderable Gainer by Death? — "May whoever talk thus, be ſuch a Gainer "as he was!" — Why: pray, Sir, did not he pre-

(*a*) The Paſſage, as it now ſtands in the *Greek*, is ſcarcely intelligible. The Difficulty is removed, by reading αγαθον for απατην, and the Tranſlation follows this Conjecture.

(*b*) The Son of *Creon*, who killed himſelf, after he had been informed, by an Oracle, that his Death would procure a Victory to the *Thebans*. APOLLODORUS. UPTON.

preſerve his Patriotiſm, his Magnanimity, his Fidelity, his gallant Spirit? And, if he had lived on, would he not have loſt all theſe? Would not Cowardice, Mean-ſpiritedneſs, and Hatred of his Country, and a wretched Love of Life, have been his Portion? Well, now: do not you think him a conſiderable Gainer, by dying? No: but I warrant you, (*c*) the Father of *Admetus* was a great Gainer, by living on, in ſo mean-ſpirited and wretched a Way, as he did! Why: did not he die at laſt? For Heaven's ſake, ceaſe to be thus ſtruck, by the mere Materials, [of Action.] Ceaſe to make yourſelves Slaves; firſt of Things, and then, upon their Account; of the Men who have the Power, either to beſtow, or take them away. Is there any Advantage then to be gained from theſe Men? From all; even from a Reviler. What Advantage doth a Wreſtler gain from him, with whom he exerciſes himſelf, before the Combat: the greateſt. Why: juſt in the ſame manner I exerciſe myſelf with this Man. (*d*) He exerciſes me in Patience, in Gentleneſs, in Meekneſs. No: but, I ſuppoſe, I gain an Advantage from him who manages my Neck, and ſets my Back and Shoulders in order; and the beſt Thing a Maſter of Exerciſe can ſay, is, "Liſt him up with both "Hands," and the heavier he is, the greater is my

(*c*) See P. 242. Vol. I. Note *a*.

(*d*) Οὗτος for οὕτως. WOLFIUS.

my Advantage: and yet, it is no Advantage to me, when I am exerciſed in Gentleneſs, of Temper! This is not knowing, how to gain an Advantage from Men. Is my Neighbour a bad one? He is ſo, to himſelf; but a good one, to me. He exerciſes my good Temper, my Moderation. Is my Father bad? To himſelf; but not to me. "This is the Rod of *Hermes*. Touch with it "whatever you pleaſe, and it will become Gold." No: but bring whatever you pleaſe, and I will turn it into *Good*. Bring Sickneſs, Death, Want, Reproach, capital Trial. All theſe by the Rod of *Hermes*, ſhall turn to Advantage. — "What will "you make of Death?"—Why: what but an Ornament to you? what but a Means of your ſhowing, by (*e*) Action, what the Man is, who knows, and follows the Will of Nature. "What will you "make of Sickneſs?"—I will ſhow its Nature. I will make a good Figure in it; I will be compoſed and happy. I will not flatter my Phyſician. I will not wiſh to die. What need you aſk further? Whatever you give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, reſpectable, and eligible. No. — "But, take care not to be ſick." Juſt as if one ſhould ſay, "Take care, that the Appearance "of Three being Four, doth not preſent itſelf to "you." "It is an Evil." How an Evil, Man?

If

(*e*) For δειξη σε εργω, δειξης εργω ſeems the true Reading.

If I think as I ought about it, what Hurt will it any longer do me? Will it not rather be even an Advantage to me? If then I think as I ought, of Poverty, of Sickneſs, of being out of Power, is not that enough for me? Why then muſt I ſeek any longer Good or Evil, in Externals? But what is the State of the Caſe? Theſe Things are allowed here; but nobody carries them home; but immediately every one is in a State of War with his Servant, his Neighbours, with thoſe who ſneer and ridicule him. Well fare *(f) Leſbius*, for proving every Day, that I know nothing.

CHAP. XXI.

Concerning thoſe who readily ſet up for Sophiſts.

§. 1. *(a)* THEY who have received bare Propoſitions, are preſently inclined to throw them up, as a ſick Stomach doth its Food. Firſt concoct it, and then you will not throw it up; otherwiſe it will be crude and impure, and unfit

(f) Mr. *Upton* conjectures this *Leſbius* to have been ſome Buffoon.

(a) The Tranſlation follows the Conjecture of *Wolfius*, ακαθαρτον.

There are other Difficulties in the Text, as it now ſtands: Εξεμεσης, perhaps, ſhould be εξεμεσεις; or, probably, there ſhould be no μη before εξεμησης: and then the Meaning of *Epictetus*

unfit for Nouriſhment. But ſhow us, from what you have digeſted, ſome Change in your ruling Faculty; as Wreſtlers do in their Shoulders, from their Exerciſe, and their Diet: as Artificers, in their Skill, from what they have learnt. A Carpenter doth not come and ſay, "Hear me diſ-"courſe on the Art of Building:" but he hires a Houſe, and fits it up, and ſhows himſelf Maſter of his Trade. Let it be your Buſineſs likewiſe to do ſomething like this: eat like a Man; drink, dreſs, marry, have Children, perform the Duty of a Citizen; bear Reproach; bear with an unreaſonable Brother; bear with a Father; bear with a Son, a Neighbour, a Companion; as becomes a Man. Show us theſe Things, that we may ſee that you have really learnt ſomewhat, from the Philoſophers. No: "But come and hear me re-"peat Commentaries." Get you gone, and ſeek ſomebody elſe, to throw them out upon. "Nay, "but I will explain the Doctrines of *Chryſippus* "to you, ſo as no other Perſon can: I will elu-"cidate his Diction, in the cleareſt Manner." And is it for this then, that young Men leave their Country, and their own Parents, that they may

Epictetus will be, That the Perſons of whom he is ſpeaking, ought firſt to concoct Propoſitions for their own Uſe, and then throw them up (*i. e.* utter them in Diſcourſe), for the Uſe of others. But the Figure he makes uſe of is ſo dirty, that it is not to be enlarged upon, though taken from the Practice of the *Greek* and *Roman* Phyſicians.

may come and hear you explain *Words*? Ought they not to return patient, active, free from Paſſion, free from Perturbation; furniſhed with ſuch a Proviſion for Life, that, ſetting out with it, they will be able to bear all Events well, and derive Ornament from them? But how ſhould you impart what you have not? For have you yourſelf done any thing elſe, from the Beginning, but ſpent your Time in ſolving Syllogiſms, and convertible Propoſitions, and interrogatory Arguments.—"But ſuch a one hath a School, and why "ſhould not I have one?"—Wretch, theſe Things are not effected, in a careleſs and fortuitous Manner. But there muſt be Age, and a Method of Life, and a guiding God. Is it not ſo? No one quits the Port, or ſets Sail, till he hath ſacrificed to the Gods, and implored their Aſſiſtance: nor do Men ſow, without firſt invoking *Ceres*. And ſhall any one who hath undertaken ſo great a Work, undertake it ſafely, without the Gods? And ſhall they, who apply to ſuch a one, apply to him with Succeſs? What are you doing elſe, Man, but divulging the Myſteries? And you ſay, "There is a Temple at *Eleuſis*; and here is one "too. *There* is a (*b*) Prieſt; and *I* will make a "Prieſt

(*b*) The Prieſt who preſided over the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries was called *Hierophantes*; *i. e.* a Revealer of ſacred Things. He was obliged to devote himſelf to divine Service, and lead a chaſte

" Prieſt *here: there* is a Herald; and *I* will ap-
" point a Herald too: *there* is a Torch-bearer;
" and *I* will have a Torch-bearer: *there* are
" Torches; and ſo ſhall there be *here*. The
" Words ſaid, the Things done, are the ſame.
" Where is the Difference betwixt one and the
" other?" Moſt impious Man! is there no Difference? Are theſe Things of Uſe out of Place, and out of Time? A Man ſhould come with Sacrifices and Prayers, previouſly purified, and his Mind affected with a Senſe, that he is approaching to ſacred and ancient Rites. Thus the Myſteries become uſeful: thus we come to have an Idea, that all theſe Things were appointed by the Antients, for the Inſtruction and Correction of Life. But you divulge and publiſh them, without Regard to Time and Place; without Sacrifices, without Purity: you have not the Garment that is neceſſary for a Prieſt, nor the Hair, or the Girdle (*c*), that is neceſſary; nor the Voice, nor the Age: nor have you purified yourſelf, like him. But, when you have got the Words by Heart, you ſay, " The Words are ſacred of themſelves."

chaſte and ſingle Life. He was attended by three Officers; a Torch-bearer, a Herald, and One who aſſiſted at the Altar. For a fuller Account of the *Eleuſinian* Myſteries, ſee POTTER's *Grecian* Antiquities, Vol. I. c. 20.

(*c*) The Girdle is mentioned among the holy Garments of the Levitical Prieſts. *Exod.* xxviii. 4, 39, 40, *&c.*

Theſe Things are to be approached, in another Manner. It is a great, it is a myſtical Affair; not given by Chance, or to every one indifferently. Nay, mere Wiſdom, perhaps, is not a ſufficient Qualification for the Care of Youth. There ought to be likewiſe a certain Readineſs and Aptitude for this, and indeed a particular Conſtitution of Body; and, above all, a Counſel from God to undertake this Office, as he counſelled *Socrates* to undertake the Office of Confutation; *Diogenes*, that of authoritative Reproof; *Zeno*, that of dogmatical Inſtruction. But *you* ſet up for a Phyſician, provided with nothing but Medicines, and without knowing, or having ſtudied, where, or how, they are to be applied. "Why: ſuch a one had "Medicines for the Eyes; and I have the ſame." Have you then, a Faculty too of making uſe of them? Do you, at all, know when, and how, and to whom, they will be of Service? Why then do you act at Hazard? Why are you careleſs, in Things of the greateſt Importance? Why do you attempt a Matter unſuitable to you? Leave it to thoſe who can perform it, and do it Honour. Do not you too bring a Scandal upon Philoſophy, by your Means; nor be one of thoſe, who cauſe the Thing itſelf to be calumniated. But, if Theorems delight you, ſit quiet, and turn them every Way by yourſelf; but never call yourſelf a Philoſopher; nor ſuffer another to call you ſo; but

ſay

ſay, "He is miſtaken: for my Deſires are not "different from what they were; nor my Pur- "ſuits directed to other Objects; nor my Aſſent "otherwiſe given; nor have I at all made any "Change in the Uſe of the Appearances, from my "former Condition." Think and ſpeak thus of yourſelf, if you would think as you ought: if not, act at all Hazards, and do as you do; for it becomes you.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Cynic Philoſophy (*a*).

§. 1. WHEN one of his Scholars, who ſeemed inclined to the Cynic Philoſophy, aſked him, what a Cynic muſt be, and what was the general Plan of that Sect? Let us examine it, ſays he, at our Leiſure. But thus much I can tell

(*a*) The Cynics owed their Original to *Antiſthenes*, a Diſciple of *Socrates*. They held Virtue to be the higheſt Good, and the End of Life; and treated Riches, Honours, and Power, with great Contempt. They were Enemies to Science, and polite Literature; and applied themſelves wholly to the Study of Morality. There was, in many Reſpects, great Conformity between them and the Stoics: but the Stoics ſelected what ſeemed laudable, in their Principles, without imitating the Roughneſs of their Addreſs, and the deteſtable Indecency of their external Behaviour. The Stoics were indeed a reformed Branch of the Cynics, and

tell you now, that he who (*b*) attempts ſo great an Affair without God, is an Object of divine Wrath, and would only bring public Diſhonour upon himſelf. For, in a well regulated Houſe, no one comes, and ſays to himſelf, "I ought to "be the Manager here." If he doth, and the Maſter (*c*) returns, and ſees him inſolently giving Orders, he drags him out, and hath him whipt. Such is the Caſe likewiſe in this great City [of the World.] For here too is a Maſter of the Family, who orders every thing. "*You* are the "Sun: you can, by making a Circuit, form the "Year, and the Seaſons, and increaſe and nou-"riſh the Fruits; raiſe and calm the Winds, "and give a moderate Warmth to the Bodies of "Men. Go: make your Circuit, and thus in-

"timately

thence, perhaps, ſpoke of them ſomewhat more favourably, than they might otherwiſe have done. The Cynics are ſaid to have derived their Name from *Cynoſarges*, a *Gymnaſium*, without the Walls of *Athens*, where *Antiſthenes* taught; and which was ſo called from the Accident of a white Dog ſtealing Part of a Victim, which *Dionus* was ſacrificing to *Hercules*: and their barking at every body, and their Want of Shame, helped to confirm the Appellation. In this *Cynoſarges* was a celebrated Temple of *Hercules*; which, very poſſibly, gave the Cynics the original Hint of comparing themſelves to that Hero; which they ſo much affected.

(*b*) *And no Man taketh this Honour unto himſelf, but he that is called of God.* — *Heb.* v. 4.

(*c*) This hath a remarkable Likeneſs to *Matth.* xxiv. 50, 51. eſpecially in the Originals.

" timately move every thing, from the greateſt " to the leaſt. *You* are a Calf: when the Lion " appears, do your (*d*) Part, or you will ſuffer for " it. *You* are a Bull: come and fight; for that " is incumbent on *you*, and becomes you, and you " can do it. *You* can lead an Army to *Troy*: be " you *Agamemnon*. You can engage in ſingle " Combat with *Hector*: be you *Achilles*." But, if *Therſites* had come and claimed the Command, either he would not have obtained it; or, if he had, he would have diſgraced himſelf, before the more Witneſſes.

§. 2. Do you too, carefully deliberate upon this Matter: it is not what you think it. " I wear " an old Cloak now; and I ſhall have one then. " I ſleep upon the hard Ground now; and I ſhall " ſleep ſo then. I will moreover take a Wallet " and a Staff, and go about, and will beg of thoſe " I meet, and begin by (*e*) abuſing them: and, " if I ſee any one uſing Means to take off the " Hair from his Face, or Body; or ſetting his " Curls, or walking in Purple, I will rebuke " him." If you imagine this to be the Thing, avaunt; come not near it: it doth not belong to you. But, if you imagine it to be what it really is, and do not think yourſelf unworthy of it, conſider how great a thing you undertake. Firſt,

(*d*) *i. e.* run away.

(*e*) For λοιδορειν read λοιδορων. UPTON.

with regard to yourſelf: you muſt no longer, in any Inſtance, appear like what you do now. You muſt accuſe neither God nor Man. You muſt totally ſuppreſs Deſire; and muſt transfer Averſion to ſuch Things only as are dependent on Choice. You muſt have neither Anger, nor Reſentment, nor Envy, nor Pity. Neither Boy, nor Girl, nor Fame, nor Delicacies in Eating, muſt have Charms for you. For you muſt know, that other Men indeed fence themſelves with Walls, and Houſes, and Darkneſs, when they do any thing of this kind, and have many Concealments: a Man ſhuts the Door, places ſomebody before the Apartment; "Say, He is gone out; "ſay, He is not at Leiſure." But the Cynic, inſtead of all this, muſt fence himſelf with virtuous Shame; otherwiſe *He* will act indecently, naked, and in the open Air. This is *his* Houſe; this, *his* Door; this, *his* Porter; this, *his* Darkneſs. He muſt not wiſh to conceal any thing relating to himſelf: for, if he doth, he is gone; he hath loſt the Cynic; the open, the free Character: he hath begun to fear ſomething external: he hath begun to need a Concealment; nor can he get it when he will. For where ſhall he conceal himſelf, or how? For if this Tutor, this Pedagogue of the Public, ſhould happen to ſlip, what muſt *he* ſuffer? Can he then, who dreads theſe Things, be thoroughly bold within, and

preſcribe

preſcribe to other Men? Impracticable, impoſſible.

§. 3. In the firſt place then, you muſt purify your own ruling Faculty, conformably *(f)* to this Method of Life. Now the Subject-matter for me to work upon, is my own Mind; as Wood is for a Carpenter, or Leather for a Shoemaker: and my Buſineſs is, a right Uſe of the Appearances of Things. But Body is nothing to me; its Parts nothing to me. Let Death come when it will; either of the Whole, or of Part. "Go into "Exile." And whither? Can any one turn me out of the World? He cannot. But where-ever I go, there is the Sun, the Moon, the Stars, Dreams, Auguries, Communication with God. And even this Preparation is, by no means, ſufficient for a true Cynic. But it muſt farther be known, that he is a Meſſenger ſent from *Jupiter* to Men, concerning Good and Evil; to ſhow them, that they are miſtaken, and ſeek the Eſſence of Good and Evil where it is not; but do not obſerve it where it is: that He is a Spy, like *Diogenes*, when he was brought to *Philip*, after the Battle of *Chæronea* (*g*). For, in effect, a Cynic is a Spy, to diſcover what Things are friendly, what hoſtile, to Man: and he muſt, after mak-

(f) The Senſe ſeems to require, that καὶ ſhould be κατὰ; and it is ſo tranſlated.

(*g*) See Vol. I. P. 95. Note (*c*).

ing an accurate Obſervation, come and tell them the Truth: not be ſtruck with Terror, ſo as to point out to them Enemies, where there are none; nor, in any other Inſtance, diſconcerted or confounded by Appearances.

§. 4. He muſt then, if it ſhould ſo happen, be able to lift up his Voice, come upon the Stage, and ſay, like *Socrates*, "O Mortals, whither are you "hurrying? What are you about? Why do you "tumble up and down, Wretches, like blind "Men? You are going a wrong Way, and have "forſaken the right. You ſeek Proſperity and "(*b*) Happineſs in a wrong Place, where it is not; "nor do you give Credit to another, who ſhows "you where it is. Why do you ſeek it without? "It is not in Body: if you do not believe me, "look upon (*i*) *Myro*; look upon *Oſellius*. It is "not in Wealth: if you do not believe me, look "upon *Cræſus*; look upon the Rich of the pre-"ſent Age, how full of Lamentation their Life "is. It is not in Power: for, otherwiſe, they, "who have been twice and thrice Conſuls, muſt "be happy: but they are not. To whom ſhall "we give Credit in this Affair? To you who "look only upon the Externals of their Condi-"tion, and are dazzled by Appearances, or to "themſelves?

(*b*) The Tranſlation follows Lord *Shafteſbury*'s Conjecture.

(*i*) Unknown Perſons, probably of great bodily Strength.

" themſelves? What do they ſay? Hear them,
" when they groan, when they ſigh, when they
" think themſelves more wretched, and in more
" Danger, from theſe very Conſulſhips, this
" Glory, and Splendor. It is not in Empire:
" otherwiſe *Nero* and *Sardanapalus* had been hap-
" py. But not even *Agamemnon* was happy,
" though a better Man than *Sardanapalus*, or
" *Nero*. But, when others are ſnoring, what is
" *He* doing?"

He rends his Hairs ——

And what doth he ſay himſelf?

Scarce can my Knees theſe trembling Limbs ſuſtain;
And ſcarce my Heart ſupport its Load of Pain.

POPE.

Why: which of your Affairs goes ill, poor Wretch? Your Poſſeſſions? No. Your Body? No. But you have Gold and Braſs in Abundance. What then goes ill? That Part of you, whatever it be called, is neglected and corrupted, by which we deſire, and are averſe; by which we purſue, and avoid. — How neglected? — It is ignorant of that for which it was naturally formed, of the Eſſence of Good, and of the Eſſence of Evil. It is ignorant what is its own, and what another's. And, when any thing belonging to others goes ill it ſays, " I am undone; the *Greeks* are in dan-
" ger!" (Poor ruling Faculty! which alone is ne-

glected, and hath no Care taken of it.) "They "will die by the Sword of the *Trojans!*"—And, if the *Trojans* ſhould not kill them, will they not die? — "Yes: but not all at once." — Why: where is the Difference? For, if it be an Evil to die, whether it be all at once, or ſingly, it is equally an Evil. Will any thing more happen, than the Separation of Soul and Body (*k*)? — "Nothing." — And, when the *Greeks* periſh, is the Door ſhut againſt *you?* Is it not in your Power to die? — "It is." — Why then do you lament, while you are a King, and hold the Sceptre of *Jove?* A King is no more to be made unfortunate than a God. What are you then? You are a Shepherd (*l*), truly ſo called: for you weep,

(*k*) Were Conquerors deeply to conſider, how much more happens than the mere Separation of Soul and Body, they would not, for Increaſe of Dominion, or a Point of falſe Honour, puſh Thouſands at once into an unknown Eternity.

(*l*) We find this Phraſe often uſed by the inſpired Writers, to deſcribe the Office and Duty of a King, or Ruler. And the moſt tender and affectionate Compaſſion is implied in it, *Iſaiah* xl. 11. where it is ſaid of the KING of Kings, *He ſhall feed his Flock, like a Shepherd: He ſhall gather the Lambs with his Arm, and carry them in his Boſom; and ſhall gently lead thoſe that are with young.* He accordingly applies this diſtinguiſhing Character to himſelf, in ſeveral Places of the New Teſtament; eſpecially *John* x. 11, 14, 15, 16.

Homer ſpeaks of *Agamemnon* by this Name (which we ſee was not unuſual in the Eaſt) to expreſs his Authority and Care: but *Epictetus* applies it as a Term of Reproach, to imply

weep, juſt as Shepherds do, when the Wolf ſeizes any of their Sheep: and they who are governed by you are mere Sheep. But why do you come hither? Was your Deſire in any Danger? Your Averſion? Your Purſuits? Your Avoidances? "No," ſays he: "but my Brother's Wife hath "been ſtolen." — Is it not great good Luck then, to be rid of a ſorry adulterous Wife? — "But muſt we be held in Contempt by the *Tro-* "*jans?*" — What are they? Wiſe Men, or Fools? If wiſe, why do you go to war with them? If Fools, why do you mind them?

§. 5. Where then doth our Good lie, ſince it doth not lie in theſe Things? Tell us, Sir; you who are our Meſſenger and Spy.—Where you do not think, nor are willing to ſeek it. For, if you were willing, you would find it in yourſelves: nor would you wander abroad, nor ſeek what belongs to others, as your own. Turn your Thoughts into yourſelves. Conſider the Pre-conceptions which you have. What do you imagine Good to be?—What is proſperous, happy, unhindered.—Well: and do you not naturally imagine it great? Do

ply Ignorance, and Meanneſs of Spirit. One cannot help obſerving, on what is here ſaid of *Agamemnon*, the Selfiſhneſs of the Stoic Doctrine; which, as it all along forbids Pity and Compaſſion, will have even a King to look upon the Welfare of his People, and a General on the Preſervation of his Soldiers, as Matters quite foreign and indifferent to him.

not you imagine it valuable? Do not you imagine it incapable of being hurt? In what Materials then muſt you ſeek Proſperity, and Exemption from Hindrance? In that which is inſlaved, or free?—In the Free?—Is your Body then inſlaved, or free?—We do not know.—Do not you know, that it is the Slave of Fever, Gout, Defluxion, Dyſentery: of a Tyrant; of Fire, Steel; of every thing ſtronger than itſelf?—Yes, it is a Slave—How then can any thing belonging to the Body be unhindered? And how can that be great, or valuable, which is, by Nature, lifeleſs, Earth, Clay? What then, have you nothing free?—Poſſibly nothing.—Why: who can compel you to aſſent to what appears falſe?—No one.—Or who, not to aſſent to what appears true?—No one.—Here then you ſee, that there is ſomething in you, by Nature, free. But who of you can deſire or be averſe, or uſe his active Powers of Purſuit or Avoidance, or concert, or purpoſe, unleſs he hath been impreſſed by an Appearance of its being for his Advantage, or his Duty?—No one.—You have then, in theſe too, ſomething unreſtrained and free. Cultivate this, Wretches; take care of this; ſeek for Good here.—"But "how is it poſſible, that a Man, worth nothing, "naked, without Houſe or Home, ſqualid, un-"attended, who belongs to no Country, can lead "a proſperous Life?"—See: God hath ſent us

One,

One, to ſhow, in fact, that it is poſſible (*m*)."
" Take Notice of me, that I am without a Coun-
" try, without a Houſe, without an Eſtate, with-
" out a Servant: I lie on the Ground: no Wife,
" no Children, no Coat (*n*); but only Earth,
" and Heaven, and one ſorry Cloke. And, what
" do I want? Am not I without Sorrow, without
" Fear? Am not I free? Did any of you ever ſee
" me diſappointed of my Deſire, or incurring my
" Averſion? Did I ever blame God or Man?
" Did I ever accuſe any one? Hath any of you
" ſeen me look diſcontented? How do I treat
" thoſe whom *you* fear, and of whom you are
" ſtruck with Awe? Is it not like ſorry Slaves?
" Who that ſees me, doth not think, that he ſees
" his

(*m*) It is obſervable, that *Epictetus* ſeems to think it a neceſſary Qualification in a Teacher, ſent from God, for the Inſtruction of Mankind, to be deſtitute of all external Advantages, and a *ſuffering* Character. Thus doth this excellent Man, who, had carried human Reaſon to ſo great a Height, bear Teſtimony to the Propriety of that Method which the Divine Wiſdom hath thought fit to follow, in the Scheme of the Goſpel; whoſe Great Author had not *where to lay his Head:* and which ſome, in later Ages, have inconſiderately urged as an Argument againſt the Chriſtian Religion. The infinite Diſparity between the Propoſal of the Example of *Diogenes*, in *Epictetus*, and of our Redeemer, in the New Teſtament, is too obvious to need any Enlargement.

(*n*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture, of χιτωνιον, inſtead of τριβωνιδιον.

" his own King and Maſter?" This is the Language, this the Character, this the Undertaking, of a Cynic. No: I warrant you; but the Wallet, and the Staff, and the great Jaws: ſwallowing, or treaſuring up, whatever is given you: abuſing unſeaſonably thoſe you meet; or ſhowing a brawny Arm. Do you conſider, how you ſhall attempt ſo important an Affair? Firſt take a Mirror. View your Shoulders, examine your Back, your Thighs. You are going to be enrolled a Combatant at the Olympic Games, Man; not in a poor ſlight Conteſt. In the Olympic Games, a Champion is not allowed merely to be conquered, and depart: but muſt firſt be diſgraced, in the View of the whole World; not only of the *Athenians*, or *Spartans*, or *Nicopolitans*: and then he, who hath raſhly departed, muſt be whipt too; and, before that, muſt ſuffer Thirſt, and Heat; and ſwallow an Abundance of Duſt.

§. 6. Conſider carefully; know yourſelf; conſult the Divinity: attempt nothing without God: for, if he counſels you, be aſſured, that it is his Will, that you ſhould be a great Man; or, [which comes to the ſame thing,] ſuffer many a Blow. For there is this very fine Circumſtance connected with the Character of a Cynic, that he muſt be beat like an Aſs: and, when he is beat, muſt love thoſe who beat him; as the Father, as the Brother

Brother of All (*o*). No, to be ſure: but, if any body beats you, ſtand publicly and roar out, "O, "*Cæſar*, am I to ſuffer ſuch Things, in breach "of your Peace? Let us go before the Procon-"ſul."—But what is *Cæſar* to a Cynic, or what is the Proconſul, or any one elſe, but *Jupiter?* Who hath deputed him, and Whom he ſerves. Doth he invoke any other but Him? And is he not perſuaded, that whatever he ſuffers of this Sort, it is *Jupiter*, who doth it to exerciſe him? Now *Hercules*, when he was exerciſed by *Euryſtheus*, did not think himſelf miſerable; but executed, with Alacrity, all that was to be done. And ſhall *he* who is appointed to the Combat, and exerciſed by *Jupiter*, cry out, and take Offence at Things? A worthy Perſon, truly, to bear the Scepter of *Diogenes!* Hear what *He*, in a Fever, ſaid to thoſe who were paſſing by (*p*). "Sorry "Wretches,

(*o*) Compare this with the Chriſtian Precepts, of Forbearance, and Love to Enemies, *Matth.* v. 39—44. The Reader will obſerve, that Chriſt ſpecifies higher Injuries and Provocations than *Epictetus* doth; and requires of *all* his Followers, what *Epictetus* deſcribes only as the Duty of one or two *extraordinary* Perſons, as ſuch.

(*p*) St. *Jerom*, cited by Mr. *Upton*, gives the following, ſomewhat different, Account of this Matter. *Diogenes*, as he was going to the Olympic Games, was taken with a Fever, and laid himſelf down in the Road: his Friends would have put him into ſome Vehicle; but he refuſed it, and bid them

go

" Wretches, why do not you ſtay? Do you take " ſuch a Journey to *Olympia*, to ſee the Deſtruc- " tion, or Combat, of the Champions; and have " you no Inclination to ſee the Combat between " a Man and a Fever?" Such a one, who took a Pride in difficult Circumſtances, and thought himſelf worthy to be a Spectacle to thoſe who paſſed by, was a likely Perſon, indeed, to accuſe God, who hath deputed him, as treating him unworthily! For what Subject of Accuſation ſhall he find? That he preſerves a Decency of Behaviour? With what doth he find fault? That he ſets his own Virtue in a clearer Light? — Well: and what doth he ſay of Poverty? Of Death? Of Pain? How did he compare his Happineſs with that of the *Perſian* King; or rather thought it beyond Compariſon. For, amidſt Perturbations, and Griefs, and Fears, and diſappointed Deſires, and incurred Averſions, how can there be any Entrance for Happineſs? And, where there are corrupt Principles, there muſt all theſe Things neceſſarily be.

§. 7. The ſame young Man enquiring, Whether, if a Friend ſhould be willing to come to him, and take care of him when he was ſick, he ſhould

go on to the Show. " This Night," ſaid he, " I will ei- " ther conquer, or be conquered. If I conquer the Fever, " I will come to the Games; if it conquers me, I will de- " ſcend to Hades."

ſhould comply? And where, ſays *Epictetus*, will you find me the Friend of a *Cynic?* For to be worthy of being numbered among his Friends, a Perſon ought to be ſuch another as himſelf: he ought to be a Partner of the Scepter and the Kingdom, and a worthy Miniſter, if he would be honoured with his Friendſhip; as *Diogenes* was the Friend of *Antiſthenes*; as *Crates*, of *Diogenes*. Do you think, that he who only comes to him, and ſalutes him, is his *Friend*; and that he will think him worthy of being entertained as ſuch? If ſuch a a Thought comes into your Head, rather look round you, for ſome clever Dunghill, to ſhelter you in your Fever, from the North Wind, that you may not periſh by taking Cold. But you ſeem to me, to want [only] to get into ſomebody's Houſe, and to be well fed there a while. What Buſineſs have *you* then, even to attempt ſo important an Affair as this?

§. 8. But (ſaid the young Man) will a Cynic engage himſelf in Marriage, and the Production of Children, as a principal Point (*q*)?

If you will allow me a Republic of Sages, no one there, perhaps, will readily apply himſelf to the Cynic Philoſophy. For on whoſe Account ſhould he embrace that Method of Life? However, ſuppoſe he doth, there will be nothing to reſtrain

(*q*) The Stoics directed this; and the *Epicureans* forbad it.

reſtrain him from marrying, and having Children. For his Wife will be ſuch another as himſelf; his Father-in-Law ſuch another as himſelf; and his Children will be brought up in the ſame manner. But as the State of Things now is, like that of an Army prepared for Battle, is it not neceſſary that a Cynic ſhould be without (*r*) Diſtraction; intirely attentive to the Service of God: at Liberty to walk among Mankind: not tied down to vulgar Duties, nor entangled in Relations; which, if he tranſgreſſes, he will no longer keep the Character of a wiſe and good Man; and which, if he obſerves, there is an End of him, as the Meſſenger, and Spy, and Herald of the Gods? For, conſider, there are ſome Offices due to his Father-

(*r*) It is remarkable, that *Epictetus* here uſes the ſame Word (απερισπαςως) with St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* vii. 35. and urges the ſame Conſideration, of applying wholly to the Service of God, to diſſuade from Marriage. His Obſervation too, that the State of Things was then (ως εν παραταξει) like *that of an Army prepared for Battle*, nearly reſembles the Apoſtle's (ενεςωσα αναγκη) *preſent Neceſſity*. St. *Paul* ſays, 2 *Tim.* ii. 4. (ουδεις ςρατευομενος εμπλεκεται, &c. *no Man that warreth* entangleth *himſelf with the Affairs of this Life*. So *Epictetus* ſays here, that a Cynic muſt not be (εμπεπλεγμενον) entangled *in Relations*, &c. From theſe and many other Paſſages of *Epictetus*, one would be inclined to think, that he was not unacquainted with St. *Paul*'s Epiſtles; or, that he had heard ſomething of the Chriſtian Doctrine. Yet ſee Introduction, §. 40.

Father in-Law; ſome to the other Relations of his Wife; ſome to his Wife herſelf: beſides, after this, he is (*s*) confined to the Care of his Family when ſick, and making Proviſion for their Support. Not to ſpeak of other Things, he muſt have a Veſſel, to warm Water in, to bathe his Child. There muſt be Wool, Oil, a Bed, a Cup, for his Wife, after her Delivery; and thus the Furniture increaſes: more Buſineſs, more Diſtraction. Where, for the future, is this King, whoſe Time is devoted to the public Good?

To whom its Safety, a whole People owes.

Who ought to overſee others; married Men, Fathers of Children: [to obſerve] who treats his Wife well; who, ill: who quarrels: which Family is well regulated; which, not: like a Phyſician, who goes about, and feels the Pulſe of his Patients: "*You* have a Fever; *you* the Head-"ach; *you*, the Gout. Do *you* (*t*) abſtain from "Food: do *you* eat: do *you* omit Bathing: *you* "muſt have an Inciſion made: *you* be cauteriſed." Where ſhall He have Leiſure for this, who is tied down to vulgar Duties? Muſt not he provide Clothes for his Children; and ſend them with Pens, and Ink, and Paper, to a Schoolmaſter? Muſt not he provide a Bed for them? (For

(*s*) Εκκλειεται ſhould be συγκλειεται; and is ſo tranſlated.
(*t*) Ασιτησον. UPTON. WOLFIUS.

(For they cannot be Cynics from their very Birth) Otherwiſe, it would have been better to expoſe them, as ſoon as they were born, than to kill them thus. Do you ſee to what we bring down our Cynic? How we deprive him of his Kingdom? — "Well: but *Crates* (*u*) was "married." The Caſe of which you ſpeak was a particular one, ariſing from Love; and the Woman, another *Crates*. But we are enquiring about

(*u*) *Crates* was a *Theban* of Birth and Fortune, who was ſo charmed by the Appearance of *Telephus*, in the Character of a dirty, ragged Beggar, upon the Stage, that he gave away all his Eſtate, aſſumed the Wallet and Staff, and turned Cynic. *Hipparchia*, a *Thracian* Lady, was ſo affected by the Diſcourſes and Manners of this polite Philoſopher, that ſhe fell deſperately in love with him, and neither the Riches, Beauty, or Diſtinction, of others, who paid their Addreſſes to her, were able to rival him, in her Heart. Her Relations vainly endeavoured to oppoſe her Inclination: ſhe was deaf to all their Remonſtrances; and even threatened to kill herſelf, unleſs ſhe was ſuffered to marry *Crates*. At the Deſire of her Family, he tried, himſelf, to diſſuade her from this Scheme. He pointed out to her the Deformity of his Perſon; and, throwing down his Wallet and Staff before her, told her, theſe were all the Riches ſhe was to expect; and that his Wife muſt purſue the ſame Courſe of Life, as he did: and deſired her to conſider of it. But no Conſideration was able to ſhake her Reſolution. She married him, and became as abſolute a Cynic as himſelf; utterly diſregarding all external Propriety and Decency. See DIOG. LAERTIUS, in their Lives.

about ordinary and (*v*) common Marriages: and in this Enquiry we do not find the Affair mightily ſuited to the Condition of a Cynic.

§. 9. How then ſhall he keep up Society?

For Heaven's ſake do they confer a greater Benefit upon the World, who leave two or three ſniveling Children in their ſtead, than thoſe, who, as far as poſſible, overſee all Mankind; what they do; how they live; what they attend to; what they neglect, contrary to their Duty. Did all they, who left Children to the *Thebans*, do them more Good than *Epaminondas*, who died childleſs? And did *Priam*, who was the Father of fifty Profligates, or *Danaus* (*w*), or *Æolus*, conduce more to

(*v*) Mr. *Upton*'s Reading.

(*w*) *Danaus* and *Egyptus* were the Sons of *Belus*. *Danaus* had fifty Daughters, who, from their Grandfather, were called *Belides*; and *Egyptus*, fifty Sons. After a Quarrel between the two Brothers, a Reconciliation was agreed, upon Condition of a Marriage between their Children. But *Danaus*, having learnt from an Oracle, that he was to be killed by one of his Sons-in-Law, commanded his Daughters to murder their Huſbands, and furniſhed them with Daggers for that Purpoſe. They all, except one, executed this cruel Order. The Poets repreſent them, as puniſhed, in the infernal Regions, by an everlaſting unavailing Attempt, to fill a Sieve with Water.

Æolus was the Father of *Siſyphus*; who, for his infamous Robberies, was killed by *Theſeus*, and, after his Death, condemned, in *Tartarus*, to roll continually a vaſt Stone up a Hill.

to the Advantage of Society, than *Homer?* Shall a military Command, or any other Poſt, then, exempt a Man from marrying, and becoming a Father, ſo that he ſhall be thought to have made ſufficient Amends for the Want of Children: and ſhall not the Kingdom of a Cynic be a proper Compenſation for it? Perhaps we do not underſtand his Grandeur, nor duly repreſent to ourſelves the Character of *Diogenes*; but conſider Cynics as they are now; who ſtand like Dogs watching at Tables, and who imitate the others in nothing, unleſs, perhaps, in breaking Wind; but abſolutely in nothing beſides: elſe this [which you have objected] would not move us; nor ſhould we be aſtoniſhed, that a Cynic will not marry, nor have Children. Conſider, Sir, that he is the Father of Human-kind: that all Men are his Sons, and all Women his Daughters. Thus he attends; thus takes Care of all. What! do you think it is from Impertinence that he rebukes thoſe he meets? He doth it as a Father, as a Brother, as a Miniſter of the common Parent, *Jove*.

§. 10. Aſk me, if you pleaſe, too, Whether a Cynic will engage in the Adminiſtration of the Commonwealth. What Commonwealth do you enquire after, Blockhead, greater than what he adminiſters? Whether *he* will harangue among the *Athenians*,

Athenians, about Revenues and Taxes, whoſe Buſineſs it is to debate with all Mankind; with the *Athenians*, *Corinthians*, and *Romans*, equally: not about Taxes and Revenues, or Peace and War, but about Happineſs and Miſery, Proſperity and Adverſity, Slavery and Freedom. Do you aſk me, whether a Man engages in the Adminiſtration of the Commonwealth, who adminiſters ſuch a Commonwealth as this? Aſk me too, whether he will accept any Command? I will anſwer you again, What Command, Fool, greater than that which he now exerciſes?

§. 11. A Cynic, however, hath need of a Conſtitution duly qualified: for, if he ſhould appear conſumptive, thin, and pale, his Teſtimony hath no longer the ſame Authority. For he muſt not only give a Proof to the Vulgar, by the Conſtancy of his Mind, that it is poſſible to be a Man of Figure and Merit, without thoſe Things that ſtrike *them* with Admiration: but he muſt ſhow too, by his Body, that a ſimple and ſlender Diet, under the open Air, doth no Injury to the Conſtitution. "See, I and my Body are a Witneſs to "this." As *Diogenes* did: for he went about freſh, and plump; and gained the Attention of the Many, by the very Appearance of a healthy Body. But a pitiable Cynic ſeems a mere Beggar: all avoid him; all are offended at him: for he ought not to appear ſlovenly, ſo as to drive People

People from him; but even his rough Negligence ſhould be neat and engaging.

§. 12. Much natural Agreeableneſs and Acuteneſs are likewiſe neceſſary in a Cynic, (otherwiſe he becomes a mere Driveller, and nothing elſe); that he may be able to give an Anſwer readily, and pertinently, upon every Occaſion. Like *Diogenes*, to one who aſked him, "Are you "that *Diogenes*, who do not believe, there are "any Gods?" "How ſo, replied he, when I "think *you* odious to them?" Again: when *Alexander* ſurprized him ſleeping, and repeated,

To waſte long Nights in indolent Repoſe
Ill fits a Chief, who mighty Nations guides,

before he was quite awake, he anſwered,

Directs in Council, and in War preſides.
POPE's Homer, B. II. V. 27.

§. 13. But, above all, the ruling Faculty of a Cynic muſt be purer than the Sun: otherwiſe he muſt neceſſarily be a common Cheat, and a Raſcal; if, while he is guilty of ſome Vice himſelf, he reproves others. For, conſider how the Caſe ſtands. Arms and Guards give a Power to common Kings and Tyrants of reproving, and of puniſhing Delinquents, though they are wicked themſelves: but to a Cynic, inſtead of Arms and Guards, Conſcience gives this Power; when he knows,

knows, that he hath watched and laboured for Mankind: that he hath ſlept pure, and waked ſtill purer: and that he hath regulated all his Thoughts as the Friend, as the Miniſter of the Gods, as a Partner of the Empire of *Jupiter*: that he is ready to ſay, upon all Occaſions,

Conduct me, Jove, *and thou*, *O* Deſtiny.

And, "if it thus pleaſes the Gods, thus let it be." Why ſhould he not dare to ſpeak boldly to his own Brethren, to his Children? in a word, to his Kindred? Hence he, who is thus qualified, is neither impertinent, nor a buſy Body: for he is not buſied about the Affairs of others, but his own, when he overſees the Tranſactions of Men. Otherwiſe ſay, that a General is a buſy Body, when he overſees, examines, and watches his Soldiers; and puniſhes the Diſorderly. But, if you reprove others, at the very Time that you have a Cake [concealed] under your own Arm, I will aſk you; Had you not better, Sir, go into a Corner, and eat up what you have ſtolen? But what have you to do with the Concerns of others? For what are *you?* Are you the Bull in the Herd, or the Queen of the Bees? Show me ſuch Enſigns of Empire, as ſhe hath from Nature. But, if you are a Drone, and arrogate to yourſelf the Kingdom of the Bees, do not you think, that your fellow Citizens will drive you out, juſt as the Bees do the Drones?

§. 14. A Cynic muſt, beſides, have ſo much Patience, as to ſeem inſenſible, and a Stone, to the Vulgar. No one reviles, no one beats, no one affronts *him*; but he hath ſurrendered his Body to be treated at pleaſure, by any one who will. For he remembers, that the Inferior, in whatever Inſtance it is the inferior, muſt be conquered by the Superior: and the Body is inferior to the Multitude, the Weaker to the Stronger. He never therefore, enters into a Combat where he can be conquered; but immediately gives up what belongs to others: he doth not claim what is ſlaviſh and dependent: but, where Choice, and the Uſe of the Appearances, are concerned, you will ſee, that he hath ſo many Eyes, you would ſay *Argos* was blind to him. Is his Aſſent ever precipitate? His Purſuits, ever raſh? His Deſire, ever diſappointed? His Averſion, ever incurred? His Intention, ever fruitleſs? Is he ever querulous, ever dejected, ever envious? Here lies all his Attention and Application. With regard to other Things, he ſnores ſupine. All is Peace. There is no Robber, no Tyrant of the Choice. — But of the Body? — Yes. — The Eſtate? — Yes. — Magiſtracies and Honours? — Yes. And what doth he care for theſe? When any one therefore would frighten him with them, he ſays, "Go, "look for Children: Vizards are frightful to "*Them*;

" *Them*; but *I* know they are only Shell, and " have nothing withinſide."

§. 15. Such is the Affair about which you are deliberating: therefore, if you pleaſe, for Heaven's ſake, defer it; and firſt conſider how you are prepared for it. Mind what *Hector* ſays to *Andromache*.

No more — but haſten to thy Taſks at home,
There guide the Spindle, and direct the Loom.
Me, Glory ſummons, to the Martial Scene,
The Field of Combat is the Sphere for Men.

POPE's Homer.

Thus conſcious he was of his own Qualifications, and of her Weakneſs.

CHAP. XXIII.

Concerning ſuch as read and diſpute, oſtentatiouſly.

§. 1. FIRST ſay to yourſelf, what you would be; and then do, what you have to do. For, in almoſt every thing elſe, we ſee this to be the Practice. Olympic Champions firſt determine what they would be, and then act accordingly. To a Racer, in a longer Courſe, there muſt be one kind of Diet, Walking, Anointing, and Exerciſe: to one in a ſhorter, all theſe muſt be different; and to a Pentathlete (*a*), ſtill more different. You will find the Caſe the ſame in the

(*a*) See Vol. II. Note (*a*) p. 2.

manual Arts. If a Carpenter, you muſt have ſuch and ſuch Things: if a Smith, ſuch other. For, if we do not refer each of our Actions to ſome End, we ſhall act at random: if to an improper one, we ſhall miſs our Aim. Further: there is a general and a particular End. Firſt, to act as a Man. What is comprehended in this? Not to be, though gentle, like a Sheep; nor miſchievous, like a wild Beaſt. But the particular End relates to the Study, and Choice of each Individual. A Harper is to act as a Harper; a Carpenter, as a Carpenter; a Philoſopher, as a Philoſopher; an Orator, as an Orator. When therefore you ſay, "Come, and hear me read:" obſerve firſt, not to do this at random; and, in the next Place, after you have found to what End you refer it, conſider whether it be a proper one. Would you be uſeful, or be praiſed? You preſently hear him ſay, "What do I value the Praiſe "of the Multitude?" And he ſays well: for this is nothing to a Muſician, or a Geometrician, as ſuch. You would be uſeful then. In what? Tell us, that we too may run, to make Part of your Audience. Now, is it poſſible for any one to benefit others, who hath received no Benefit himſelf? No: for neither can he, who is not a Carpenter, or a Shoemaker, benefit any, in reſpect to thoſe Arts. Would you know then, whether you have received Benefit? Produce your Principles,

Principles, Philoſopher: What is the Aim and Promiſe of Deſire? Not to be diſappointed. What of Averſion? Not to be incurred. Come: do we fulfil this Promiſe? Tell me the Truth: but, if you falſify, I will tell it *you*. The other Day, when your Audience came but coldly together, and did not receive what you ſaid, with Acclamations of Applauſe, you went away dejected. Again: the other Day, when you were praiſed, you went about, aſking every body, "What did "you think of me?"—"Upon my Life, Sir, it "was prodigious."—"But, how did I expreſs "myſelf upon that Subject?"—"Which?"—"Where I gave a Deſcription of *Pan*, and the "*Nymphs* (*b*)."—"Moſt excellently."—And do you tell me, after this, that you regulate your Deſires and Averſions conformably to Nature? Get you gone. Perſuade ſomebody elſe. Did not you, the other Day, praiſe a Man, contrary to your own Opinion? Did not you flatter a certain Senator? Would you wiſh your own Children to be like him?—"Heaven forbid!"—"Why "then did you praiſe and cajole him?"—"He "is an ingenuous young Man, and attentive to "Diſcourſes."—"How ſo?"—"He admires "*me*." Now indeed you have produced your Proof. After all, what do you think? Do not

(*b*) Mr *Upton* obſerves, that theſe florid Deſcriptions were the principal Study of the Sophiſts.

theſe very People ſecretly deſpiſe you? When therefore a Man, conſcious of no good Action, or Intention, finds ſome Philoſopher ſaying, "You are a great Genius, and of a frank and "candid Diſpoſition;" what do you think he ſays, but, "This Man hath ſome Need of me." Pray tell me, what Action of a great Genius he hath ſhown. You ſee, he hath long converſed with you, hath heard your Diſcourſes, hath heard your Lectures. Hath he turned his Attention to himſelf? Hath he perceived his own Faults? Hath he thrown off his Conceit? Doth he ſeek an Inſtructor? — Yes, he doth. — An Inſtructor how to *live?* No, Fool; but how to *talk:* for it is upon this Account that he admires *you.* Hear what he ſays. "This Man writes with very great "Art, and much more finely than *Dion* (*c*)." That is quite another thing. Doth he ſay, This is a modeſt, faithful, calm Perſon? But, if he ſaid this too, I would aſk him, ſince he is *faithful*, What is it to be *faithful* (*d*)? And, if he could not tell, I would add, Firſt learn the Meaning of what you ſay, and then ſpeak. While you are in this bad Diſpoſition then, and gaping after Applauders,

(*c*) *Dion* was a *Greek* Writer of thoſe Times; called, for his Eloquence, *Chryſoſtom*, or Golden-mouthed: as one of the Fathers of the Church was afterwards.

(*d*) The Senſe ſeems abſolutely to require, that the latter ουτος ſhould be either expunged or changed into τουτο.

plauders, and counting your Hearers, would you be of Benefit to others? "To-day I had many "more Hearers." "Yes, many: we think there "were five hundred." You ſay nothing: make them a Thouſand. — "*Dion* never had ſo great "an Audience." "How ſhould he?"—"And "they have a fine Taſte for Diſcourſes." — "What is excellent, Sir, will move even a Stone." Here is the Language of a Philoſpher! Here is the Diſpoſition of one, who is to be beneficial to Mankind! Here is the Man, attentive to Diſcourſes! Who hath read the Works of the *Socratic* Philoſophers, as ſuch; not as if they were the Writings of Orators, like *Lyſias* and *Iſocrates*. "*I have often wondered by what Arguments*, (*e*), "&c. No: *By what Argument:* that is the "more perfectly accurate Expreſſion." Is this to have read them any otherwiſe, than as you read little Pieces of Poetry? If you read them as you ought, you would not dwell on ſuch Trifles; but would rather conſider ſuch a Paſſage as this: Anytus *and* Melitus *may kill*; *but they cannot hurt me.* And, *I am always ſo diſpoſed, as to regard none of my Friends, but that Reaſon, which, after Examination, appears to me to be the beſt.* Hence, who

(*e*) Theſe Words are the Beginning of *Xenophon*'s Memoirs of *Socrates*; and it was a Debate among the minute Critics, whether *Argument* or *Arguments* was the proper Reading. UPTON.

ever heard *Socrates* ſay, "I know, or teach, any "thing?" But he ſent different People to different Inſtructors: ſo they came to him, deſiring to be recommended to the Philoſophers; and he took and recommended them. No: but I warrant you, as he accompanied them, he uſed to give them ſuch Advice as this: "Hear *me* diſcourſe "To-day at the Houſe of *Quadratus (f)*." — Why ſhould I hear you? Have you a Mind to ſhow me how finely you put Words together, Sir? And what Good doth that do you? "But praiſe "me." — What do you mean by praiſing you? — Say, incomparable! prodigious! — Well: I do ſay it. But, if Praiſe be that which the Philoſophers call by the Appellation of *Good*, what have I to praiſe you for? If it be a Good to ſpeak well, teach me, and I will praiſe you. — "What then, "ought theſe Things to be heard without Plea-"ſure?"—By no means. I do not hear even a Harper, without Pleaſure; but am I therefore to ſtand playing upon the Harp? Hear what *Socrates* ſays to his Judges. "It would not be decent "for me to appear before you, at this Age, com-"poſing Speeches, like a Boy." Like a Boy, ſays he. For it is, without doubt, a pretty Knack, to chuſe out Words, and place them together: and then to read or ſpeak them gracefully in public;

(f) It might be uſual for Perſons of Faſhion to lend their Houſes, for Sophiſts and Orators to declaim in. UPTON.

lic; and, in the midſt of the Diſcourſe, to obſerve, that "he vows by all that is good, there "are but Few capable of theſe Things." But doth a Philoſopher apply to People to hear him? Doth not he attract thoſe who are fitted to receive Benefit from him, in the ſome manner as the Sun, or their neceſſary Food doth? What Phyſician applies to any body to be cured by him? (Though now indeed I hear, that the Phyſicians at *Rome* apply for Patients; but in my Time they were applied to) "I apply to you, to come and hear "that you are in a bad Way; and that you take "care of every thing, but what you ought: that "you know not what is good or evil; and are un-"fortunate, and unhappy." A fine Application! And yet, unleſs the Diſcourſe of a Philoſopher hath this Effect, both that, and the Speaker, are void of Life (*g*). *Rufus* uſed to ſay, If you are at leiſure to praiſe me, I ſpeak to no Purpoſe. And indeed he uſed to ſpeak in ſuch a manner, that each of us, who heard him, ſuppoſed, that ſome Perſon had accuſed us to him; he ſo hit upon what was done by us, and placed the Faults of every one, before his Eyes.

§. 2. The School of a Philoſopher is a Surgery. You are not to go out of it with Pleaſure, but with Pain; for you come there, not in Health: but one

(*g*) St. *James* uſes the ſame Word, when he ſaith, *Faith without Works is dead.*

of you hath a diſlocated Shoulder; another, an Abſceſs; a third, a Fiſtula; a fourth, the Head-ach. And I am then, to ſit uttering pretty trifling Thoughts, and little Exclamations, that, when you have praiſed me, you may each of you go away with the ſame diſlocated Shoulder, the ſame aching Head, the ſame Fiſtula, and the ſame Abſceſs, that you brought? And is it for this that young Men are to travel? And do they leave their Parents, their Friends, their Relations, and their Eſtates, that they may praiſe you, while you are uttering little Exclamations?" Was this the Practice of *Socrates?* Of *Zeno?* Of *Cleanthes?* "What then! is there not in ſpeaking, a Style "and Manner of Exhortation?" — Who denies it? Juſt as there is a Manner of Confutation, and of Inſtruction. But whoever therefore, added that of *Oſtentation*, for a fourth? For in what doth the exhortatory Manner conſiſt? In being able to ſhow to one and all, the Contradictions in which they are involved; and that they care for every thing rather than what they mean to care for: for they mean the Things conducive to Happineſs; but they ſeek them where they are not to be found. To effect this, muſt a thouſand Seats be placed, and an Audience invited; and you, in a fine Robe, or Cloke, aſcend the Roſtrum, and deſcribe the Death of *Achilles?* Forbear, for Heaven's ſake, to bring, as far as you are able, good Words

Words and Practices into Diſgrace. Nothing, to be ſure, gives more Force to Exhortation, than when the Speaker ſhows, that he hath need of the Hearers! but tell me, who, when he hears you reading or ſpeaking, is ſolicitous about *himſelf?* Or turns his Attention upon *himſelf?* Or ſays, when he is gone away, "The Philoſopher hit "me well." Inſtead of this, even though you are in high Vogue, is not all that one Man ſays; "He ſpoke finely about *Xerxes.*" — "No, ſays "another; but on the Battle of *Thermopylæ.*" Is this the Audience of a Philoſopher?

CHAP. XXIV.

That we ought not to be affected, by Things not in our own Power.

§. 1. LET not what is contrary to Nature in another, be an Evil to you: for you were not born to be depreſſed, and unhappy, along with others; but to be happy, along with them. And if any is unhappy, remember, that he is ſo for himſelf: for God made all Men to enjoy Felicity, and a ſettled good Condition. He hath furniſhed all with Means for this Purpoſe; having given them ſome Things for their own; others, not for their own. Whatever is ſubject to Reſtraint, Compulſion, or Deprivation, not their own: whatever is not ſubject to Reſtraint,

their own. And the Eſſence of Good and Evil, he hath placed in Things which are our own; as it became Him, who provides for, and protects us, with paternal Care.

But I have parted with ſuch a one, and he is in Grief.

And why did he eſteem what belonged to another, his own? Why did he not conſider, while he was pleaſed with ſeeing you, that you are mortal, that you are ſubject to change your Abode? Therefore he bears the Puniſhment of his own Folly. But to what Purpoſe, or for what Cauſe do you too break (*a*) your Spirits? Have not *you* neither ſtudied theſe Things? But, like trifling, ſilly Women, conſidered the Things you delighted in; the Places, the Perſons, the Converſations, as if they were to laſt for ever; and now ſit crying, becauſe you do not ſee the ſame People, nor live in the ſame Place? Indeed you deſerve to be ſo affected, and thus to become more wretched than Ravens or Crows; which, without groaning, or longing for their former State, can fly where they will,

(*a*) There is no need of *Salmaſius*'s Change of αντι τινος, &c. to αντιτεινεις, &c. if, for επι τι κλας, one reads επικλᾶς. The τι might ariſe from a Miſtake in writing πι twice over. Επεκλασεν is uſed in the ſame Senſe, in L. 3. c. 26. p. 527. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition. If κλαω hath it, the preſent Reading may ſtand.

will, build their Neſts in another Place, and croſs the Seas.

Ay: but this happens from their Want of Reaſon.

Was Reaſon then given to us by the Gods, for the Purpoſe of Unhappineſs and Miſery, to make us live wretched and lamenting? O, by all means, let every one be immortal! Let nobody go from home! Let us never go from home ourſelves, but remain rooted to a Spot, like Plants! And, if any of our Acquaintance ſhould quit his Abode, let us ſit and cry; and when he comes back, let us dance, and clap our Hands, like Children. Shall we never wean ourſelves, and remember what we have heard from the Philoſophers, (unleſs we have heard them only as juggling Enchanters;) That the World is one great City, and the Subſtance one, out of which it is formed: that there muſt neceſſarily be a certain Rotation of Things: that ſome muſt give way to others; ſome be diſſolved, and others riſe in their ſtead: ſome remain in the ſame Situation, and others be moved: but that all is full of Friendſhip: firſt of the Gods, and then of Men, by Nature endeared to each other: that ſome muſt be ſeparated; others live together, rejoicing in the Preſent, and not grieving for the Abſent: and that Man, beſides a natural Greatneſs of Mind, and Contempt of Things independent on Choice, is likewiſe formed not to be rooted to the Earth: but

to

to go at different Times to different Places; ſometimes on urgent Occaſions, and ſometimes merely for the ſake of Obſervation. Such was the Caſe of *Ulyſſes*; who,

Wand'ring from Clime to Clime obſervant ſtray'd,
Their Manners noted, and their States ſurvey'd.
POPE's Odyſſ. I.

And yet, before him, of *Hercules*, to travel over the World.

Juſt and unjuſt recording in his Mind,
And, with ſure Eyes, inſpecting all Mankind.
POPE's Odyſſ. XVII. v. 580.

To expel and clear away the one, and, in its ſtead, to introduce the other. Yet how many Friends do you think he muſt have at *Thebes?* How many at *Argos?* How many at *Athens?* And how many did he acquire in his Travels? He married too, when he thought it a proper Time, and became a Father, and then quitted his Children; not lamenting and longing for them, nor as if he had left them Orphans: for he knew, that no human Creature is an Orphan; but that there is a Father, who always and without Intermiſſion, takes care of all. For he had not merely heard it, as Matter of Talk, that *Jupiter* was the Father of Mankind; but he eſteemed and called him his own Father, and performed all that he did, with a View

a View to Him. Hence, he was, in every Place, able to live happy. But it is never poſſible to make Happineſs conſiſtent with a Deſire of what is not preſent. For (*b*) what is happy muſt have all it wiſhes for: muſt reſemble a Perſon ſatisfied with Food: there muſt be no Thirſt, no Hunger.

But *Ulyſſes* longed for his Wife, and ſat crying on a Rock.

Why: do you mind *Homer*, and his Fables, in every thing? Or, if *Ulyſſes* really did cry, what was he, but a wretched Man? But what wiſe and good Man is wretched? The Univerſe is ſurely but ill governed, unleſs *Jupiter* takes care, that his Subjects may be happy like himſelf. But theſe are unlawful and profane Thoughts; and *Ulyſſes*, if he did indeed cry and bewail himſelf, was not a good Man. For who can be a good Man, who doth not know what he is? And who knows this, and forgets, that all things made are periſhable; and that it is not poſſible for Man and Man always to live together? What then? To deſire Impoſſibilities is baſe and fooliſh: it is the Behaviour of a (*c*) Stranger [to the World]; of one who fights againſt God, the only Way he can, by his Principles.

But

(*b*) Το γαρ ευδαιμονουν απεχειν δει παντα ἁ θελει, πεπληρωμενω τινι εοικεναι. This bears a ſtrong Reſemblance to απεχω δε παντα και περισσευω, πεπληρωμαι, &c. *Phil.* iv. 18.

(*c*) The *Greek* ſhould be pointed, ξενου, θεομαχουντες,

But my Mother grieves, when ſhe doth not ſee me.

And why hath not ſhe learnt theſe Doctrines? I do not ſay, that Care ought not to be taken that ſhe may not lament; but that we are not to wiſh abſolutely, what is not in our own Power. Now, the Grief of another is not in our Power: but my own Grief is. I will therefore abſolutely ſuppreſs my own, for that is in my Power; and I will endeavour to ſuppreſs another's Grief, as far as I am able: but I will not endeavour it abſolutely, otherwiſe I ſhall fight againſt God; I ſhall reſiſt *Jupiter*, and oppoſe him, in the Adminiſtration of the Univerſe. And not only my (*d*) Children's Children will bear the Puniſhment of this Diſobedience, and Fighting againſt God, but I myſelf too; ſtarting, and full of Perturbation, both in the Daytime, and in my Dreams by Night; trembling at every Meſſage, and having my (*e*) Enjoyment dependent on the Intelligence of others. "Some-"body is come from *Rome*." "No Harm, I-"hope." Why, what Harm can happen to you, where you are not? — "From *Greece*." "No "Harm, I hope." Why, at this Rate, every Place

(*d*) An Alluſion to *Homer*.

(*e*) The Tranſlation here follows a Conjecture of *Wolfius*; who reads, for ευπειθειαν, ευπαθειαν. The ſame Word occurs in B. IV. c. 3. p. 582. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition; and is there tranſlated in the ſame manner.

Place may be the Cauſe of Misfortune to you. Is it not enough for you to be unfortunate where you are, but it muſt be beyond Sea too, and by Letters? Such is the Security of your Condition!

But what if my Friends there ſhould be dead?

What indeed, but that thoſe are dead, who were born to die. Do you at once wiſh to live to be old, and yet not to ſee the Death of any one you love? Do not you know, that, in a long Courſe of Time, many and various Events muſt neceſſarily happen? That a Fever muſt get the better of one; a Highwayman, of another; a Tyrant, of a third? For ſuch is the World we live in; ſuch they who live in it with us. Heats and Colds, improper Diet, Journies, Voyages, Winds, and various Accidents deſtroy ſome, baniſh others; deſtine one to an Embaſſy, another to a Camp. And now, pray, ſit in a Flutter about all theſe Things; lamenting, diſappointed, wretched, dependent on another; and that not one or two, but ten thouſand times ten thouſand.

§. 2. Is this what you have heard from the Philoſophers? This what you have learnt? Do not you know *(f)* what ſort of a Thing a Warfare is? One muſt keep Guard; another go out for a Spy; another, to Battle too. It is neither poſſible,

(f) The Tranſlation here follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture, in his *Addenda*.

poſſible, that all ſhould be in the ſame Place, nor indeed better: but you, neglecting to perform the Orders of your General, complain, whenever any thing a little hard is commanded; and do not conſider what you make the Army become, as far as lies in your Power. For, if all ſhould imitate you, nobody will dig a Trench, or throw up a Rampart, or watch, or expoſe himſelf to Danger; but every one will appear uſeleſs to the Expedition. Again: if you were a Sailor in a Voyage, fix upon one Place, and there remain. If it ſhould be neceſſary to climb the Maſt, refuſe to do it; if to run to the Head of the Ship, refuſe to do it. And what Captain will bear you? Would not he throw you over board, as a uſeleſs Piece of Goods, and mere Luggage, and a bad Example to the other Sailors? Thus alſo, in the preſent Caſe: every one's Life is a (*g*) Warfare, and that long and various. You muſt obſerve the Duty of a Soldier, and perform every thing, at the Nod of your General: and even, if poſſible, divine what he would have done. For there is no Compariſon between the above-mentioned General and This, either in Power, or Excellence of Character. You are placed in an extenſive Command,

(*g*) This Figure is frequently uſed both by ſacred and profane Authors. See *Job* vii. 1. *Eph.* vi. 12. 1 *Pet.* ii. 11, &c. *Vivere militare eſt. Life is a State of War.* SEN. Epiſt. 96, &c.

Command, and not in a mean Poſt; but you are a Senator (*b*): Do not you know, that ſuch a one muſt ſpend but little Time on his Affairs at home; but be much abroad, either commanding or obeying; attending on the Duties either of a Magiſtrate, a Soldier, or a Judge? And now pray, would you be fixed and rooted on the ſame Spot, like a Plant?

Why: it is pleaſant.

Who denies it? And ſo is a Ragout pleaſant; and a fine Woman is pleaſant. Is not this juſt what They ſay who make Pleaſure their End? Do not you perceive whoſe Language you have ſpoken? That of *Epicureans* and *Catamites*. And while you follow their Practices, and hold their Principles, do you talk to us of the Doctrines of *Zeno* and *Socrates?* Why do not you throw away, to as great a Diſtance as poſſible, thoſe Ornaments which belong to others, and which you have nothing to do with? What elſe do the *Epicureans* deſire, than to ſleep without Hindrance, and riſe, (*i*) without Compulſion; and, when they are got up, to yawn at their leiſure, and waſh their Face; then write and read what they pleaſe; then prate about ſome Trifle or other, and be applauded

(*b*) Inſtead of Αλλ, ασι Βυλευτης, the true Reading, perhaps, is, Αλλα ει Βυλευτης; and it is tranſlated accordingly.

(*i*) The Conjecture of *Wolfius* (αναςηναι) is a good one; and the Tranſlation hath followed it.

plauded by their Friends, whatever they ſay: then go out for a Walk; and, after they have taken a Turn, bathe, and then eat; and then to Bed: in what manner they ſpent their Time there, why ſhould one ſay? For it is eaſily gueſſed. Come: now do *you* alſo tell me, what Courſe of Life *you* deſire to lead, who are a Zealot for Truth, and *Diogenes*, and *Socrates?* What would you do at *Athens?* Theſe very ſame Things? Why then do you call yourſelf a Stoic? They who falſely pretend to the *Roman* Citizenſhip, are puniſhed ſeverely: and muſt thoſe be diſmiſſed with Impunity, who falſely claim ſo great a Thing, and ſo venerable a Title, as you do? Or is this impoſſible; and is there not a divine, and powerful, and inevitable Law, which exacts the greateſt Puniſhments from thoſe, who are guilty of the greateſt Offences? For what ſays this Law? *Let him who claims what doth not belong to him, be arrogant, be vain-glorious, be baſe, be a Slave: let him grieve, let him envy, let him pity; and, in a Word, let him be unhappy, let him lament.*

§. 3. (*k*) What then! would you have me pay my Court to ſuch a one? Would you have me frequent his Door?

If

(*k*) What follows hath no Connexion with what immediately preceded; but belongs to the general Subject of the Chapter.

If Reaſon requires it, for your Country, for your Relations, for Mankind, why ſhould you not go? You are not aſhamed to go to the Door of a Shoemaker, when you want Shoes; nor of a Gardener, when you want Lettuce. Why then of the Rich, when you have ſome ſimilar Want?

Ay: but I am not ſtruck with Awe of a Shoemaker.

Nor of a rich Man neither.

I need not flatter a Gardener.

Nor a rich Man neither.

How then ſhall I get what I want?

Why, do I bid you go, in Expectation of *getting* it? No: only that you may do what becomes yourſelf.

Why then, after all, ſhould I go?

That you may have gone: that you may have diſcharged the Duties of a Citizen, of a Brother, of a Friend. And, after all, remember, that you are going to a Shoemaker, to a Gardener, who hath not the Power of any thing great or reſpectable, though he ſhould ſell it ever ſo dear. You are going to buy Lettuces. They are ſold for a Penny, not for a Talent. So here too, the Matter is worth going to his Door about. Well: I will go. It is worth talking with him about (*l*). Well: I will talk with him. Ay:

(*l*) The Change of the Perſons in theſe Diſcourſes is often ſo ſudden, that it is difficult to diſcover the Speaker; and one can

Ay; but one muſt kiſs his Hand too, and cajole him with Praiſe.

Away with you. That is worth a Talent. It is not expedient for myſelf, nor my Country, nor my fellow Citizens, nor my Friends, to deſtroy the good Citizen, and the Friend [in my own Character.]

But one ſhall appear not to have ſet heartily about the Buſineſs, if one fails.

What, have you forgot again, why you went? Do not you know, that a wiſe and good Man doth nothing for Appearance; but for the ſake of having acted well?

What Advantage then it is to him, to have acted well.

What Advantage is it to one, who writes the Name of *Dion* as he ought? The having writ it.

Is there no Reward then?

Why: do you ſeek any greater Reward, for a good Man, than the doing what is fair and juſt? And yet, at *Olympia*, you deſire nothing elſe; but think it enough, to be crowned Victor. Doth it appear to you ſo ſmall and worthleſs a Thing, to be fair, good and happy? Beſides: being introduced

can judge only from the general Senſe. The Tranſlator hath endeavoured to give this Paſſage the Turn which ſeems moſt agreeable to the Context, without adhering very literally to the ſeveral Words in the *Greek*. *Epictetus*, in this Paragraph, perſonates the Scholar, whom he is exhorting to viſit a great Man.

duced by God into this great City, [the World,] and bound to diſcharge, at this time, the Duties of a Man, do you ſtill want Nurſes and a Mamma; and are you (*m*) moved and effeminated by the Tears of poor fooliſh Women? Are you thus determined never to ceaſe being an Infant? Do not you know, that he who acts like a Child, the older he is, ſo much the more he is ridiculous?

§. 4. (*n*) Did you never viſit any one at *Athens*, at his own Houſe;

Yes: whomſoever I pleaſed.

Why: now you are here, be willing to viſit this Perſon, and you will ſtill ſee whom you pleaſe; only let it be without Meanneſs, without Deſire, or Averſion, and your Affairs will go well: but their going well, or not, doth not conſiſt in going to the Houſe, and ſtanding at the Door, or not; but lies within, in your own Principles; when you have acquired a Contempt of Things independent on Choice, and eſteem none of them your own; but that what belongs to you is only to judge, to think, to exert your Purſuits, your Deſires, and Averſions, right. What further Room is there, after this, for Flattery, for Meanneſs? Why do you ſtill long for the Quiet you enjoyed there (*o*); for Places familiar to you? Stay a little, and theſe will become

(*m*) This refers to a former Part of the Chapter.

(*n*) Here, what was ſaid before, about going to a great Man is again reſumed.

(*o*) At *Athens*.

become familiar to you, in their Turn; and then, if you are ſo mean ſpirited, weep and lament again at leaving theſe.

How then am I to preſerve an affectionate Temper?

As becomes a noble-ſpirited and happy Perſon. For Reaſon will never tell you to be dejected, and broken-hearted; or to depend on another; or to reproach either God, or Man. Be affectionate in ſuch a manner as to obſerve all this. But if, from *Affection*, as you call it, you are to be a Slave, and a Wretch, it is not worth your while to be affectionate. And what reſtrains you from loving any one as a Mortal, as a Perſon who may be obliged to quit you? Pray did not *Socrates* love his own Children? But it was as became one, who was free, and mindful that his firſt Duty was, to gain the Love of the Gods. Hence he violated no Part of the Character of a good Man, either in his Defence, or in fixing a Penalty on himſelf (*p*).

Nor

(*p*) It was the Cuſtom at *Athens*, in Caſes where no fixed Puniſhment was appointed by the Law, before the Judges gave Sentence, to aſk the Criminal himſelf, what Penalty he thought he deſerved. *Socrates* refuſed either to comply with this Form himſelf, or ſuffer any of his Friends to do it for him; alledging, that the naming a Penalty was a Confeſſion of Guilt. When the Judges therefore aſked him, what Penalty he thought he deſerved, he anſwered, "The higheſt Honours, "and Rewards; and to be maintained in the *Prytaneum*, at "the

Nor yet before, when he was a Senator, or a Soldier. But *we* make uſe of every Pretence to be mean-ſpirited; ſome, on the Account of a Child; ſome, of a Mother; and ſome, of a Brother. But it is not fit to be unhappy, on the Account of any one; but happy, on the Account of All; and chiefly of God, who hath conſtituted us for this Purpoſe. What! did *Diogenes* love nobody; who was ſo gentle, and benevolent, as chearfully to undergo ſo many Pains and Miſeries of Body, for the common Good of Mankind? Yes: he did love them: but how? As became a Miniſter of *Jove*; at once taking care of Men, and obedient to God. Hence the whole Earth, not any particular Place, was his Country. And when he was taken Captive, he did not long for *Athens*, and his Friends and Acquaintance there; but made himſelf acquainted with the Pirates, and endeavoured to reform them: and, when he was at laſt ſold, he lived at *Corinth*, juſt as before at *Athens:* and, if he had gone to the *Perrhœbeans* (*q*), he would have been exactly the ſame. Thus is Freedom acquired. Hence he uſed to ſay, "Ever ſince "*Antiſthenes* made me free (*r*), I have ceaſed to

 "be

"the public Expence." An Anſwer which ſo extremely irritated his Judges, that they immediately condemned him to Death. PLATO. CICERO.

(*q*) A People towards the Extremity of *Greece*.

(*r*) *Diogenes* was the Diſciple of *Antiſthenes*. Compare what *Diogenes* ſays of *Antiſthenes* making him free, with *John* viii. 32—36.

" be a Slave." How did *he* make him free? Hear what he ſays. " He taught me what was " my own, and what not. An Eſtate is not my " own. Kindred, Domeſtics, Friends, Reputati- " on, familiar Places, Manner of Life, all belong " to another." " What is your own then?" " The Uſe of the Appearances of Things. He " ſhowed me, that I have *this*, not ſubject to Re- " ſtraint, or Compulſion: no one can hinder or " force me to uſe them, any otherwiſe than I pleaſe. " Who then, after this, hath any Power over me? " *Philip*, or *Alexander*, or *Perdiccas*, or the *Perſian* " King? Whence ſhould they have it? For he " that is to be ſubdued by Man, muſt, long before, " be ſubdued by Things. He therefore, of whom " neither Pleaſure, nor Pain, nor Fame, nor " Riches, can get the better; and who is able, " whenever he thinks fit, to throw away his whole " Body, with Contempt, and depart, whoſe Slave " can he ever be? To whom is he ſubject?" But if *Diogenes* had taken Pleaſure in living at *Athens*, and had been ſubdued by that Manner of Life, his Affairs would have been at every one's Diſpoſal; and whoever was ſtronger, would have had the Power of grieving him. How would he have flattered the Pirates, think you, to make them ſell him to ſome *Athenian*, that he might ſee again the fine *Piræum*, the long Walls, and the Citadel? How would you ſee them, you Wretch? As a diſpirit-

ed

ed Slave? And what Good would that do you?— "No: but free."—Show in what manner, free. See, ſomebody lays hold on you; whoever takes you away from your uſual Manner of Life, and ſays, "You are my Slave: for it is in my Pow- "er to reſtrain you from living as you like. It "is in my Power to (*s*) afflict and humble you. "Whenever I pleaſe, you may be chearful again; "and ſet out, elated, for *Athens*." What do you ſay to him who thus enſlaves you? What Method will you find of getting free? Or dare you not ſo much as look up at him; but, without making many Words, ſupplicate to be diſmiſſed? You ought to go to Priſon, Man, with Alacrity, with Speed, and to precede your Conductors. Inſtead of this, do you regret living at *Rome*, and long for *Greece?* And, when you muſt die, will you then too come crying to us, that you ſhall no more ſee *Athens*, nor walk in the *Lycæum?* Have you travelled for *this?* Is it for *this*, that you have been ſeeking for ſomebody to do you Good? What Good? That you may the more eaſily ſolve Syllogiſms, and manage hypothetical Arguments? And is it for this Reaſon, you left your Brother, your Country, your Friends, your Family, that you might carry back ſuch Improvements as theſe? So that you did not travel for Conſtancy, nor for

(*s*) Inſtead of ἀνεῖναι, the ſenſe ſeems to require ἀνιᾶν; and it is ſo tranſlated.

Tranquillity; nor that, ſecured from Harm, you might complain of no one, accuſe no one: that no one might injure you; and that thus you might preſerve your relative Duties, without Impediment. You have made a fine Traffic of it, to carry home hypothetical Arguments, and convertible Propoſitions! If you pleaſe too, ſit in the Market, and cry them for Sale, as Mountebanks do their Medicines. Why will you not rather deny, that you know even what you have learned; for fear of bringing a Scandal upon Theorems as uſeleſs? What Harm hath Philoſophy done you? In what hath *Chryſippus* injured you, that you ſhould give a Proof, by your Actions, that Philoſophy is of no Value? Had you not Evils enough at home? How many Cauſes for Grief and Lamentation had you there, even if you had not travelled? But you have added more; and, if you ever get any new Acquaintance and Friends, you will find freſh Cauſes for groaning; and, in like manner, if you attach yourſelf to any other Country. To what Purpoſe therefore do you live? To heap Sorrow upon Sorrow, to make you wretched? And then you tell me this is *Affection*. What Affection, Man? If it be good, it is not the Cauſe of any Ill: if ill, I will have nothing to do with it. I was born for my own Good; not Ill.

§. 5. What then is the proper Exerciſe in this Caſe?

First,

First, the higheſt, and principal, and obvious, as it were at your Door, is, that when you attach yourſelf to any thing, it may not be as to what cannot be taken away.

But as to what?

As to ſomething of the ſame kind with an earthen Pot, or a glaſs Cup; that, when it happens to be broken, you may remember not to be troubled (*t*). So here too: when you kiſs your Child, or your Brother, or your Friend, never intirely give way to the Appearance, nor ſuffer the Pleaſure to diffuſe itſelf as far as it will; but curb it, reſtrain it, like thoſe who ſtand behind triumphant Victors, and remind them, that they are Men. Do you likewiſe remind yourſelf, that you love what is mortal; that you love what is not your own. It is allowed you for the preſent, not irrevocably, nor for ever; but as a Fig, or a Bunch of Grapes, in the appointed Seaſon. If you long for theſe in Winter, you are a Fool. So, if you long for your Son, or your Friend, when he is not allowed you, know, you wiſh for Figs in Winter. For as Winter is to a Fig, ſo is every Accident in the Univerſe, to thoſe Things which are taken away by it. In the next place, repreſent to yourſelf Appearances contrary to (*u*) whatever Objects

(*t*) See *Enchiridion*, c. iii.

(*u*) The Tranſlation here follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture. Εν αυτοις οιςισι, &c.

give you Pleaſure. What Harm is there, while you are kiſſing your Child, to ſay ſoftly, "To-"morrow you will die:" and ſo to your Friend, "To-morrow either you or I ſhall go away, and "we ſhall ſee each other no more."

But theſe Sayings are ominous.

And ſo are ſome Incantations: but, becauſe they are uſeful, I do not mind it; only let them be uſeful. But do you call any thing *ominous*, except what is the Signification of ſome Ill? Cowardice is *ominous*; Mean-ſpiritedneſs is *ominous*; Lamentation, Grief, Want of Shame. Theſe are Words of bad Omen; and yet we ought not to be ſcrupulous of uſing them, as a Guard againſt the Things they mean. But do you tell me, that a Word is *ominous* which is ſignificant of any thing natural? Say too, that it is *ominous*, for Ears of Corn to be reaped; for this ſignifies the Deſtruction of the Corn; but not of the World. Say too, that the Fall of the Leaf is *ominous*; and that a candied Maſs ſhould be produced from Figs; and Raiſins, from Grapes. For all theſe are Changes from a former, into another State; not a Deſtruction, but a certain appointed Oeconomy and Adminiſtration. Such is Abſence, a ſmall Change: ſuch is Death, a greater Change: not from what now is nothing, but to what now is not.

What

(*w*) What then, ſhall I be no more?

You will be: but [you will be] ſome thing elſe, of which, at preſent, the World hath no Need: for even *you* were not produced when you pleaſed, but when the World hath Need [of you.] Hence a wiſe and good Man, mindful who he is, and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is attentive only how he may fill his Poſt regularly, and dutifully to God. "Is it thy Pleaſure I ſhould "any longer continue in being? I will continue, "free, ſpirited, agreeably to thy Pleaſure: for "Thou haſt made me incapable of Reſtraint, in "what is my own. But haſt Thou no farther "Uſe for me? Fare thou well! I have ſtaid thus "long for thy Sake alone, and no other; and "now I depart in Obedience to Thee." — "How do you depart?" — "Again: agreeably "to thy Pleaſure; as free, as thy Servant, as one "ſenſible of thy Commands, and thy Prohibitions. But, while I am employed in thy Service, "*what* wouldſt Thou have me be? A Prince, or "a private Man; a Senator, or a Plebeian; a "Soldier, or a General; a Preceptor, or a "Maſter of a Family? Whatever Poſt or Rank

(*w*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Tranſpoſition of ουκ. The Meaning of the Paſſage is, that, though the perſonal Exiſtence is diſſolved, and deſtroyed by Death, the Subſtance, out of which it was produced, remains, under ſome other Form; which was the Stoic Doctrine.

" Thou ſhalt aſſign me, like *Socrates*, I will die a " thouſand times rather than deſert it. *Where* " wouldſt thou have me be? At *Rome*, or at *A-* " *thens*; at *Thebes*, or at *Gyaros?* Only remember " me there. If Thou ſhalt ſend me, where Men " cannot live conformably to Nature, I do not " depart from thence (*x*), in Diſobedience to thy " Will; but as receiving my Signal of Retreat " from Thee. I do not deſert Thee: Heaven " forbid! but I perceive Thou haſt no Uſe for " me. If a Life conformable to Nature be grant- " ed, I will ſeek no other Place, but that in " which I am; nor any other Company, but " thoſe with whom I am."

§. 6. Let theſe Things be ready at hand, Night and Day. Theſe Things write; theſe Things read; of theſe Things talk both to yourſelf and others. [Aſk them,] " Have you any Aſſiſtance " to give me for this Purpoſe?" And again, go and aſk another, and another. Then if any of thoſe Things ſhould happen that are ſaid to be againſt our Will, immediately this will be a Relief to you; in the firſt Place, that it was not unexpected. For it is a great Matter upon all Occaſions, to [be able to] ſay (*y*), " I knew that I " begot one born to die." Thus do you ſay too; " I

(*x*) Απιθων. WOLFIUS.

(*y*) This was ſaid by *Xenophon*, when News was brought him, that his Son *Gryllus* was killed in a Battle.

" I knew that I was liable to die, to remove, to " be exiled, to be impriſoned." If afterwards you turn to youſelf, and ſeek from what Quarter the Event proceeds, you will preſently recollect: " It is from Things independent on Choice; " not from what is my own. What then is it to " me?" Then, farther (which is the chief): Who ſent it? The Commander, the General, the City, the Law of the City? Give it me then; for I muſt always obey the Law in all Things. Farther yet: when any Appearance moleſts you (for [to prevent] *that*, is not in your Power,) ſtrive againſt it; and, by Reaſon, conquer it. Do not ſuffer it to gain Strength, nor to lead you on to Conſequences; and repreſent what, and how, it pleaſes. If you are at *Gyaros*, do not repreſent to yourſelf the Manner of Living at *Rome*; how many Pleaſures you uſed to find there, and how many would attend your Return; but be intent on this Point; How he, who lives at *Gyaros*, may live with Spirit and Comfort, at *Gyaros*. And, if you are at *Rome*, do not repreſent to yourſelf the Manner of Living at *Athens*: but conſider only, how you ought to live where you are. Laſtly: to all other Pleaſures oppoſe that of being conſcious, that you are obeying God; and performing not in Word, but in Deed, the Duty of a wiſe and good Man. How great a Thing is it to be able to ſay to yourſelf, " What others are

" now ſolemnly arguing in the Schools, and ſeem " to carry beyond Probability, this I am [actu- " ally] performing. They are ſitting and expa- " tiating upon *my* Virtues, and diſputing about " *me*, and celebrating *me*. *Jupiter* hath been " pleaſed to let me receive a Demonſtration of " this from myſelf; and indeed that *He* may know " whether he hath a Soldier, a Citizen, ſuch as " he ſhould be, and to produce me as a Witneſs " to other Men, concerning Things independent " on Choice. See that your Fears were vain, " your Appetites vain. Seek not Good from " without: ſeek it in yourſelves, or you will ne- " ver find it. For this Reaſon, he now brings " me hither, now ſends me thither; ſhows me " to Mankind, poor, without Authority, ſick; " ſends me to *Gyaros*; leads me to Priſon: not " that he hates me: Heaven forbid! For who " hates the beſt of his Servants? Nor that he " neglects me: for he doth not neglect any one " of the ſmalleſt (z) Things: but to exerciſe me, " and make uſe of me as a Witneſs to others. " Appointed to ſuch a Service, do I ſtill care " where I am, or with whom, or what is ſaid of " me, inſtead of being wholly attentive to God, " and to his Orders and Commands?"

§. 7.

(z) Compare this with the Deſcription of the univerſal Care of Providence, *Matth.* x. 29, 30. and the Occaſion on which it was introduced.

§. 7. Having theſe Things always at hand, and practiſing them by yourſelf, and making them ready for Uſe, you will never want any one to comfort and ſtrengthen you. For Shame doth not conſiſt in not having any thing to eat, but in not having Reaſon enough to exempt you from Fear and Sorrow. But, if you once acquire that Exemption, will a Tyrant, or his Guards, or Courtiers, be any thing to you? Will any Deſtination of Offices, or they who offer Sacrifices in the Capitol, on being admitted into the Emperor's Train, give *you* Uneaſineſs, who have received ſo great a Command from *Jupiter?* Only, do not make a Parade of it, nor grow inſolent upon it. But ſhow it by your Actions: and, though no one ſhould perceive it, be content, that you are well, and happy.

CHAP. XXV.

Concerning Thoſe who deſiſt from their Purpoſe.

§. 1. CONSIDER which of the Things, which you at firſt propoſed to yourſelf, you have retained, which not, and how; which give you Pleaſure, which Pain, in the Reflection; and if poſſible, recover yourſelf, where you have failed. For the Champions, in this greateſt of Combats, muſt not grow weary; but are even con-

tentedly to bear Whipping. For this is no Combat of Wreſtling or Boxing; where both he who ſucceeds, and he who doth not ſucceed, may poſſibly be of very great Worth, or of little; indeed may be very fortunate, or very miſerable: but the Combat is for good Fortune and Happineſs itſelf. What is the Caſe then? *Here*, even if we have renounced the Conteſt, no one reſtrains us from renewing it; nor need we wait for another four Years, for the Return of another *Olympiad*: but recollecting, and recovering yourſelf, and returning with the ſame Zeal, you may renew it immediately: and even if you ſhould again yield, you may again begin: and, if you once get the Victory, you become like one who hath never yielded. Only do not begin, from a Habit of this, to do it with Pleaſure, and then, like Quails that have fled the Pit (*a*), go about as if you were a brave Champion, though you have been conquered, all the Games round (*b*).—"The Appear-

"ance

(*a*) Is was a Sport among the *Greeks*, to put Quails in a circular Space, like our Cockpits, and uſe various Ways of trying their Courage. If the Quail ran away out of the Pit, its Maſter loſt.

(*b*) An Alluſion to the *Pythian*, *Iſthmian*, *Nemean*, and *Olympic* Games. The Perſons who were victorious in all theſe, were diſtinguiſhed by a particular Name; ſignifying, that they had been Conquerors through the whole Circle of the Games. UPTON.

" ance of a pretty Girl conquers me." What then? " Have not I been conquered before? " I have a mind to rail at ſomebody. Well: " have not I railed before?" — You talk to us juſt as if you had come off unhurt. Like one that ſhould ſay to his Phyſician, who had forbidden him to bathe, " Why, did not I bathe before?" Suppoſe the Phyſician ſhould anſwer him, " Well: " and what was the Conſequence of your Bath- " ing? Were not you feveriſh? Had not you " the Head-ach?" So, when you before railed at ſome body, did not you act like an ill-natured Perſon; like an impertinent one? Have not you fed this Habit of yours, by Actions familiar to it? When you were conquered by a pretty Girl, did you come off with Impunity? Why then do you talk of what you have done *before?* You ought to remember it, I think, as Slaves do Whipping, ſo as to refrain from the ſame Faults. — " But the Caſe is unlike: for there it is Pain " that Cauſes the Remembrance: but what is " the Pain, what the Puniſhment, of my com- " mitting Faults? For when was I ever habitu- " ated [by any Suffering] to avoiding acting ill?" — Therefore the Pains of Experience, whether we will, or not, have their Uſe.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

Concerning thoſe who are in Dread of Want.

§. 1. (*a*) ARE not you aſhamed to be more fearful and mean-ſpirited than fugitive Slaves? To what Eſtates, to what Servants, do *they* truſt, when they run away, and leave their Maſters? Do not they, after carrying off a little with them for the firſt Days, travel over Land and Sea, contriving firſt one, then another Method of getting Food? And what Fugitive ever died with Hunger? But *you* tremble, and lie awake by Night, for fear you ſhould want Neceſſaries. Wretch! are you ſo blind? Do not you ſee the Way where the Want of Neceſſaries leads?

Why, where doth it lead?

Where a Fever, where even a Stone falling on you, leads — to Death. Have not you yourſelf then, often ſaid this to your Companions? Have not you read, have not you written, many Things of this kind? And how often have you arrogantly boaſted, that you are eaſy with regard to Death?

Ay: but my Family too will ſtarve with Hunger.

What

(*a*) Compare this Chapter with the beautiful and affecting Diſcourſes of our Saviour on the ſame Subject, *Matth.* vi. 25—34. *Luke* xii. 22—30.

What then? Doth their Hunger lead any other Way than yours? Is there not the ſame Deſcent? The ſame State below? Will not you then, in every Want and Neceſſity, look with Confidence there, whereeven the moſt Rich and Powerful, and Kings and Tyrants themſelves muſt deſcend? You indeed, hungry perhaps; and they, burſt with Indigeſtion and Drunkenneſs? What Beggar have you almoſt ever ſeen, who did not live to Old-age, nay, to extreme Old-age? Chilled with Cold Day and Night, lying on the Ground, and eating only what is barely neceſſary, they come nearly to an Impoſſibility of Dying.—Cannot you write? Cannot you keep a School? Cannot you be a Watchman at ſomebody's Door?

But it is ſhameful to come to this Neceſſity.

Firſt therefore learn what Things are ſhameful; and then tell us, you are a Philoſopher: but at preſent, do not bear, that even any one elſe ſhould call you ſo. Is that ſhameful to *you*, which is not your own Act? Of which you are not the Cauſe? Which hath happened to you by Accident, like a Fever, or the Head-ach? If your Parents were poor, or left others their Heirs, or, though they are living, do not aſſiſt you, are theſe Things ſhameful for *you?* Is this what you have learned from the Philoſphers? Have you never heard, that what is ſhameful is blameable; and what is blameable deſerves to be blamed? Whom do you blame

blame for an Action not his own, which he hath not done himſelf? Did *you* then make your Father ſuch a one [as he is?] Or is it in *your* Power to mend him? Is that permitted you? What then, muſt you deſire what is not permitted; and, when you fail of it, be *aſhamed?* Are you thus habituated, even when you are ſtudying Philoſophy, to depend upon others, and to hope nothing from yourſelf? Sigh then, and groan, and eat in Fear that you ſhall have no Victuals To-morrow. Tremble, leſt your Servants ſhould rob you, or run away from you, or die. Thus live on, without ceaſing, whoever you are, who have applied to Philoſophy in Name only; and, as much as in you lies, have diſgraced its Theorems, by ſhowing, that they are unprofitable and uſeleſs to thoſe who take up the Profeſſion of them. You have never made Conſtancy, Tranquillity, and Apathy, the Object of your Deſires; have attended on no one upon this Account; but on many, for the ſake of Syllogiſms: nor have ever, by yourſelf, examined any one of theſe Appearances. "Can I bear this, or can I not bear it? What re-" "mains for me to do?" But, as if all your Affairs went ſafe and well, you have dwelt upon the third Claſs (*b*), that of Security from Failure; that you may never fail — Of what? — Fear, Mean ſpiritedneſs, Admiration of Riches, an unaccompliſhed

(*b*) See Introduction, §. 6.

accompliſhed Deſire, and unſucceſsful Averſion. Theſe are the Things which you have been labouring to ſecure. Ought you not firſt to have acquired ſomething by the Uſe of Reaſon, and then to have provided Security for *that?* Whom did you ever ſee building a Round of Battlements, without placing them upon a Wall? And what Porter is ever ſet where there is no Door? But you *ſtudy*. Can you ſhow me what you ſtudy?

Not to be ſhaken by Sophiſtry.

Shaken from what? Show me firſt, what you have in your Cuſtody; what you meaſure, or what you weigh; and then accordingly ſhow me the Balance, or the Buſhel. What ſignifies it to go on, ever ſo long, meaſuring Duſt? Ought you not to ſhow, what makes Men happy, what makes their Affairs proceed as they wiſh? How we may blame no one, accuſe no one; how acquieſce in the Adminiſtration of the Univerſe? Show me theſe Things. "See, I do ſhow them," ſay you; "I will ſolve Syllogiſms to you." — This is the Meaſure, Wretch, and not the Thing meaſured. Hence you now pay the Penalty due for neglecting Philoſophy. You tremble, you lie awake, you adviſe with every body, and if what you are adviſed to doth not pleaſe every body, you think that you have been ill-adviſed. Then you dread Hunger, as you fancy: but it is not Hunger that you dread; but you are afraid, that you ſhall not have a Cook;

a Cook; that you ſhall not have another Perſon for a Butler: another, to pull off your Shoes; a fourth, to dreſs you; others, to rub you: others, to follow you: that when you have undreſſed yourſelf in the Bathing-room, and ſtretched yourſelf out like thoſe who are crucified, you may be rubbed here and there; and the Perſon who preſides over theſe Operations may ſtand by, and ſay, "Come this Way; give your Side; "take hold on his Head; turn your Shoulder:" and that, when you are returned home from the Bath, you may bawl out, "Doth nobody bring "any thing to eat?" And then, "Take away; "wipe the Table." This is your Dread, that you ſhall not be able to lead the Life of a ſick Man. But learn the Life of thoſe in Health: how Slaves live; how, Labourers; how, thoſe who are genuine Philoſophers; how *Socrates* lived, even with a Wife and Children; how, *Diogenes*; how, *Cleanthes* (*c*), at once ſtudying and drawing Water. If theſe are the Things you would have, you will have them every-where, and with a fearleſs Confidence.

In

(*c*) *Cleanthes* was a Stoic Philoſopher, the Diſciple and Succeſſor of *Zeno*. He uſed to draw Water for his Livelihood all Night, and ſtudy all Day. He was ſo poor, that for Want of proper Materials, he uſed to write down what he had heard from his Maſter *Zeno*, on Tiles, and Pieces of Bone.

In what?

In the only Thing that can be confided in; what is ſure, incapable of being reſtrained, or taken away; your own Choice.

§. 2. But why have you contrived to make yourſelf ſo uſeleſs, and good for nothing, that nobody will receive you into their Houſe; nobody take Care of you: but though, if any ſound uſeful Veſſel was thrown out of Doors, whoever finds it, will take it up, and eſteem it as a Gain; yet nobody will take up *you*; but every body eſteem you a Loſs. What, cannot you ſo much as perform the Office of a Dog, or a Cock? Why then do you wiſh to live any longer, if you are ſo worthleſs? Doth any good Man fear, that Food ſhould fail him? It doth not fail the Blind; it doth not fail the Lame. Shall it fail a good Man? A Paymaſter is not wanting to a Soldier, or to a Labourer, or to a Shoemaker; and ſhall one be wanting to a good Man? Is God ſo negligent of his own Inſtitutions; of his Servants; of his Witneſſes, whom alone he makes uſe of as Examples to the Uninſtructed, both that He *is*, and that he adminiſters the

Bone. The Phyſicians ordered him, for a Swelling in his Gums, to abſtain two Days from Food; with which he complied. When he was recovered, they gave him Leave to return to his uſual Diet; which he refuſed; and, ſaying he was now far advanced on his Journey, ſtarved himſelf to Death. DIOG. LAERT.

the Univerſe rightly; and doth not neglect human Affairs; and that no Evil happens to a good Man, either living or dead? What then' is the Caſe, when he doth not beſtow Food? What elſe, than that, like a good General, he hath made me a Signal of Retreat? I obey, I follow; ſpeaking well of my Leader, praiſing his Works. For I came when it ſeemed good to him, and again, when it ſeems good to him, I depart: and in Life it was my Buſineſs to praiſe God, both by myſelf, to each particular Perſon, and to the World. Doth he not grant me many Things? Doth he not grant me Affluence? It is not his Pleaſure, that I ſhould live luxuriouſly: for he did nor grant that even to *Hercules*, his own Son; but another (*d*) reigned over *Argos* and *Mycene*; while *he* lived ſubject to Command, laboured, and was exerciſed. And *Euryſtheus* was juſt what he was; neither King of *Argos*, nor *Mycene*; not being indeed King of himſelf. But *Hercules* was Ruler and Governor of the whole Earth and Seas; the Expeller of Lawleſſneſs and Injuſtice; the Introducer of Juſtice and Sanctity. And this he effected naked and alone. Again: when *Ulyſſes* was ſhipwrecked, and caſt away, did his helpleſs Condition at all deject him? Did it break his Spirit? No: but how did he go to *Nauſicaa*, and her Attendants,

(*d*) *Euryſtheus.*

dants, to aſk thoſe Neceſſaries which it ſeems moſt ſhameful to beg from another?

As the fierce Lion, on the Mountain bred,
Confiding in his Strength ——

Confiding in what? Not in Glory, or in Riches, nor in Dominion; but in his own Strength: that is, in his Principles, concerning what Things are in our own Power; what, not. For theſe alone are what render us free, render us incapable of Reſtraint; raiſe the Head of the Dejected, and make them look, with unaverted Eyes, full in the Face of the Rich, and of the Tyrants: and this was the Gift of the Philoſopher (*e*). But *you* will not ſet out with Confidence; but trembling, about ſuch Trifles as Clothes and Plate. Wretch! have you thus waſted your Time till now?

But what, if I ſhould be ſick?
You will be ſick as you ought.
Who will take care of me?
God: your Friends.
I ſhall lie in a hard Bed.
But like a Man.
I ſhall not have a convenient Room.
You will be ſick in an inconvenient one then.
Who will provide Victuals for me?

They

(*e*) The Senſe would be better, if we read της φιλοσοφιας, of Philoſophy.

They who provide for others too: you will be ſick like *Manes (f)*.

But, beſides, what will be the Concluſion of my Sickneſs? Any other than Death?

Why, do not you know then, that the Origin of all human Evils, and of Mean-ſpiritedneſs, and Cowardice, is not *Death*; but rather the *Fear* of Death? Fortify yourſelf therefore againſt this. Hither let all your Diſcourſes, Readings, Exerciſes, tend. And then you will know, that thus alone are Men made free (*g*).

(*f*) The Name of a Slave, particularly of a Slave who once belonged to *Diogenes*: and perhaps this Expreſſion alludes to ſome Story about him, which is now unknown.

(*g*) There is, I think, in this Diſcourſe, a remarkable Likeneſs to great Part of the xith and xiith Chapters of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews*. The Authors, in each, proceed on the Principle, that *God is*, and *that He is a Rewarder of them, that diligently ſeek Him*: They call the good Perſons, who patiently ſuffer from a Conviction of this Truth, by the ſame Title of *Witneſſes*: and they make Uſe of the ſame *Gymnaſtic* Term *Exerciſes*, to expreſs the Nature of their Trials. The Reſemblance will appear much more ſtrongly, by comparing the Originals.

Both the Apoſtle and the Philoſopher, are endeavouring to impreſs on their Diſciples, the Duty of Dependence on God, and of Confidence in Him: but there is great Difference in the Encouragement, which animated and ſupported the *Cloud of Witneſſes*, cited by the firſt, and thoſe mentioned by the laſt. *Epictetus*, after ſuppoſing it abſurd that a good Man ſhould fail of a Pay-maſter, acknowledges however, that he may happen to be ſtarved; and (as was obſerved

obſerved in a former Note) hath no other Comfort to give him, but the Conſideration, that his Sufferings will be terminated in Death; which, in the Stoic Scheme, was the Loſs of all perſonal Exiſtence; a very different Expectation from that *Recompence of Reward*, which enabled the Worthies of Revelation to ſupport their Afflictions; and to deſpiſe all preſent Pleaſures, inconſiſtent with their Duty. (*Heb.* xi. 24—26.) Again: *Epictetus* propoſes *Hercules* and *Ulyſſes* as illuſtrious Inſtances, that Hardſhips and Sufferings are no Proofs of the Divine Diſpleaſure. He repreſents *Hercules* as the Son of God; and the Deſcription, which he gives, of his Character and Offices, is very ſtriking: eſpecially if one was to render the Words, as they are tranſlated in the Bible, that He *purged Iniquity and Unrighteouſneſs, and brought in Righteouſneſs and Holineſs*. But it muſt be obſerved, that great Part of the Story of *Hercules* was merely imaginary; and even according to *that*, though he deſtroyed many wicked Men, he was far from being a Teacher, or Practiſer of *Righteouſneſs and Holineſs*. His Life is repreſented, as ſullied with Vice and Folly: it was partly ſpent, and at laſt ended, in miſchievous, and deplorable Madneſs. There are at leaſt, equal Objections to be made to the Conduct of the deceitful and cruel *Ulyſſes*. Beſides; theſe Heroes, who are produced by *Epictetus* in Support of his Argument, were cold and unaffecting Inſtances to his Audience; to whom they ſtood in ſo very diſtant a Relation. But the Apoſtle urges an Example deeply intereſting, when he directs his Diſciples to look *unto the Author and Finiſher of* their *Faith, who for the Joy that was ſet before him, endured the Croſs, deſpiſing the Shame, and is ſet down at the right Hand of the Throne of God.*

END *of the* THIRD BOOK.

THE DISCOURSES OF *EPICTETUS.*

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Freedom.

§. 1. HE is free, who lives as he likes; who is not ſubject either to Compulſion, to Reſtraint, or to Violence: whoſe Purſuits are unhindered, his Deſires ſucceſsful, his Averſions unincurred. Who then would wiſh to lead a wrong Courſe of Life? — "No

"No one." — Who would live deceived, prone to miſtake, unjuſt, diſſolute, diſcontented, dejected? — "No one." — No wicked Man then lives as he likes; therefore neither is he free. And who would live in Sorrow, Fear, Envy, Pity; with diſappointed Deſires, and incurred Averſions? — "No one." — Do we then find any of the Wicked exempt from Sorrow, Fear, diſappointed Deſires, incurred Averſions? — "Not "one." — Conſequently then, not free (*a*).

§. 2. If a Perſon who hath been twice Conſul ſhould hear this, provided you add, "but *you* are "a wiſe Man; this is nothing to *you*;" he will forgive you. But if you tell him the Truth; that, in point of Slavery, he doth not differ from thoſe who have been thrice ſold, what muſt you expect, but to be beaten? "For how, ſays he, am "I a Slave? My Father was free, my Mother "free (*b*). Beſides, I am a Senator too, and the "Friend of *Cæſar*; and have been twice Con-"ſul; and have myſelf many Slaves." — In the firſt Place, moſt worthy Sir, perhaps your Father too was a Slave of the ſame kind; and your Mother, and your Grandfather, and all your Anceſtors

(*a*) *Whoſoever committeth Sin, is the Servant of Sin.* John viii. 34.

(*b*) *They anſwered him, We be* Abraham's *Seed, and were never in Bondage to any Man: how ſayeſt thou, Ye ſhall be made free?* John viii. 33.

tors ſucceſſively. But even if they were ever ſo free, what is that to *you?* For what, if they were of a generous, you of a mean Spirit: they, brave; and you, a Coward: they ſober; and you, diſſolute?

§. 3. And, "What, ſays he, is this towards "being a Slave?" (*c*)—Do you think it nothing towards being a Slave, to act againſt your Will? Compelled, and lamenting?—"Be it ſo. But "who can compel me, but the Maſter of All, "*Cæſar?*"—By your own Confeſſion then, you have *one* Maſter: and let not his being, as you ſay, Maſter of All, give you any Comfort; but know that you are a Slave in a great Family. Thus the *Nicopolitans* too, frequently cry out, "By the "Life of *Cæſar*, we are *free!*"

§. 4. For the preſent, however, if you pleaſe, we will let *Cæſar* alone. But tell me this. Have you never been in Love with any one, either of a ſervile or liberal Condition?—"Why, what is "*that* to the being either a Slave, or free?"—Was you never commanded any thing by your Miſtreſs, that you did not chuſe? Have you never flattered your Slave? Have you never kiſſed her Feet? And yet, if you were commanded to kiſs *Cæſar*'s Feet, you would think it an Outrage, and

(*c*) Mr. *Upton*'s Copy tranſpoſes many Pages of this Chapter to their right Place; which, in others, were joined to the laſt Chapter of the Third Book.

an Exceſs of Tyranny. Have you never gone out by Night, where you did not chuſe? Have you never ſpent more than you choſe? Have not you ſometimes uttered your Words with Sighs and Groans? Born to be reviled, and ſhut out of Doors? But, if you are aſhamed to confeſs your own Follies, ſee what *Thraſonides* (*d*) ſays, and doth; who, after having fought more Battles perhaps than you, went out by Night, when *Geta* (*e*) would not dare to go: Nay, had he been compelled to it by him, would have gone roaring, and lamenting his bitter Servitude. And what doth [this Maſter of his] ſay afterwards? "A "ſorry Girl hath enſlaved *me*, whom no Enemy "ever enſlaved."—(Wretch! to be the Slave of a Girl, and a ſorry Girl too! Why then do you ſtill call yourſelf *free?* Why do you boaſt your military Expeditions?) — Then he calls for a Sword, and is angry with the Perſon, who, out of Kindneſs, denies it; and ſends Preſents to her who hates him; and begs, and weeps, and then again is elated on every little Succeſs. But how is he elated even then? Is it ſo, as neither paſſionately to deſire or fear.

§. 5. Conſider, in Animals, what is our Idea of Freedom. Some keep tame Lions, and feed, and

(*d*) A Character in one of the Comedies of *Menander*, called *The Hated Lover*.

(*e*) The Name of a Slave.

and even carry them about with them: and who will ſay, that any ſuch Lion is free? Nay, doth he not live the more ſlaviſhly, the more he lives at Eaſe? And who, that had Senſe and Reaſon, would wiſh to be one of thoſe Lions? Again: How much do Birds, which are taken and kept in a Cage, ſuffer, by trying to fly away? Nay, ſome of them ſtarve with Hunger, rather than undergo ſuch a Life: then, as many of them as are ſaved, it is ſcarcely, and with Difficulty, and in a pining Conditlon; and the Moment they find any Hole, out they hop. Such a Deſire have they of natural Freedom, and to be at their own Diſpoſal, and unreſtrained. — "And what Harm *(f)* doth this "Confinement do you?" — "What ſay you? "I was born to fly where I pleaſe, to live in the "open Air, to ſing when I pleaſe. You deprive "me of all this, and ſay, What *Harm* doth it "do you?"

§. 6. Hence we will allow thoſe only to be free, who do not endure Captivity; but, as ſoon as they are taken, die, and eſcape. Thus *Diogenes* ſomewhere ſays, That the only Way to Freedom is to die with Eaſe. And he writes to the *Perſian* King; "You can no more enſlave the *Athenians*, "than you can Fiſh." — "How? What, ſhall "not I take them?" — "If you do take them, "ſays he, they will leave you, and be gone, like "Fiſh. For take a Fiſh, and it dies. And, if

(f) Wolfius, very rightly, for κακον reads κακον.

" the *Athenians* too die, as ſoon as you have tak-
" en them, of what Uſe are your warlike Pre-
" parations?"—This is the Voice of a free Man, who had examined the Matter in earneſt; and, as it might be expected, found it out. But, if you ſeek it where it is not, what Wonder if you never find it?

§. 7. A Slave wiſhes to be immediately ſet free. Think you it is becauſe he is deſirous to pay his Fine to the Officer (*g*)? No: but becauſe he fancies, that for want of acquiring his Freedom, he hath hitherto lived under Reſtraint, and unproſperouſly. " If I am once ſet free, ſays he, it is all " Proſperity: I care for no one; I ſpeak to All, as " their Equal, and on a Level with them. I go " where I will, I come when (*h*), and how I will." He is at laſt made free; and preſently, having no where to eat, he ſeeks whom he may flatter, with whom he may ſup. He then either ſubmits to the baſeſt and moſt infamous Proſtitution; and if he can obtain Admiſſion to ſome great Man's Table, falls into a Slavery much worſe than the former: or, if the Creature, void of Senſe and right Taſte, happens to acquire an affluent Fortune, he doats upon ſome Girl, laments, and is unhappy, and wiſhes for Slavery again. " For " what Harm did it do me? Another clothed " me

(*g*) See Vol. I. p. 136. Note (*d*).

(*h*) It ſeems neceſſary, that οθεν and οπου ſhould be οταν and οπως; and they are ſo tranſlated.

" me, another ſhod me, another fed me, another " took care of me when I was ſick. It was but " in a few Things, by way of Return, I uſed to " ſerve him. But now, miſerable Wretch! what " do I ſuffer, in being a Slave to many, inſtead " of one! Yet, if I can obtain the Equeſtrian " Rings (*i*), I ſhall live with the utmoſt Proſpe- " rity and Happineſs." In order to obtain them, he firſt ſuffers what he deſerves; and, as ſoon as he hath obtained them, it is all the ſame again. " But then, ſays he, if I do but get a military " Command, I ſhall be delivered from all my " Troubles." He gets a military Command. He ſuffers as much as the vileſt Rogue of a Slave: and, nevertheleſs, he aſks for a ſecond Command, and a third: and when he hath put the finiſhing Hand, and is made a Senator, then he is a Slave indeed. When he comes into the Aſſembly, it is then that he undergoes his fineſt and moſt ſplendid Slavery.

§. 8 ——(*k*). Not to be a Fool; but to learn what *Socrates* taught; the Nature of Things: and not to adapt Pre-conceptions raſhly to particular Subjects. For the Cauſe of all human Evils is, the not being able to adapt general Pre-conceptions to particular Caſes. But different Peo-

(*i*) A Gold Ring was the peculiar Ornament of the *Roman* Knights, by which they were diſtinguiſhed from the Plebeians. UPTON.

(*k*) Something is here wanting in the Original.

ple have different Opinions. One thinks the Cauſe of his Evils to be, that he is ſick. By no means: but that he doth not adapt his Pre-conceptions right. Another, that he is poor: another, that he hath a harſh Father and Mother: another, that he is not in the good Graces of *Cæſar*. This is nothing elſe, but not underſtanding how to adapt our Pre-conceptions. For, who hath not a Pre-conception of Evil, that it is hurtful? That it is to be avoided? That it is by all means to be prudently guarded againſt? One Pre-conception doth not contradict another, except when it comes to be adapted. What then is this Evil, thus hurtful, and to be avoided? "Not to be the Friend of *Cæſar*," ſaith one. He is gone; he fails in the adapting; he is embarraſſed; he ſeeks what is nothing to the Purpoſe. For, if he gets to be *Cæſar*'s Friend, he is never the leſs diſtant from what he ſought. For what is it that every Man ſeeks? To be ſecure, to be happy, to do what he pleaſes without Reſtraint, and without Compulſion. When he becomes the Friend of *Cæſar* then, doth he ceaſe to be reſtrained? To be compelled? Is he ſecure? Is he happy? Whom ſhall we aſk? Whom can we better credit than this very Man, who hath been his Friend? Come forth and tell us, whether you ſleep more quietly now, or before you were the Friend of *Cæſar*?

You

You preſently hear him cry, "Leave off, for Hea-
"ven's ſake, and do not inſult me. You know
"not the Miſeries I ſuffer: there is no Sleep for
"me; but one comes, and ſaith, that *Cæſar* is
"already awake; another, that he is juſt going
"out. Then follow Perturbations, then Cares."
Well: and when did you uſe to ſup more plea-
ſantly, formerly, or now? Hear what he ſays
about this too. When he is not invited, he is
diſtracted: and if he is, he ſups like a Slave with
his Maſter, ſolicitous all the while, not to ſay or
do any thing fooliſh. And what think you? Is
he afraid of being whipped, like a Slave? How
can he hope to eſcape ſo well? No: but as be-
comes ſo great a man, *Cæſar*'s Friend, of loſing
his Head.—And when did you bathe more quietly;
when did you perform your Exerciſes more at your
leiſure; in ſhort, which Life would you rather
wiſh to live, your preſent, or the former? I could
ſwear, there is no one ſo ſtupid and inſenſible (*l*),
as not to deplore his Miſeries, in proportion as he
is more the Friend of *Cæſar*.

§. 9. Since then, neither they who are called
Kings (*m*), nor the Friends of Kings, live as they
like; who, after all, are free? Seek, and you will
find: for you are furniſhed by Nature with Means

(*l*) Αναλγητ⊙ for αναλγης. UPTON.

(*m*) The Stoics held the wiſe Man to be the only real King. UPTON.

for diſcovering the Truth. But, if you are not able by theſe alone to find the Conſequence, hear them who have ſought it. What do they ſay? Do you think Freedom a Good?—"The great-"eſt."—Can any one then, who attains the great-eſt Good be unhappy, or unſucceſsful in his Affairs?—"No."—As many, therefore, as you ſee unhappy, lamenting, unproſperous, confidently pronounce them not free.—"I do."—Henceforth then we have done with buying and ſelling, and ſuch like ſtated Conditions of becoming Slaves. For, if you have made theſe Conceſſions properly, whether a great or a little King, a Conſular, or one twice a Conſul, be unhappy, he is not free. —"Agreed."

§. 10. Further then, anſwer me this: do you think Freedom to be ſomething great, and noble, and valuable? —"How ſhould I not?" —Is it poſſible then, that he who acquires any thing ſo great and valuable, and noble, ſhould be of an abject Spirit? —"It is not." —Whenever then you ſee any one ſubject to another, and flattering him, contrary to his own Opinion, confidently ſay, that He too is not free: and not only if he doth it for a Supper, but even if it be for a Government; nay, a Conſulſhip: but call thoſe indeed little Slaves, who act thus for the ſake of little Things; and the others, as they deſerve, great Slaves.—"Be this "too agreed." —Well: do you think Freedom

to

to be ſomething independent and ſelf-determined?—"How can it be otherwiſe?"—Him then, whom it is in the Power of another to reſtrain or to compel, affirm confidently, to be not free. And do not mind his Grandfathers, or Great Grandfathers; or inquire, whether he hath been bought or ſold: but, if you hear him ſay, from his Heart, and with Emotion, *my Maſter*, though twelve Lictors ſhould march before him, call him a Slave. And, if you ſhould hear him ſay, *Wretch, that I am! what do I ſuffer!* call him a Slave. In ſhort, if you ſee him wailing, complaining, unproſperous, call him a Slave in Purple.—"Suppoſe then he "doth nothing of all this."—Do not yet ſay, he is free; but learn whether his Principles are liable to Compulſion, to Reſtraint, or Diſappointment; and, if you find this to be the Caſe, call him a Slave, keeping Holiday during the *Saturnalia* (*n*). Say, that his Maſter is abroad: he will come preſently; and you will know what he ſuffers.—"Who will come?"—Whoever hath the Power either of beſtowing, or taking away, any of the Things he wiſhes for.—"Have we ſo many Maſ-"ters then?"—We have. For, prior to all ſuch, we have the Things themſelves for our Maſters; now they are many: and it is through theſe, that

(*n*) The Feaſt of *Saturn*, in which the Slaves had a Liberty of ſitting at Table with their Maſters; in Memory of the Equality of Conditions under his Reign.

it becomes neceſſary that ſuch as have the Diſpoſal of them, ſhould be our Maſters too. For no one fears *Cæſar* himſelf; but Death, Baniſhment, Loſs of Goods, Priſon, Diſgrace. Nor doth any one love *Cæſar*, unleſs he be a Perſon of great Worth: but we love Riches, the Tribunate, the Prætorſhip, the Conſulſhip. When we love, and hate, and fear theſe Things, they who have the Diſpoſal of them muſt neceſſarily be our Maſters. Hence we even worſhip them as Gods. For we conſider, that whoever hath the Diſpoſal of the greateſt Advantages, is a Deity: and then we ſubjoin falſely, *but ſuch a one hath the Power of the greateſt Advantages; therefore he is a Deity.* For, if we ſubjoin falſely, the Inference ariſing from thence muſt be falſe likewiſe.

§. 11. "What is it then that makes a Man free "and independent? For neither Riches, nor "Conſulſhip, nor Command of Provinces, or "Kingdoms, make him ſo; but ſomething elſe "muſt be found."—What is it that preſerves any one from being hindered and reſtrained in Writing?—"The Science of Writing."—In Muſic?—"The Science of Muſic."—Therefore, in Life too, the Science of Living. As you have heard it in general then, conſider it likewiſe in Particulars. Is it poſſible for Him to be unreſtrained, who deſires any of thoſe Things, that

are

are in the Power of others?—"No."—Can he avoid being hindered?—"No."—Therefore neither can he be free. Conſider then, whether we have nothing, or all, in our own Power alone, or whether ſome Things are in our own Power and ſome in that of others.—"What do you mean?"—When you would have your Body perfect, is it in your own Power, or is it not?—"It is not."—When you would be healthy?—"Nor this."—When you would be handſome?—"Nor "this."—Live or die?—"Nor this."—Body then is not our own; but ſubject to every thing ſtronger than itſelf.—"Agreed."—Well: is it in your own Power to have an Eſtate when you pleaſe, and ſuch a one as you pleaſe?—"No."—Slaves?—"No."—Clothes?—"No."—A Houſe?—"No."—Horſes? "Indeed none of theſe."—Well: if you would ever ſo fain have your Children live, or your Wife, or your Brother, or your Friends, is it in your own Power?—"No, nor "this."—Will you ſay then, that there is *nothing* independent, which is in your own Power alone, and unalienable? See then, if you have any thing of this ſort.—"I do not know."—But, conſider it thus: Can any one make you aſſent to a Falſhood?—"No one."—In the Topic of Aſſent then, you are unreſtrained and unhindered.—"Agreed:"—Well: and can any one compel you to exert your Purſuits, towards what you do not

not like?—"He can. For when he threatens "me with Death, or Fetters, he compels me to "exert them."—If then you were to deſpiſe dying, or being fettered, would you any longer regard him?—"No."—Is deſpiſing Death then an Action in our Power, or is it not?—"It is."—Is it therefore in your Power alſo, to exert your Purſuits towards any thing, or is it not?—"Agreed, that it is. But in whoſe Power is my "avoiding any thing?"—This too is in your own.—"What then, if, when I am exerting "myſelf to walk, any one ſhould reſtrain me?"—What Part of you can he reſtrain? Can he reſtrain your Aſſent?—"No: but my Body."—Ay, as he may a Stone.—"Be it ſo. But ſtill I "walk no more."—And who told you, that Walking was an Action of your own, that cannot be reſtrained? For I only ſaid, that your exerting yourſelf towards it could not be reſtrained. But, where there is need of Body, and its Aſſiſtance, you have already heard, that nothing is in your Power.—"Be this too agreed."—And can any one compel you to deſire againſt your Will?—"No one."—Or to propoſe, or intend, or, in ſhort, not to make uſe of the Appearances which preſent themſelves to you?—"Nor this. But "when I deſire any thing, he will reſtrain me "from obtaining what I deſire."—If you deſire any thing that is your own, and that cannot be reſtrained,

reſtrained, how can He reſtrain you?"—"By no "means."—And pray who tells you, that he who deſires what depends on another, cannot be reſtrained?—"May not I deſire Health then?" —By no means: nor any thing elſe that depends on another; for what is not in your own Power, either to procure, or to preſerve, when you will, *that* belongs to another. Keep off not only your Hands from it, but, far prior to theſe, your Deſires. Otherwiſe you have given yourſelf up a Slave: you have put your Neck under the Yoke, if you admire any of the Things not your own, but ſubject and mortal, to which ſoever of them you are attached.—"Is not my Hand my own?" —It is a Part of you; but it is, by Nature, Clay; liable to Reſtraint, to Compulſion; a Slave to every thing ſtronger than itſelf. And why do I ſay your *Hand?* You ought to poſſeſs your whole *Body* as a paultry Aſs, with a Pack-ſaddle on, as long as may be, as long as it is allowed you. But, if there ſhould come a Preſs (*o*), and a Soldier ſhould lay hold on it, let it go. Do not reſiſt, or murmur: otherwiſe you will be firſt beat, and loſe the Aſs after all. And, ſince you are to conſider, the Body [itſelf] in this manner, think what remains to do concerning thoſe Things which are provided for the Sake of the Body. If *that* be an Aſs,

(*o*) Beaſts of Burden and Carriages are preſſed, for the Uſe of Armies, when Need requires.

Aſs, the reſt are Bridles, Pack-ſaddles, Shoes, Oats, Hay, for the Aſs. Let theſe go too. Quit them more eaſily and expeditiouſly, than the Aſs. And when you are thus prepared, and thus exerciſed, to diſtinguiſh what belongs to others from your own; what is liable to Reſtraint, from what is not; to eſteem the one your own Property, the other not; to keep your Deſire, to keep your Averſion, carefully turned to this Point; whom have you any longer to fear?—"No one."—For about what ſhould you be afraid? About what is your own, in which conſiſts the Eſſence of Good and Evil? And who hath any Power over *this?* Who can take it away? Who can hinder you? No more than God [can be hindered]. But are you afraid for Body, for Poſſeſſions, for what belongs to others, for what is nothing to you? And what have you been ſtudying all this while, but to diſtinguiſh between your own, and not your own; what is in your Power, and what is not in your Power; what is liable to Reſtraint, and what is not? And for what Purpoſe have you applied to the Philoſophers? That you might be never the leſs diſappointed and unfortunate? No doubt you will be exempt from Fear and Perturbation! And what is *Grief* to *you?* For [nothing but] what we fear, when expected, affects us with Grief when preſent. And what will you any longer

longer paſſionately wiſh for? For you have a temperate and ſteady Deſire of Things dependent on Choice, as they are good, and preſent: and you have no Deſire of Things independent on Choice, ſo as to leave room for that irrational and impetuous, and immoderately haſty Paſſion.

§. 12. Since then you are thus affected with regard to *Things*, what *Man* can any longer be formidable to you? What hath *Man* formidable to Man, either in Appearance, or Speech, or mutual Intercourſe? No more than Horſe to Horſe, or Dog to Dog, or Bee to Bee. But *Things* are formidable to every one, and whenever any Perſon can either confer or take away theſe from another, *He* becomes formidable too. — "How (*p*) "then is the Citadel" [the Seat of Tyranny] "to "be deſtroyed?"—Not by Sword or Fire, but by Principle. For if we ſhould demoliſh that which is in the Town, ſhall we have demoliſhed alſo that of a Fever, of pretty Girls, in ſhort, the Citadel within ourſelves; and turned out the Tyrants, to whom we are ſubject upon all Occaſions, every Day; ſometimes the ſame, ſometimes others? From hence we muſt begin; from hence demoliſh the Citadel; turn out the Tyrants: give up

(*p*) *Epictetus* here perſonates one deſirous of recovering the Liberty of the City, in which he lives. There were Citadels, erected from Time to Time in *Greek* Cities, to ſupport Tyrants: and they and the Citadels were deſtroyed together, whenever it could be done.

up Body, its Parts, Riches, Power, Fame, Magiſtracies, Honours, Children, Brothers, Friends: eſteem all theſe as belonging to others. And, if the Tyrants be turned out from hence, why ſhould I beſides demoliſh the [external] Citadel; at leaſt, on my own Account? For what doth it do to *me* by ſtanding? Why ſhould I turn out the Guards? For in what Point do they affect *me*? It is againſt others they direct their Faſces, their Staves, and their Swords. Have I ever been reſtrained from what I willed; or compelled againſt my Will? Indeed how is this poſſible? I have ranged my Purſuits under the Direction of God. Is it His Will, that I ſhould have a Fever? It is my Will too. Is it His Will, that I ſhould purſue any Thing? It is my Will too. Is it his Will that I ſhould deſire? It is my Will too. Is it his Will, that I ſhould obtain any Thing? It is mine too. Is it not His Will? It is not mine. Is it his Will, that I ſhould be tortured (*q*)? Then it is my Will to be tortured. Is it his Will, that I ſhould die? Then it is my Will to die. Who can any longer reſtrain or compel me, contrary to my own Opinion? No more than *Jupiter* [can be reſtrained]. It is thus that cautious Travellers act. Doth any hear, that the Road is beſet by Robbers? He doth not ſet out alone; but waits for the Retinue of an Embaſſador, or Quæſtor, or

(*q*) The Tranſlation here is agreeable to Mr. *Upton*'s Copy.

or a Proconſul: and, when he hath joined himſelf to their Company, goes along in Safety. Thus doth the prudent Man act in the World. There are many Robberies, Tyrants, Storms, Diſtreſſes, Loſſes of Things the moſt dear. Where is there any Refuge? How can he go along unattacked? What Retinue can he wait for, to go ſafely through his Journey? To what Company join himſelf? To ſome rich Man? To ſome Conſular Senator? And what Good will that do me? He is [often] ſtript himſelf; groans and laments. And what if my Fellow-Traveller himſelf ſhould turn againſt me, and rob me? What ſhall I do? I will be the Friend of *Cæſar*. While I am his Companion, no one will injure me. Yet, before I can become illuſtrious enough for this, what muſt I bear and ſuffer! How often, and by how many, muſt I be robbed! And then, if I do become the Friend of *Cæſar*, he too is mortal: and if, by any Accident, he ſhould become my Enemy, where can I beſt retreat? To a Deſart? Well; and doth not a Fever come there? What can be done then? Is it not poſſible to find a Fellow-Traveller, ſafe, faithful, brave, incapable of being ſurprized? A Perſon, who reaſons thus, underſtands and conſiders, that, if he joins himſelf to God, he ſhall go ſafely through his Journey.—"How do you mean, join himſelf?"—That whatever is the Will of God, may be *his* Will

Will too: whatever is not the Will of God, may not be *his*.—"How then can this be done?"—Why, how otherwiſe than by conſidering the Exertions of God's Power, and his Adminiſtration? What hath he given me, my own, and independent? What hath he reſerved to himſelf? He hath given me whatever depends upon Choice. The Things in my Power he hath made incapable of Hindrance or Reſtraint. But how could he make a Body of Clay (*r*) incapable of Hindrance? Therefore he hath ſubjected [that, and] Poſſeſſions, Furniture, Houſe, Children, Wife, to the Revolution of the Univerſe. Why then do I fight againſt God? Why do I will to retain what depends not on Will? What is not granted abſolutely; but how? In ſuch a Manner, and for ſuch a Time, as was thought proper. But he who gave, takes away (*s*). Why then do I reſiſt? Not to ſay, that I ſhall be a Fool in contending with a ſtronger than myſelf: what is a prior Conſideration, I ſhall be unjuſt. For whence had I theſe Things, when I came into the World? My Father gave them to me. And who gave them to *him?* And who made the Sun? Who, the Fruits? Who, the Seaſons? Who, their Connexion and Relations to each other? And, after you have received all, and even your

(*r*) See B. I. c. 1. §. 3.

(*s*) *The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away.* Job i. 21.

your very Self from another, are you angry with the Giver; and complain, if He takes any thing away from you? Who are you; and for what Purpoſe did you come? Was it not He who brought you here? Was it not He who ſhowed you the Light? Hath not He given you Aſſiſtants? Hath not He given you Senſes? Hath not He given you Reaſon? And as whom did He bring you here? Was it not as a Mortal? Was it not as one to live, with a little Portion of Fleſh, upon Earth, and to ſee his Adminiſtration; to behold the Spectacle with him, and partake of the Feſtival for a ſhort Time? After having beheld the Spectacle, and the Solemnity, then, as long as it is permitted you, will you not depart, when He leads you out, adoring and thankful for what you have heard and ſeen? — "No: but I "would enjoy the Feaſt ſtill longer."—So would the Initiated too be longer in their Initiation; ſo, perhaps, would the Spectators at *Olympia* ſee more Combatants. But the Solemnity is over. Go away. Depart, like a grateful and modeſt Perſon: make room for others. Others too muſt be born, as you were; and, when they are born, muſt have a Place, and Habitations, and Neceſſaries. But, if the firſt do not give way, what [Room] is there left? Why are you inſatiable? Why are you unconſcionable? Why do you crowd the World? — "Ay: but I would have "my

" my Wife and Children with me too."—Why, are they *your's?* Are they not the Giver's? Are they not His who made *you* alſo? Will you not quit what belongs to another then? Will you not yield to your Superior? —" Why then did he " bring me into the World upon theſe Conditi- " ons?" — Well: if it is not worth your while, depart (*t*). He hath no Need of a diſcontented Spectator. He wants ſuch as may ſhare the Feſtival; make Part of the Chorus: who may rather extol, applaud, celebrate the Solemnity: He will not be diſpleaſed to ſee the Wretched and Fearful diſmiſſed from it. For, when they were preſent, they did not behave as at a Feſtival, nor fill a proper Place; but lamented, found Fault with the Deity, Fortune, their Companions: inſenſible both of their Advantages, and their Powers, which they received for contrary Purpoſes; the Powers of Magnanimity, Nobleneſs of Spirit, Fortitude, and the Subject of our preſent Enquiry, Freedom.—

" For

(*t*) And is this all the Comfort, every ſerious Reader will be apt to ſay, which one of the beſt Philoſophers, in one of his nobleſt Diſcourſes, can give to the good Man under ſevere Diſtreſs? " Either tell yourſelf, that preſent Suffering, " void of future Hope, is no Evil; or give up your Ex- " iſtence, and mingle with the Elements of the Univerſe!" Unſpeakably more rational, and more worthy of infinite Goodneſs, is our bleſſed Maſter's Exhortation to the perſecuted Chriſtian: " Rejoice, and be exceding glad, for great " is your Reward in Heaven."

" For what Purpoſe then have I received theſe " Things?"—To uſe them.—" How long?"—As long as He, who lent them, pleaſes. If then they are not neceſſary, do not attach yourſelf to them, and they will not be ſo: do not tell yourſelf, that they are neceſſary, and they are not.

§. 13. This ſhould be our Study from Morning till Night, beginning from the leaſt and fraileſt Things, from an earthen Veſſel, from a Glaſs. Afterwards, proceed to a Suit of Clothes, a Dog, a Horſe, an Eſtate: from thence to your Self, Body, Parts of the Body, Children, Wife, Brothers. Look every-where around you, and throw them from yourſelf. Correct your Principles. See that nothing cleave to you, which is not your own; nothing grow (*u*) to you, that may give you Pain, when it is torn away. And ſay, when you are daily exerciſing yourſelf as you do here, not that you act the Philoſopher (admit this to be an inſolent Title), but that you are aſſerting your Freedom. For this is true Freedom. This is the Freedom, that *Diogenes* gained from *Antiſthenes*; and declared, it was impoſſible, that he ſhould ever after be a Slave, to any one. Hence, when he was taken Priſoner, how did he treat the Pirates? Did he call any of them Maſter? (I do not mean the Name, for I am not afraid of a Word, but the Diſpoſition from whence the Word proceeds.)

(*u*) Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture.

proceeds.) How did he reprove them for feeding their Priſoners ill? How was he ſold? Did he ſeek a Maſter? (*w*) No: but a Slave. And when he was ſold, how did he converſe with his Lord? He immediately diſputed with him, that he ought not to be dreſſed nor ſhaved in the manner he was; how he ought to bring up his Children. And where is the Wonder? For if the ſame Maſter had bought an Inſtructor for his Children, in the Exerciſes of the *Palæſtra*, would he in thoſe Exerciſes have treated him as a Servant, or as a Maſter? And ſo if he had bought a Phyſician or an Architect? In every Subject, the Skilful muſt neceſſarily be ſuperior to the Unſkilful. What elſe then can he be but Maſter, who poſſeſſes the univerſal Knowledge of Life? For who is Maſter in a Ship? The Pilot. Why? Becauſe whoever diſobeys him is a Loſer.—"But a Maſter can put me "in Chains."—Can he do it then without being a Loſer?—"So I, among others, uſed to think." —But, becauſe he muſt be a Loſer, for that very Reaſon it is not in his Power: for no one acts unjuſtly, without being a Loſer.—"And what "Loſs doth he ſuffer, who puts his own Slave "in Chains?"—What think you? The very putting him in Chains. This you yourſelf muſt grant, if you would preſerve the Doctrine, that Man is not a wild, but a gentle Animal. For when

(*w*) See Vol. I. p. 189. Note (*c*).

when is it, that a Vine is in a bad Condition?—"When it is in a Condition contrary to its Na-"ture."—When a Cock?—"The ſame."—Therefore a Man too. What then is his Nature? To bite, and kick, and throw into Priſon, and cut off Heads? No: but to do good, to aſſiſt, to indulge the Wiſhes of others. Whether you will or not then, he is in a bad Condition, when-ever he acts unreaſonably.—"And ſo, was not *So-*"*crates* in a bad Condition?"—No: but his Judges and Accuſers.—"Nor *Helvidius*, at *Rome*?—No: but his Murderer.—"How do you talk?"—(*x*) Why, juſt as you do. You do not call that Cock in a bad Condition, which is victorious, and wounded; but that which is conquered, and comes off unhurt. Nor do you call a Dog happy, which neither hunts nor toils; but when you ſee him ſweating, and in pain, and panting, with the Chace. In what do we talk Paradoxes? If we ſay, that the Evil of every thing conſiſts in what is contrary to its Nature, is this a Paradox? Do not you ſay it with regard to other Things? Why therefore, in the Caſe of Man alone, do you take a different Turn? But farther: it is no Paradox to ſay, that by Nature Man is gentle, and ſocial, and faithful.—

(*x*) The Tranſlation here follows a different Pointing from Mr. *Upton*, Πως λεγεις; ως και συ, Αλεκτρυονα, &c.

"This is (*y*) none neither."—How then [is it a Paradox to ſay,] that, when he is whipped, or impriſoned, or beheaded, he is not hurt? If he ſuffers nobly, doth not he come off even the better, and a Gainer? But he is the Perſon hurt, who ſuffers the moſt miſerable and ſhameful Evils: who, inſtead of a Man, becomes a Wolf, or Viper, or a Hornet.

§. 14. Come then: let us recapitulate what hath been granted. The Man who is unreſtrained, who hath all Things in his Power as he wills, is free: but he who may be reſtrained, or compelled, or hindered, or thrown into any Condition againſt his Will, is a Slave.—"And who is unre-"ſtrained?"—He that deſires none of thoſe Things, that belong to others? "And what are thoſe "Things, which belong to others?"—Thoſe which are not in our own Power, either to have, or not to have; or to have them of ſuch a Sort, or in ſuch a State. Body, therefore, belongs to another; its Parts, to another; Poſſeſſions, to another. If then you attach yourſelf to any of theſe as your own, you will be puniſhed, as he deſerves, who deſires what belongs to others. This is the Way, that leads to Freedom; this the only Deliverance from Slavery: to be able at length to ſay, from the Bottom of one's Soul, *Conduct*

(*y*) This Anſwer implies a ſilent Conceſſion, that it is no Paradox to affirm, the Evil of every thing to conſiſt, in what is contrary to its Nature.

Conduct me, Jove, *and thou*, *O* Deſtiny,
Where-ever Your Decrees have fix'd my Lot.

§. 15. But what ſay you, Philoſopher? A Tyrant ſummons you to ſpeak ſomething unbecoming you. Will you ſay it, or will you not?—"Stay, let me conſider."—Would you conſider *now?* And what did you uſe to conſider, when you were in the Schools? Did not you ſtudy what Things are good, and evil, and what indifferent?—"I did."—Well: and what were the Opinions which pleaſed us?—"That juſt and "(z) fair Actions were good; unjuſt and baſe "ones, evil."—Is living a Good?—"No."—Dying, an Evil?—"No."—A Priſon?—"No."—And what did a mean and diſhoneſt Speech, the betraying a Friend, or the flattering a Tyrant, appear to us?—"Evils."—Why then are you ſtill conſidering, and have not already conſidered, and come to a Reſolution? For what Sort of a Conſideration is this? *Whether I ought, when it is in my Power, to procure myſelf the greateſt Good, inſtead of procuring myſelf the greateſt Evil.* A fine and neceſſary Conſideration, truly, and deſerving mighty Deliberation! Why do you trifle with us, Man? There never was any ſuch Point conſidered: nor, if you really imagined what was fair and

(z) The Tranſlation here follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture.

honeſt to be good, what baſe and diſhoneſt, evil, and all other Things indifferent, would you ever be at ſuch a Stand as this, or near it: but you would preſently be able to diſtinguiſh, by your Underſtanding, as you do by your Sight. For do you ever conſider, whether black is white: or light, heavy? Do not you follow the plain Evidence of your Senſes? Why then do you ſay, that you are now conſidering, whether Things indifferent are to be avoided, rather than Evils? The Truth is, you have no Principles: for neither doth the one Sort of Things appear to you indifferent, but the greateſt Evils; nor the other Evils, but Matters of no Concern to you. For thus you have accuſtomed yourſelf from the firſt.

"Where am I? In the School? And is there
"an Audience? I talk as the Philoſophers do.
"But am I got out from the School? Away
"with this Stuff, that belongs only to Scholars
"and Fools. This Man is accuſed by the Teſ-
"timony of a Philoſopher, his Friend: this Phi-
"loſopher turns Paraſite; that hires himſelf out
"for Money; a third doth it in the very Senate.
"Who doth not wiſh what appears [to himſelf
"to be right]? His (*a*) Principles exclaim from
"within."

(*a*) There is much Obſcurity, and ſome Variety of Reading, in ſeveral Lines of the Original, in this Place; and I am not certain, whether the Tranſlation hath given the true Senſe; but it it the beſt I could make of it.

" within."—You are a poor cold Lump of Opinion, conſiſting of mere Words; on which you hang, as by a Hair. But preſerve yourſelf firm, and make a due Uſe of the Appearances; remembering, that you are to be exerciſed in Things. In what manner do you hear, I do not ſay, that your Child is dead, (for how ſhould you bear that?) but that your Oil is ſpilled, your Wine drank out? That any one, while you are bawling, might only ſay this; "Philoſopher, you talk " otherwiſe in the Schools. Why do you de- " ceive us? Why, when you are a Worm, do " you call yourſelf a Man?" I ſhould be glad to be near one of theſe Philoſophers, while he is revelling in Debauchery, that I might ſee how he exerts himſelf, and what Sayings he utters; whether he remembers his Title, and the Diſcourſes which he hears, or ſpeaks, or reads.

§. 16. " And what is all this to Freedom?" —Truly nothing elſe is, but this, whether you rich People will or not.—" And who is your " Evidence of this?" — Who, but yourſelves? Who have a powerful Maſter, and live by his Motion and Nod, and faint away, if he doth but look ſternly upon you: who pay your Court to old Men, and old Women, and ſay, " I cannot " do this, it is not in my Power." Why is it not in your Power? Did not you juſt now contradict me, and ſay, you were free? — " But

" *Aprylla* (*b*) hath forbid me."—Speak the Truth then, Slave, and do not run away from your Maſters; nor deny them; nor dare to aſſert your Freedom, when you have ſo many Proofs of your Slavery. One might indeed find ſome Excuſe for a Perſon, compelled by Love to do ſomething contrary to his Opinion, even when at the ſame time he ſees what is beſt, and yet hath not Reſolution enough to follow it: ſince he is with-held by ſomething violent, and in ſome meaſure, divine. But who can bear you, who are in Love with old Men and old Women; and wipe their Noſes, and waſh them, and bribe them with Preſents, and wait upon them when they are ſick, like a Slave; at the ſame time wiſhing they may die, and enquiring of the Phyſician, whether their Diſtemper be yet mortal? And again, when for theſe great and venerable Magiſtracies and Honours, you kiſs the Hands of the Slaves of others; ſo that you are the Slave of thoſe who are not free themſelves! And then you walk about in State, a Prætor, or a Conſul. Do not I know how you came to be Prætor: whence you received the Conſulſhip; who gave it you? For my own Part, I would not even live, if I muſt live by *Felicio*'s Means, and bear his Pride, and ſlaviſh Inſolence.

(*b*) Probably ſome rich old Woman, from whom the Speaker had Expectations.

ſolence. For I know what a Slave is, blinded by what he thinks good Fortune.

§. 17. Are you free yourſelf then? (It will be ſaid.) By Heaven I wiſh and pray for it. But I cannot yet face my Maſters. I ſtill pay a Regard to my Body, and ſet a great Value on keeping it whole; though at the ſame time it it not whole (*c*). But I can ſhow you one who was free, that you may no longer ſeek an Example. *Diogenes* was free.—"How ſo?"—Not becauſe he was of free Parents, for he was not: but becauſe he was ſo himſelf; becauſe he had caſt away all the Handles of Slavery; nor was there any Way of getting at him, nor any where to lay hold on him, to enſlave him. Every thing ſat looſe upon him, every thing only juſt hung on. If you took hold on his Poſſeſſions, he would rather let them go, than follow you for them: if on his Leg, he let go his Leg: if his Body, he let go his Body: Acquaintance, Friends, Country, juſt the ſame. For he knew whence he had them, and from whom, and upon what Conditions he received them. But he would never have forſaken his true Parents the Gods, and his real Country; nor have ſuffered any one to be more dutiful and obedient to them than he: nor would any one have died more readily for his Country

(*c*) *Epictetus* here alludes to his own Lameneſs. See Vol. I. p. 39 and 69.

than he. For he never ſought when it would be proper for him to act for the ſake of (*d*) any thing elſe, [except his real Country the Univerſe;] but he remembered, that every thing that exiſts is from thence, and carried on by it, and commanded by its Ruler. Accordingly, ſee what he himſelf ſays and writes. "Upon this Ac-"count, ſays he, O *Diogenes*, it is in your Power "to converſe as you will with the *Perſian* Mo-"narch, and with *Archidamus*, King of the *La-"cedemonians*."—Was it becauſe *he* was born of free Parents? Or was it becauſe *they* were deſcended from Slaves, that all the *Athenians*, and all the *Lacedemonians*, and *Corinthians*, could not converſe with them as they pleaſed; but feared and paid Court to them? Why then is it in *your* Power, *Diogenes?* "Becauſe I do not eſteem this "ſorry Body as my own. Becauſe I want no-"thing. Becauſe theſe [Principles,] and nothing "elſe, are a Law to me." Theſe were the Things that ſuffered him to be free.

§. 18. And that you may not think, that I ſhow you the Example of a Man clear of Incumbrances; without a Wife or Children, or Country, or Friends, or Relations, to bend and draw him aſide: take *Socrates*, and conſider him, who had

(*d*) This Paſſage hath great Difficulties in the Original. I have given it what appeared to me the beſt Senſe. But I am ſtill doubtful.

had a Wife and Children, but not as his own; a Country, Friends, Relations; but only as long as it was proper, and in the manner that was proper; and all theſe he ſubmitted to the Law, and to the Obedience due to it. Hence, when it was proper to fight, he was the firſt to go out, and expoſed himſelf to Danger, without the leaſt Reſerve. But when he was ſent by the Thirty Tyrants to apprehend *Leo* (*e*); becauſe he eſteemed it a baſe Action, he did not deliberate about it; though he knew, that, perhaps, he might die for it. But what did that ſignify to *him?* For it was ſomething elſe that *he* wanted to preſerve, not his paultry Fleſh: but his Fidelity, his Honour, free from Attack, or Subjection. And afterwards, when he was to make a Defence for his Life, doth he behave like one who had Children? Or a Wife? No: (*f*) but like a ſingle Man. And how doth he behave, when he was to drink the Poiſon? When he might have eſcaped, and

(*e*) *Socrates*, with Four other Perſons, was commanded by the Thirty Tyrants of *Athens* to fetch *Leo* from the Iſle of *Salamis*, in order to be put to Death. His Companions executed their Commiſſion; but *Socrates* remained at home, and choſe rather to expoſe his Life to the Fury of the Tyrants, than be acceſſary to the Death of an innocent Perſon. He would moſt probably have fallen a Sacrifice to their Vengeance, if the Oligarchy had not ſhortly after been diſſolved. See PLATO's *Apology*.

(*f*) Mr. *Upton*'s Copy.

Crito perſuaded him to get out of Priſon, for the Sake of his Children, what doth he ſay? Doth he eſteem it a fortunate Opportunity? How ſhould he? But he conſiders what is becoming, and neither ſees nor regards any thing elſe. "For I "am not deſirous, ſays he, to preſerve this piti-"ful Body: but that [Part of me] which is im-"proved and preſerved by Juſtice, and impaired "and deſtroyed by Injuſtice." *Socrates* is not to be baſely preſerved. He, who refuſed to vote for what the *Athenians* commanded: he, who contemned the Thirty Tyrants: he, who held ſuch Diſcourſes on Virtue, and moral Beauty: ſuch a Man is not to be preſerved by a baſe Action: but is preſerved by dying, not by running away. For even a good Actor is preſerved by leaving off when he ought; not by going on to act beyond his Time. "What then will become of your "Children?" "If I had gone away into *Theſſaly*, "you would have taken care of them; and will "there be no one to take care of them, when I "am departed to *Hades?*" You ſee how he ridicules, and plays with Death. But, if it had been you or I, we ſhould preſently have proved, by philoſophical Arguments, that thoſe, who act unjuſtly, are to be repaid in their own Way; and ſhould have added, "If I eſcape, I ſhall be of "Uſe to many; if I die, to none." Nay, if it had been neceſſary, we ſhould have crept through a Mouſe-

a Mouſe-hole to get away. But how ſhould *we* have been of Uſe to any? For where muſt they have dwelt? If we were uſeful alive, ſhould we not be of ſtill more Uſe to Mankind, by dying when we ought, and as we ought? And now the Remembrance of the Death of *Socrates* is not leſs, but even more uſeful to the World, than that of the Things which he did and ſaid, when alive.

§. 19. Study theſe Points, theſe Principles, theſe Diſcourſes; contemplate theſe Examples, if you would be free, if you deſire the Thing in Proportion to its Value. And where is the Wonder, that you ſhould purchaſe ſo good a Thing at the Price of others, ſo many, and ſo great? Some hang themſelves, others break their Necks, and ſometimes even whole Cities have been deſtroyed, for that which is reputed Freedom: and will not you, for the Sake of the true, and ſecure, and inviolable Freedom, repay God what he hath given, when he demands it? Will you not ſtudy, not only as *Plato* ſays, to die, but to be tortured, and baniſhed, and ſcourged; and, in ſhort, to give up all that belongs to others. If not, you will be a Slave among Slaves, though you were ten thouſand Times a Conſul: and, even though you ſhould riſe to the Palace, you will be never the leſs ſo. And you will feel, that though Philoſophers (as *Cleanthes* ſays) do, perhaps, talk contrary to common Opinion, yet not contrary to

Reaſon. For you will find it true in fact, that the Things that are eagerly followed and admired, are of no Uſe to thoſe, who have gained them: while they who have not yet gained them, imagine, that, if they are acquired, every Good will come along with them: and then, when they are acquired, there is the ſame Feveriſhneſs, the ſame Agitation, the ſame Nauſeating, and the ſame Deſire of what is abſent. For Freedom is not procured by a full Enjoyment of what is deſired, but by proving the Deſire to be a wrong one. And, in order to know that this is true, take the ſame Pains about theſe, which you have taken about other Things. Lie awake to acquire a Set of Principles, that will make you free. Inſtead of a rich old Man, pay your Court to a Philoſopher. Be ſeen about his Doors. You will not get any Diſgrace by being ſeen there. You will not return empty, or unprofited, if you go as you ought. However, try at leaſt. The Trial is not diſhonourable.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Complaiſance (*a*).

§. 1. TO this Point you muſt attend before all others: Not to be ſo attached to any one of your former Acquaintance or Friends, as to condeſcend to the ſame Behaviour with his; otherwiſe you will undo yourſelf. But, if it comes into your Head, *I ſhall appear odd to him, and he will not treat me as before*, remember, that there is nothing to be had for nothing: nor is it poſſible, that he who acts in the ſame manner, ſhould not be the ſame Perſon. Chuſe then, whether you will be loved by thoſe you were formerly, and be like your former ſelf; or be better, and not meet with the ſame Treatment. For, if this is preferable, immediately incline altogether that Way, and let no other Kinds of Reaſoning draw you aſide: for no one can improve while he is wavering (*b*). If then you prefer this to every thing, if you would be fixed only on this, and employ all your Pains about it, give up every thing elſe. Otherwiſe this Wavering will affect you both Ways; you will neither make a due Improvement, nor preſerve the Advantages you had

(*a*) Compare this Chapter with *Matt.* vi. 24. *No Man can ſerve two Maſters.*

(*b*) See *James* i. 8.

had before. For before, by ſetting your Heart intirely on Things of no Value, you were agreeable to your Companions. But you cannot excel in both Kinds: but muſt neceſſarily loſe as much of the one, as you partake of the other. If you do not drink with thoſe, with whom you uſed to drink, you cannot appear equally agreeable to them. Chuſe then, whether you would be a Drunkard, and agreeable to them, or ſober, and diſagreeable to them. If you do not ſing with thoſe, with whom you uſed to ſing, you cannot be equally dear to them. Here too then, chuſe which you will. For if it is better to be modeſt and decent, than to have it ſaid of you, *What an agreeable Fellow!* give up the reſt; renounce it; withdraw yourſelf; have nothing to do with it. But, if this doth not pleaſe you, incline, with your whole Force, the contrary Way. Be one of the Catamites; one of the Adulterers. Act all that is conſequent to ſuch a Character, and you will obtain what you would have. Jump up in the Theatre too, and roar out in praiſe of the Dancer. But Characters ſo different are not to be confounded. You cannot act both *Therſites* and *Agamemnon*. If you would be *Therſites*, you muſt be hump-backed and bald: If *Agamemnon*, tall and handſome, and a Lover of thoſe who are under your Care.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

What Things are to be exchanged for others.

§. 1. WHEN you have loſt any thing external, have this always at hand, what you have got inſtead of it: and, if that be of more Value, do not by any means ſay, "I am a Lo-"ſer:" whether it be a Horſe for an Aſs; an Ox for a Sheep; a good Action for a Piece of Money; a due Compoſedneſs of Mind for a dull Jeſt; or Modeſty for indecent Diſcourſe. By continually remembering this, you will preſerve your Character ſuch as it ought to be. Otherwiſe conſider, that you are ſpending your Time in vain; and all that you are now applying your Mind to, you are going to ſpill and overſet. And there needs but little, and a ſmall Deviation from Reaſon, to deſtroy and overſet all. A Pilot doth not need the ſame Apparatus to overſet a Ship, as to ſave it; but, if he turns it a little to the Wind, it is loſt: even if he ſhould not do it by Deſign, but only for a Moment be thinking of ſomething elſe, it is loſt. Such is the Caſe here too. If you do but nod a little, all that you have hitherto collected is gone. Take heed then to the Appearances of Things. Keep yourſelf awake over them. It is no inconſiderable Matter you have

to

to guard; but Modeſty, Fidelity, Conſtancy, Enjoyment (*a*), Exemption from Grief, Fear, Perturbation; in ſhort, Freedom. For what will you ſell theſe? Conſider what the Purchaſe is worth. — "But ſhall I not get ſuch a Thing in-"ſtead of it?" — Conſider, if you do get it (*b*), what it is that you obtain for the other. I have Decency; another the Office of a Tribune: I have Modeſty; he hath the Prætorſhip. But I do not make Acclamations where it is unbecoming: I ſhall not riſe (*c*) up [to do Honour to another] in a Caſe where I ought not: for I am free, and the Friend of God, ſo as to obey him willingly: but I muſt not value any thing elſe; neither Body, nor Poſſeſſions, nor Fame; in ſhort nothing. For it is not His Will, that I ſhould value them. For, if this had been his Pleaſure, he would have made them my Good, which now he hath not done: therefore I cannot tranſgreſs his Commands.—"In every thing preſerve your "own proper Good."—"But what of the reſt?" —"Preſerve *them* too according as it is permit-"ted,

(*a*) See Vol. II. p. 112. Note (*e*).

(*b*) I ſuſpect, that τυγχανων ſhould be ου τυγχανων, and then the Tranſlation will be,—Conſider, on the other hand, if you do not get that, what you obtain inſtead of it.

(*c*) Probably *Epictetus* here alludes to the jumping up in the Theatre, in favour of ſome Actor, mentioned in the preceding Chapter, and in the fourth Chapter of the third Book.

" ted; and ſo far as to behave agreeably to Rea-
" ſon in relation to them; contented with this
" alone. Otherwiſe you will be unfortunate,
" diſappointed, reſtrained, hindered." Theſe are the Laws, theſe the Statutes, tranſmitted from thence. Of theſe one ought to be an Expoſitor, and to theſe obedient, not to thoſe of *Maſurius* (*d*) and *Caſſius*.

CHAP. IV.

Concerning Thoſe who earneſtly deſire a Life of Repoſe.

§. 1. REMEMBER, that it is not only the Deſire of Riches and Power, that renders us mean, and ſubject to others, but even of Quiet, and Leiſure, and Learning, and Travelling. For, in general, valuing any external Thing whatever, ſubjects us to another. Where is the Difference then, whether you deſire to be a Senator, or not to be a Senator? Where is the Difference whether you deſire Power, or to be out of Power? Where is the Difference, whether you

(*d*) Two famous Lawyers. This Paſſage is an Inſtance of the manner of Speaking, leſs uſual among the *Greek* and *Romans*, than the Eaſtern Writers; where enjoining one Thing, and forbidding another, means only that the firſt ſhould be preferred in Caſe of Competition.

you ſay, "I am in a wretched Way, I have no-"thing to do; but am tied down to Books, as "inactive as if I were dead;"—or, "I am in a "wretched Way, I have no Leiſure to read?" For as Levees and Power are among Things external, and independent on Choice, ſo likewiſe is a Book. For what Purpoſe would you read? Tell me. For if you reſt merely in being amuſed, and learning ſomething, you are inſignificant and miſerable. But if you refer it to what you ought, what is that but a proſperous Life? And if Reading doth not procure you a proſperous Life, of what Uſe is it? "But it doth procure a proſperous "Life (ſay you); and therefore I am uneaſy at "being deprived of it."—And what ſort of Proſperity is that, which every thing, I do not ſay *Cæſar*, or the Friend of *Cæſar*, but a Crow, a Piper, a Fever, ten thouſand other Things, can hinder? But nothing is ſo eſſential to Proſperity, as the being perpetual, and unhindered. I am now called to do ſomething. I now go therefore, and will be attentive to the Bounds and Meaſures, which ought to be obſerved; that I may act modeſtly, ſteadily, and without Deſire or Averſion with regard to Externals (*a*). In the next place,

(*a*) The Readers, perhaps, may grow tired, with being ſo often told, what they will find it very difficult to believe, That, becauſe Externals are not in our own Power, they are nothing to us. But, in Excuſe for this frequent Repetition, it

place, I am attentive to other Men; what they ſay, and how they are moved; and that, not from Ill-nature, nor that I may have an Opportunity for Cenſure or Ridicule: but I turn to myſelf, [and aſk,] "Am I alſo guilty of the ſame "Faults; and how then ſhall I leave them off?" (*b*) Once I too was faulty; but, God be thanked, not now. Well: when you have done thus, and been employed in this manner, have not you done as good a Work, as if you had read a thouſand Lines, or written as many? For are you uneaſy at not reading while you are eating, or bathing, or exerciſing? Are not you ſatisfied with performing theſe Actions conformably to what you have read? Why then do you not think uniformly about every thing? When you approach *Cæſar*, or any other Perſon, if you preſerve yourſelf unpaſſionate;

it muſt be conſidered, that the Stoics had reduced themſelves to a Neceſſity of dwelling on this Conſequence, extravagant as it is, by rejecting ſtronger Aids. One cannot indeed avoid highly admiring the very Few, who attempted to amend and exalt themſelves, on this Foundation. No one, perhaps, ever carried the Attempt ſo far in Practice; and no one ever ſpoke ſo well in ſupport of the Argument, as *Epictetus*. Yet, notwithſtanding his great Abilities, and the Force of his Example, one finds him ſtrongly complaining of the want of Succeſs: and one ſees from this Circumſtance, as well as from many others in the Stoic Writings, That Virtue cannot be maintained in the World, without the Hope of a future Reward.

(*b*) Τοτε, perhaps ſhould be ποτε; and is ſo tranſlated.

paſſionate, unalarmed, ſedate; if you are rather an Obſerver of what is done, than [yourſelf] obſerved; if you do not envy thoſe who are preferred to you; if the Materials of Action do not ſtrike you; what do you want? Books? How, or to what End? For is not this a kind of Preparation for Living, but Living itſelf, made up of Things different? Juſt as if a Champion, when he enters the Liſts, ſhould fall a crying, becauſe he is not exerciſing without. It was for this, that you uſed to be exerciſed. For this, were the Poiſers, the Duſt (*c*), the young Fellows, your Antagoniſts. And do you now ſeek for theſe, when it is the Time for Buſineſs? This is juſt as if, in the Topic of Aſſent, when we are preſented with Appearances, of which ſome are evidently true, others not, inſtead of diſtinguiſhing them, we ſhould want to read Diſſertations on Evidence.

§. 2. What then is the Cauſe of this? That we have neither read nor written, in order to treat the Appearances that occur to us, conformably to Nature, in our Behaviour. But we ſtop at learning what is ſaid, and being able to explain it at others; at ſolving Syllogiſms, and ranging hypothetical Arguments. Hence, where the Study is, there too is the Hindrance. Do you deſire abſolutely

(*c*) The Olympic Champions uſed to rub themſelves with Duſt and Sand: which, as they were anointed, was neceſſary to give them the better Hold on each other. See Mr. *Upton*'s Note on L. III. c. 15. p. 419. l. 10.

abſolutely what is out of your Power? Be reſtrained then, be hindered, be diſappointed. But if we read Diſſertations about the Exertion of the Efforts, not merely to ſee what is ſaid about the Efforts, but to exert them well: on Deſire and Averſion, that we may not be diſappointed of our Deſires, nor incur our Averſions: on the Duties of Life, that, mindful of our Relations, we may do nothing irrationally, nor contrary to them: we ſhould not be provoked at being hindered in our Reading; but ſhould be contented with the Performance of Actions ſuitable to us, and ſhould not compute as we have hitherto been accuſtomed to compute. "To day I have read ſo many "Lines; I have written ſo many;" but, "To-"day I have uſed my Efforts as the Philoſophers "direct. I have reſtrained my Deſires abſo-"lutely; I have applied my Averſion only to "Things dependent on Choice. I have not "been terrified by ſuch a one, nor put out of "Countenance by ſuch another. I have exer-"ciſed my Patience, my Abſtinence, my Benefi-"cence." And thus we ſhould thank God for what we ought to thank him. But now we reſemble the Vulgar in another Way alſo, and do not know it. One is afraid, that he ſhall not be in Power; *you* (*d*), that you ſhall By no means be afraid of it, Man; but as you laugh at *him*, laugh

(*d*) The Tranſlation follows the Conjecture of *Wolfius*.

laugh at *yourſelf*. For there is no Difference, whether you thirſt, like one in a Fever, or dread Water, like him who is bit by a mad Dog. Elſe, how can you ſay, like *Socrates*, "If it ſo pleaſes "God, ſo let it be?" Do you think that *Socrates*, if he had fixed his Deſires on the Leiſure of the *Lycèum*, or the Academy, or the Converſation of the Youth there, Day after Day, would have made ſo many Campaigns as he did ſo readily? Would not he have lamented and groaned; "How wretched am I! now muſt I be miſerable "here, when I might be ſunning myſelf in the "*Lycèum?*" Was that your Buſineſs in Life then, to ſun yourſelf? Was it not to be proſperous? To be unreſtrained? Unhindered? And how could he have been *Socrates*, if he had lamented thus? How could he, after that, have written Pæans in a Priſon?

§. 3. In ſhort then, remember this, that whatever external to your own Choice you eſteem, you deſtroy that Choice. And not only Power is external to it, but the being out of Power too: not only Buſineſs, but Leiſure too.—"Then, muſt I "live in this Tumult now?"—What do you call a Tumult?—"A Multitude of People."—And where is the Hardſhip? Suppoſe it is the *Olympic* Games. Think it a public Aſſembly. There too ſome bawl out one Thing, ſome do another: ſome puſh the reſt. The Baths are crowded.

crowded. Yet who of us is not pleaſed with theſe Aſſemblies, and doth not grieve to leave them? Do not be hard to pleaſe, and ſqueamiſh at what happens. "Vinegar is diſagreeable, "[ſays one]; for it is ſour. Honey is diſagree-"able, ſays a ſecond; for it diſorders my Conſti-"tution. I do not like Vegetables, ſays a third. "Thus too [ſay others] I do not like Retire-"ment; it is a Deſart: I do not like a Crowd; "it is a Tumult."—Why, if Things are ſo diſpoſed, that you are to live alone, or with few, call this Condition a Repoſe; and make uſe of it as you ought. Talk with yourſelf: exerciſe the Appearances preſented to your Mind: work up your Preconceptions to Accuracy. But if you light on a Crowd, call it one of the public Games, a grand Aſſembly, a Feſtival. Endeavour to ſhare in the Feſtival with the reſt of the World. For what Sight is more pleaſant to a Lover of Mankind, than a great Number of Men? We ſee Companies of Oxen, or Horſes, with Pleaſure. We are highly delighted to ſee a great many Ships. Who is ſorry to ſee a great many Men? —"But they ſtun me with their Noiſe."—Then your Hearing is hindered; and what is that to *you?* Is your Faculty of making a right Uſe of the Appearances of Things hindered too? Or who can reſtrain you from uſing your Deſire and Averſion, your Powers of Purſuit and Avoidance, conformably

conformably to Nature? What Tumult is ſufficient for this? Do but remember the general Rules. *What is mine? What not mine? What is allotted me? What is the Will of God, that I ſhould do now? What is not his Will?* A little while ago it was His Will, that you ſhould be at leiſure, ſhould talk with yourſelf, write about theſe Things, read, hear, prepare yourſelf. You have had ſufficient Time for this. At preſent He ſays to you, "Come now to the Combat. Show us "what you have learned; how you have wreſt-"led." How long would you exerciſe by yourſelf? It is now the Time to ſhow, whether you are of the Number of thoſe Champions who merit Victory, or of thoſe who go about the World, conquered in all the Games round. Why then are you out of Humour? There is no Combat without a Tumult. There muſt be many preparatory Exerciſes, many Acclamations, many Maſters, many Spectators.—"But I would live "in Quiet."—Why then, lament and groan, as you deſerve. For what greater Puniſhment is there to the Uninſtructed, and Diſobedient to the Orders of God, than to grieve, to mourn, to envy; in ſhort, to be diſappointed, and unhappy? Are not you willing to deliver yourſelf from all this?—And how ſhall I deliver myſelf?—Have not you heard, that you muſt abſolutely withhold Deſire, and apply Averſion to ſuch Things only,

only, as are dependent on Choice? That you muſt give up all, Body, Poſſeſſions, Fame, Books, Tumults, Power, Exemption from Power? For to which ſoever your Propenſion is, you are a Slave; you are under Subjection; you are made liable to Reſtraint, to Compulſion; you are altogether the Property of others. But have that of *Cleanthes* always ready,

Conduct me, Jove; *and Thou*, *O* Deſtiny.

Is it Your Will, that I ſhould go to *Rome?* Conduct me to *Rome.* To *Gyaros?*—To *Gyaros.* To *Athens?*—To *Athens.* To Priſon?—To Priſon. If you once ſay, "When is one to go "to *Athens?*" You are undone. This Deſire, if it be unaccompliſhed, muſt neceſſarily render you diſappointed; and, if fulfilled, vain on what ought not to elate you: on the contrary, if you are hindered, wretched, by incurring what you do not like. Therefore give up all theſe Things. —"*Athens* is a fine Place."—But it is a much finer Thing to be happy, impaſſive, tranquil, not to have what concerns you dependent on others. —"*Rome* is full of Tumults and Viſits."—But Proſperity is worth all Difficulties. If then it be a proper Time for theſe, why do not you withdraw your Averſion from them? (What Neceſſity is there for you to be made to carry your Burden, by being cudgelled like an Aſs?) Other-

wiſe conſider, that you muſt always be a Slave to him, who hath the Power to procure your Diſcharge, to every one who hath the Power of hindering you; and muſt worſhip him, like your evil Genius.

§. 4. The only Way to real Proſperity (let this Rule be at hand Morning, Noon, and Night,) is, a Reſignation of Things independent on Choice; to eſteem nothing as a Property; to deliver up all Things to our tutelar Genius, and to Fortune; to make thoſe the Governors of them, whom *Jupiter* hath made ſo; to be ourſelves devoted to that only, which is our Property; to that which is incapable of Reſtraint; and whatever we read, or write, or hear, to refer all to this.

§. 5. Therefore I cannot call any one induſtrious, if I hear only that he reads, or writes; nor even if he adds the whole Night to the Day, do I call him ſo, unleſs I know to what he refers it. For not even *you* would call Him induſtrious, who ſits up for the Sake of a Girl; nor therefore in the other Caſe do *I*. But, if he doth it for Fame, I call him ambitious; if for Money, avaritious; if from the Deſire of Learning, bookiſh; but not induſtrious. But, if he refers his Labour to his ruling Faculty, in order to treat and regulate it conformably to Nature, then only I call him induſtrious. For never either praiſe or blame

any

any Perſon, on account of outward Actions that are common to all; but on the account of Principles. Theſe are the peculiar Property of each Individual, and the Things which make Actions good or bad.

§. 6. Mindful of this, be pleaſed with the preſent, and contented with whatever it is the Seaſon for. If you perceive any of thoſe Things, which you have learned and ſtudied, occurring to you in Action, rejoice in them. If you have laid aſide Ill-nature and Reviling; if you have leſſened your Harſhneſs, indecent Language, Inconſiderateneſs, Effeminacy; if you are not moved by the ſame Things as formerly; if not in the ſame manner as formerly; you may keep a perpetual Feſtival: To-day, becauſe you have behaved well in one Affair: To-morrow, becauſe in another. How much better a Reaſon for Sacrifice is this, than obtaining a Conſulſhip, or a Government? Theſe Things you have from yourſelf, and from the Gods. Remember this, Who it is that gave them, and to whom, and for what Purpoſe. Habituated once to theſe Reaſonings, can you ſtill think there is any Difference, in what Place you are to pleaſe God? Are not the Gods everywhere at the ſame Diſtance? Do not they everywhere equally ſee what is doing?

CHAP. V.

Concerning the Quarrelſome, and Ferocious.

§. 1. A WISE and good Perſon neither quarrels with any one himſelf, nor, as far as poſſible, ſuffers another. The Life of *Socrates* affords us an Example of this too, as well as of the other [Virtues]; who not only every-where avoided quarrelling himſelf, but did not even ſuffer others to quarrel. See in *Xenophon*'s *Sympoſium*, how many Quarrels he ended; how, again, he bore with *Thraſymachus*, with *Polus*, with *Callicles*; how, with his Wife, how, with his Son, who attempted to confute him, and cavilled with him. For he well remembered, that no one is Maſter of the ruling Faculty of another; and therefore he deſired nothing but what was his own.—"And what is that?"—Not that this [or that] Perſon (*a*) ſhould be moved conformably to Nature; for that belongs to others; but that while they act in their own Way, as they pleaſe, he ſhould nevertheleſs be affected, and live conformably to Nature, only doing what belongs to himſelf, in order to make them too live conformably to Nature. For this is the Point, that a wiſe and good Perſon hath in view. To have the Command of an Army? No: but if it be allotted

(*a*) Perhaps for κινη ουτω τι, ſhould be read, Κινηται ουτω; and the Tranſlation follows this Conjecture.

allotted him, to preſerve on this Subject of Action, the right Conduct of his own ruling Faculty. To marry? No: but if Marriage be allotted him, to preſerve himſelf, on this Subject of Action, conformable to Nature. But, if he would have his Wife, or his Child, exempt from Fault, he would have that his own, which belongs to others. And being inſtructed, conſiſts in this very Point, To learn what Things are our own, and what belong to others.

§. 2. What Room is there then for Quarrelling, to a Perſon thus diſpoſed? For doth he wonder at any thing that happens? Doth it appear new to Him? Doth not he expect worſe and more grievous Injuries from bad People, than happen to him? Doth he not reckon it ſo much gained, as they come ſhort of the laſt Extremities? Such a one hath reviled you.—You are much obliged to him, that he hath not ſtruck you.—But he hath ſtruck you too.—You are much obliged to him, that he hath not wounded you too.—But he hath wounded you too.—You are much obliged to him, that he hath not killed you. For when did he ever learn, or from whom, that he is a gentle, that he is a ſocial Animal: that the very Injury itſelf is a great Miſchief to the Injurious? As then he hath not learned theſe Things, nor believes them, why ſhould he not follow what appears for his Intereſt? Your Neighbour

hath thrown Stones. What then? Is it any Fault of *yours?* But your Goods are broken. What then? Are you a Piece of Furniture? No: but your Eſſence conſiſts in the Faculty of Choice. What Behaviour then is aſſigned you, in Return? If you conſider yourſelf as a Wolf—to bite again, to throw more Stones. But if you aſk the Queſtion, as a Man, examine your Treaſure: ſee what Faculties you have brought into the World with you. Are they Diſpoſitions to Ferocity? To Revenge? When is a Horſe miſerable? When he is deprived of his natural Faculties. Not when he cannot crow, but when he cannot run. And a Dog? Not when he cannot fly, but when he cannot hunt. Is not a Man then alſo unhappy in the ſame manner? Not he, who cannot ſtrangle Lions, or graſp Statues (*b*), (for he hath received no Faculties for this Purpoſe from Nature;) but who hath loſt his Rectitude of Mind, his Fidelity. Such a one is the Perſon, who ought to be publicly lamented, for the Misfortunes into which he is fallen: not, by Heaven, either he who is born (*c*) or dies; but he, whom it hath befallen while he

(*b*) Like *Hercules* and *Diogenes*. See p. 46. of this Vol. Note (*b*).

(*c*) An Alluſion to a Paſſage in *Euripides*. The general Senſe of which is, That we ought to lament the Perſon who is born, from a Conſideration of the Evils into which he is coming.

he lives to loſe what is properly his own: not his paternal Poſſeſſions, his paultry Eſtate, or his Houſe, his Lodging, or his Slaves, (for none of theſe are a Man's own; but all belonging to others, ſervile, dependent, and given at different Times, to different Perſons, by the Diſpoſers of them;) but his perſonal Qualifications as a Man, the Impreſſions which he brought into the World ſtampt upon his Mind: ſuch as we ſeek in Money; and, if we find them, allow it to be good; if not, throw it away. "What Impreſſion hath "this Piece of Money?"—"*Trajan*'s." "Give "it me."—*Nero*'s (*d*)." Throw it away. It is falſe: it is good for nothing. So in the other Caſe. "What Impreſſion have his Principles?" "Gentleneſs, ſocial Affection, Patience, Good-"nature." Bring them hither. I receive them. I make ſuch a Man a Citizen; I receive him for a Neighbour, a fellow Traveller. Only ſee that he hath not the *Neronian* Impreſſion. Is he paſſionate? Is he reſentful? Is he querulous? Would

coming, and to rejoice over the Dead, who is at reſt from his Labours. UPTON.

There is an Account in *Herodotus*, of a People of *Thrace*, who uſed to aſſemble, and condole with a Family where any one was born; and, on the contrary, expreſs great Joy and Congratulation where-ever there happened a Death. L. 5. c. 4.

(*d*) *Nero* being declared an Enemy by the Senate, his Coin was, in conſequence of this, prohibited and deſtroyed.

he, if he took the Fancy, break the Head of thoſe who fall in his Way? Why then do you call him a Man? For is every thing diſtinguiſh'ed by a mere outward Form? Then ſay, juſt as well, that a Piece of Wax is an Apple, or that it hath the Smell and Taſte too. But the external Figure is not enough: nor, conſequently, is it ſufficient to make a Man, that he hath a Noſe and Eyes, if he hath not the proper Principles of a Man. Such a one doth not underſtand Reaſon, or apprehend when he is confuted. He is an Aſs. Another is dead to the Senſe of Shame. He is a worthleſs Creature (*e*); any thing, rather than a Man. Another ſeeks whom he may kick or bite: ſo that he is neither Sheep nor Aſs. But what then? He is a wild Beaſt.

§. 3. "Well: but would you have me deſpiſed "then?"—By whom? By thoſe who know you? And how can they deſpiſe you, who know you to be gentle and modeſt? But, perhaps, by thoſe who do not know you? And what is that to You? For no other Artiſt troubles himſelf about the Ignorant.—"But People will be much the readier "to attack me."—Why do you ſay *me?* Can any one hurt your Choice, or reſtrain you from treating conformably to Nature, the Appearances that

(*e*) The Name of ſome Animal would ſuit better here, than the Epithet ἀχρηςον. But χοιρον, a Hog, is a Word too unlike; and I can think of no better.

that are preſented to you? Why then are you diſturbed, and deſirous to make yourſelf appear formidable? Why do not you make public Proclamation, that you are at Peace with all Mankind, however they may act; and that you chiefly laugh at thoſe, who ſuppoſe they can hurt you. "Theſe Wretches neither know who I am, or "in what conſiſt my Good and Evil: or that "there is no Acceſs for *them* to what is really "*mine*." Thus the Inhabitants of a fortified City laugh at the Beſiegers. "What Trouble "now are theſe People giving themſelves for no-"thing? Our Wall is ſecure; we have Proviſions "for a very long Time, and every other Prepa-"ration." Theſe are what render a City fortified, and impregnable: but nothing but its Principles render the human Soul ſo. For what Wall is ſo ſtrong, what Body ſo impenetrable, or what Poſſeſſion ſo unalienable, or what Dignity ſo ſecured againſt Stratagems? All Things elſe, everywhere elſe, are mortal, eaſily reduced; and whoever, in any Degree, fixes his Mind upon them, muſt neceſſarily be ſubject to Perturbation, Deſpair, Terrors, Lamentations, diſappointed Deſires, and incurred Averſions.

§. 4. And will we not fortify then the only Place of Security that is granted us; and, withdrawing ourſelves from what is mortal and ſervile, diligently improve what is immortal, and by Na-

ture free? Do we not remember, that no one either hurts or benefits another: but the Principle, which we hold concerning every thing, doth it? It is this that hurts us; this that overturns us. Here is the Fight, the Sedition, the War. It was nothing elſe, that made *Eteocles* and *Polynices* Enemies, but their Principle concerning Empire, and their Principle concerning Exile: that the one ſeemed the extremeſt Evil; the other, the greateſt Good. Now the very Nature of every one is to purſue Good, to avoid Evil; to eſteem him as an Enemy and Betrayer, who deprives us of the one, and involves us in the other, though he be a Brother, or a Son, or Father. For nothing is more nearly related to us than Good. So that if Good and Evil conſiſt in Externals, there is no Affection between Father and Son, Brother and Brother; but all is every-where full of Enemies, Betrayers, Sycophants. But if a right Choice be the only Good, and a wrong one the only Evil, what further Room is there for quarrelling, for reviling? About what? About what is nothing to us? Againſt whom? Againſt the Ignorant, againſt the Unhappy, againſt thoſe who are deceived in Things of the greateſt Importance?

§. 5. Mindful of this, *Socrates* lived in his own Houſe, patiently bearing a furious Wife, a ſenſeleſs Son. For what were the Effects of her Fury?

Fury? The throwing as much Water as ſhe pleaſed on his Head, the trampling *(f)* a Cake under her Feet. "And what is this to me, if I "think ſuch Things nothing to me? This very "Point is my Buſineſs: and neither a Tyrant, "nor a Maſter, ſhall reſtrain my Will; nor Mul-"titudes, though I am a ſingle Perſon; nor one "ever ſo ſtrong, though I am ever ſo weak. For "this is given by God to every one, free from "Reſtraint."

§. 6. Theſe Principles make Friendſhip in Families, Concord in Cities, Peace in Nations. They make a Perſon grateful to God, everywhere in good Spirits, [about Externals,] as belonging to others, as of no Value. But we, alas! are able indeed to write and read theſe Things, and to praiſe them when they are read; but very far from being convinced by them. Therefore what is ſaid of the *Lacedemonians*,

Lions at Home, Foxes at Epheſus,

may be applied to us too: Lions in the School, but Foxes out of it.

(f) Alcibiades ſent a fine great Cake, as a Preſent to *Socrates*: which ſo provoked the Jealouſy of the meek *Xantippe*, that ſhe threw it down, and ſtampt upon it. *Socrates* only laughed, and ſaid, "Now you will have no Share in it "yourſelf." UPTON *from* ÆLIAN.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning Thoſe who grieve at being pitied.

§. 1. IT vexes me, ſay you, to be pitied. Is this *your* Affair then, or *theirs*, who pity you? And further: How is it in your Power to prevent it?—"It is, if I ſhow them, that I do not need "Pity."—But are you now in ſuch a Condition, as not to need Pity, or are you not?—"I think "I am. But theſe People do not pity me for "what, if any thing, would deſerve Pity, my "Faults; but for Poverty, and want of Power, "and Sickneſſes, and Deaths, and other Things "of that Kind."—Are you then prepared to convince the World, that none of theſe Things is in Reality an Evil: but that it is poſſible for a Perſon to be happy, even when he is poor, and without Honours, and Power? Or are you prepared to appear to them, rich and powerful? The laſt of theſe is the Part of an arrogant, ſilly, worthleſs Fellow. Obſerve too, by what Means this Fiction muſt be carried on. You muſt hire ſome paultry Slaves, and get poſſeſſed of a few little Pieces of Plate, and often ſhow them in public; and, though they are the ſame, endeavour to conceal that they are the ſame: you muſt have gay Clothes, and other Finery; and make a Show of being

being honoured by your great People; and endeavour to ſup with them; or be *thought* to ſup with them; and uſe ſome vile Arts with your Perſon, to make it appear handſomer and genteeler than it really is. All this you muſt contrive, if you would take the ſecond Way not to be pitied. And the firſt is impracticable, as well as tedious, to undertake the very Thing, that *Jupiter* himſelf could not do: to convince all Mankind what Things are really good and evil. Is this granted you? The only Thing granted you is, to convince *yourſelf:* and you have not yet done that: and do you, notwithſtanding, undertake to convince *others?* Why, who hath lived ſo long with you, as you have with yourſelf? Who is ſo likely to have Faith in you, in order to be convinced by you, as you in yourſelf? Who is a better Wiſher, or a nearer Friend to you, than you to yourſelf? How is it then, that you have not yet convinced yourſelf. Should not you (*a*) now turn theſe Things every Way in your Thoughts? What you were

(*a*) The Text is either corrupt, or very elliptical and obſcure; and the Tranſlation conjectural. Ανω κατω hath the ſame Senſe in the next Page but one, which is aſſigned to it here. The και before μανθανειν is omitted, as being probably a Corruption of the laſt Syllable of the preceding Word, written twice over. Mr *Upton*'s MS. cuts the Difficulty ſhort, by leaving out ſeveral Words; in conſequence of which the Tranſlation would be; *How is it then, that you have not yet brought yourſelf to learn to be exempt*, &c.

were ſtudying was this: to learn to be exempt from Grief, Perturbation, and Meanneſs, and to be free. Have not you heard then, that the only Way that leads to this is, to give up what doth not depend on Choice: to withdraw from it; and confeſs, that it belongs to others? What kind of Thing then is another's Opinion about you?—"Independent on Choice."—Is it nothing then to *you*?—"Nothing."—While you are ſtill piqued and diſturbed about it then, do you think, that you are convinced concerning Good and Evil?

§. 2. Letting others alone then, why will you not be your own Scholar and Teacher? Let others look to it, whether it be for their Advantage to think and act contrary to Nature: but no one is nearer to me than myſelf. What then is the Meaning of this? I have heard the Reaſonings of Philoſophers, and aſſented to them: yet, in fact, I am never the more relieved. Am I ſo ſtupid? And yet in other Things, that I had an Inclination to, I was not found very ſtupid: but I quickly learned Grammar, and the Exerciſes of the *Palæſtra*, and Geometry, and the Solution of Syllogiſms. Hath not Reaſon then convinced me? And yet there is no one of the other Things, that I ſo much approved or liked from the very firſt. And now I read concerning theſe Subjects, I hear Diſcourſes upon them, I write about them, and

and I have not yet found any Reaſoning of greater Strength than this. What then do I want? Is it not, that the contrary Principles are not removed out of my Mind? Is it not, that I have not ſtrengthened theſe Opinions by Exerciſe, nor accuſtomed them to occur in Action; but, like Arms thrown aſide, they are grown ruſty, and do not fit me? Yet neither in the *Palæſtra*, nor writing, nor reading, nor ſolving Syllogiſms, am I contented with mere Learning: but I turn the Arguments every Way, which are preſented to me, and I compoſe others; and the ſame of convertible Propoſitions. But the neceſſary Theorems, by which I might become exempted from Fear, Grief, Paſſion, unreſtrained and free, I neither exerciſe, nor ſtudy, with a proper Application. And then I trouble myſelf, what others will ſay of me; whether I ſhall appear to them worthy of Regard; whether I ſhall appear happy. —Will you not ſee, Wretch, what you can ſay of *yourſelf?* What ſort of Perſon you appear to *yourſelf*, in your Opinions, in your Deſires, in your Averſions, in your Purſuits, in your Preparation, in your Intention, in the other proper Works of a Man? But, inſtead of that, do you trouble yourſelf, whether *others* pity you?—"Very "true. But I am pitied improperly."—Then are not you *pained* by this? And is not he who is in Pain to be pitied.—"Yes."—How then are

you

you pitied improperly? For you render yourſelf worthy of Pity by what you ſuffer upon being pitied.

§. 3. What ſays *Antiſthenes* then? Have you never heard? "It is kingly, O *Cyrus*, to do well, "and to be ill ſpoken of." My Head is well, and all around me think it akes. What is that to *me?* I am free from a Fever; and they compaſſionate me, as if I had one. "Poor Soul, what a long "while have you had this Fever!" I ſay too, with a diſmal Countenance, Ay, indeed, it is now a long time that I have been ill.—"What can "be the Conſequence then?"—What pleaſes God. And at the ſame time I ſecretly laugh at them, who pity me. What forbids then, but that the ſame may be done in the other Caſe? I am poor: but I have right Principles concerning Poverty. What is it to me then, if People pity me for my Poverty? I am not in Power, and others are: but I have ſuch Opinions as I ought to have concerning Power, and the want of Power. Let them ſee to it, who pity me. But I am neither hungry, nor thirſty, nor cold. But, becauſe they are hungry and thirſty, they ſuppoſe me to be ſo too. What can I do for them? Am I to go about, making Proclamation, and ſaying, Do not deceive yourſelves, good People, I am very well: I regard neither Poverty, nor want of Power, nor any thing elſe, but right Principles.

Theſe

Theſe I poſſeſs unreſtrained. I care for nothing farther.—But what trifling is this? How have I right Principles, when I am not contented to be what I am; but am out of my Wits, how I ſhall appear?—But others will get more, and be preferred to me.—Why, what is more reaſonable, than that they who take Pains for any thing, ſhould get moſt in that Particular, in which they take Pains? They have taken Pains for Power; you, for right Principles: they, for Riches; you, for a proper Uſe of the Appearances of Things. See whether they have the Advantage of you in that, for which you have taken Pains, and which they neglect: if they aſſent better, concerning the natural Bounds and Limits of Things; if their Deſires are leſs diſappointed than yours, their Averſions leſs incurred; if they take a better Aim in their Intention, in their Purpoſes, in their Purſuits: whether they preſerve a becoming Behaviour, as Men, as Sons, as Parents, and ſo on in reſpect of the other Relations of Life. But, if they are in Power, and you not (*b*): why will you not ſpeak the Truth to yourſelf; that *you* do nothing for the ſake of Power; but that *they* do every thing? And it is very unreaſonable, that he who carefully ſeeks any thing, ſhould be leſs ſucceſsful than he who neglects it.—"No: but "ſince

(*b*) I have tranſlated thus, on the Suppoſition, that ω in the Original ought to be repeated.

" ſince I take Care to have right Principles, it is " more reaſonable that I ſhould have Power."—. Yes, in reſpect to what you take Care about, your Principles. But give up to others the Things, in which they have taken more Care than you. Elſe it is juſt as if, becauſe you have right Principles, you ſhould think it fit, that when you ſhoot an Arrow, you ſhould hit the Mark better than an Archer, or that you ſhould forge better than a Smith. Therefore let alone taking Pains about Principles, and apply yourſelf to the Things which you wiſh to poſſeſs, and then fall a crying, if you do not ſucceed; for you deſerve to cry. But now you ſay, that you are engaged in other Things; intent upon other Things: and it is a true Saying, that one Buſineſs doth not ſuit with another. One Man, as ſoon as he riſes and goes out, ſeeks to whom he may pay his Compliments; whom he may flatter; to whom he may ſend a Preſent; how he may pleaſe the Dancer [in Vogue]; how, by doing ill-natured Offices to one, he may oblige another. Whenever he prays, he prays for Things like theſe: whenever he ſacrifices, he ſacrifices for Things like theſe. To theſe he tranſfers the *Pythagorean* Precept;

Let not the ſtealing God of Sleep ſurpriſe, &c.

Where

(*c*) *Where have I failed* in Point of Flattery? *What have I done?* Any thing like a free, brave-ſpirited Man? If he ſhould find any thing of this Sort, he rebukes and accuſes himſelf. "What "Buſineſs had you to ſay that? For could not "you have lied? Even the Philoſophers ſay, there "is no Objection againſt telling a Lie."

§. 4. But on the other Hand, if you have in reality been careful about nothing elſe, but to make a right Uſe of the Appearance of Things; as ſoon as you are up in a Morning, conſider, what do I want in order to be free from Paſſion? What, to enjoy Tranquillity? What am I? Am I mere worthleſs Body? Am I Eſtate? Am I Reputation? None of theſe. What then? I am a reaſonable Creature. What then is required of me? Recollect your Actions. *Where have I failed*, in any Requiſite for Proſperity? *What have I done*, either unfriendly, and unſociable? *What have I omitted*, that was neceſſary in theſe Points?

§. 5. Since there is ſo much Difference then in your Deſires, your Actions, your Wiſhes, would you yet have an equal Share with others in thoſe Things, about which you have not taken Pains, and they have? And do you wonder, after all, and are you out of Humour, if they pity you? But they are not out of Humour, if you pity them.

(*c*) See the *Pythagorean* Verſes (quoted in B. III. c. 10.) of which theſe Queſtions are a Parody.

them. Why? Becauſe they are convinced, that they are in Poſſeſſion of their proper Good; but you are not convinced that you are. Hence you are not contented with your own Condition; but deſire theirs: whereas they are contented with theirs, and do not deſire yours. For, if you were really convinced, that it is *you* who are in Poſſeſſion of what is good, and that *they* are miſtaken, you would not ſo much as think what they ſay about you.

CHAP. VII.

Of Fearleſſneſs.

§. 1. WHAT makes a Tyrant formidable? His Guards, ſay you, and their Swords; they who belong to the Bed-chamber; and they who ſhut out thoſe, who would go in. What is the Reaſon then, that, if you bring a Child to him when he is ſurrounded by his Guards, it is not afraid? Is it becauſe the Child doth not know what they mean? Suppoſe then, that any one doth know what is meant by Guards, and that they are armed with Swords; and, for that very Reaſon, comes in the Tyrant's Way, being deſirous, on account of ſome Misfortune, to die, and ſeeking to die eaſily by the Hand of another: Doth ſuch a Man fear the Guards? No: for he wants

wants the very Thing, that renders them formidable. Well then: if any one, without an abſolute Deſire to live or die, but, as it may happen, comes in the Way of a Tyrant, what reſtrains his approaching him without Fear? Nothing. If then another ſhould think concerning his Eſtate, or Wife, or Children, as this Man doth concerning his Body; and, in ſhort, from ſome Madneſs or Folly, ſhould be of ſuch a Diſpoſition, as not to care whether he hath them, or hath them not; but, as Children, playing with Shells, make a Difference indeed in the Play, but do not trouble themſelves about the Shells; ſo he ſhould pay no Regard to the Materials [of Action]; but apply himſelf to the playing with, and Management of, them; what Tyrant, what Guards, or their Swords, are any longer formidable to ſuch a Man?

§ 2. And is it poſſible, that any one ſhould be thus diſpoſed towards theſe Things from Madneſs *(a)*; and the *Galileans*, from mere Habit; yet that

(*a*) *Epictetus*, probably, means, not any remaining Diſciples of *Judas* of *Galilee*, but the Chriſtians, whom *Julian* afterwards affected to call *Galileans*. It helps to confirm this Opinion, that *M. Antoninus* (L. 2. §. 3.) mentions them, by their proper Name of Chriſtians, as ſuffering Death out of mere Obſtinacy. It would have been more reaſonable, and more worthy the Character of theſe great Men, to have enquired into the Principles, on which the Chriſtians

that no one ſhould be able to learn, from Reaſon and Demonſtration, that God made all Things in the World, and the whole World itſelf, unreſtrained and perfect; and all its Parts for the Uſe of the Whole? All other Creatures are indeed excluded from a Power of comprehending the Adminiſtration of the World; but a reaſonable Being hath Abilities for the Conſideration of all theſe Things: both that it [ſelf] is a Part, and what Part; and that it is fit the Parts ſhould ſubmit to the Whole. Beſides, being by Nature conſtituted noble, magnanimous, and free, it ſees, that, of the Things which relate to it, ſome are unreſtrained and in its own Power, ſome reſtrained, and in the Power of others: the unreſtrained, ſuch as depend on Choice; the reſtrained,

Chriſtians refuſed to worſhip Heathen Deities, and by which they were enabled to ſupport their Sufferings with ſuch amazing Conſtancy, than raſhly to pronounce their Behaviour the Effect of Obſtinacy and Habit. *Epictetus* and *Antoninus* were too exact Judges of human Nature, not to know, that Ignominy, Tortures, and Death, are not, merely on their own Account, Objects of Choice: nor could the Records of any Time or Nation, furniſh them with an Example of Multitudes of Perſons of both Sexes, of all Ages, Ranks, and natural Diſpoſitions, in diſtant Countries, and ſucceſſive Periods, reſigning whatever is moſt valuable and dear to the Heart of Man, from a Principle of *Obſtinacy*, or the mere Force of *Habit*: not to ſay, that Habit could have no Influence on the firſt Sufferers.

ſtrained, ſuch as do not depend on it. And, for this Reaſon, if it eſteems its Good and its Intereſt to conſiſt in Things unreſtrained, and in its own Power, it will be free, proſperous, happy, unhurt, magnanimous, pious; thankful (*b*) to God for every thing; never finding fault with any thing, never cenſuring any thing that is brought to paſs by him. But, if it eſteems its Good, and its Intereſt, to conſiſt in Externals, and Things independent on Choice, it muſt neceſſarily be reſtrained, be hindered, be enſlaved to thoſe who have the Power over thoſe Things which it admires, and fears; it muſt neceſſarily be impious, as ſuppoſing itſelf injured by God, and unequitable, as claiming more than its Share; it muſt neceſſarily too be abject, and mean-ſpirited.

§. 3. What forbids, but that he, who diſtinguiſhes theſe Things, may live with an eaſy and light Heart, quietly expecting whatever may happen, and bearing contentedly what hath happened? Would you have Poverty [be my Lot]? Bring it; and you ſhall ſee what Poverty is, when it hath got one to act it well. Would you have Power? Bring Toils too along with it. Baniſhment? Where-ever I go, it will be well with me there: for it was well with me *here*, not on account

(*b*) This agrees with *Eph.* v. 20. *Giving Thanks always for all Things unto God* —.

count of the Place, but of the Principles, which I ſhall carry away with me; for no one can deprive me of theſe: on the contrary, they alone are my Property, and cannot be taken away; and retaining them, ſuffices me where-ever I am, or what-ever I do.—"But it is now time to die."—What is it that you call dying (*c*)? Do not talk of the Thing in a Tragedy Strain; but ſay, as the Truth is, that it is Time for a compound Piece of Matter to be reſolved back into its Original. And where is the Terror of this? What Part of the World is going to be loſt? What is going to happen new, or prodigious? Is it for this, that a Tyrant is formidable? Is it on this Account, that the Swords of his Guards ſeem ſo large and ſharp? Try theſe Things upon others. For my Part, I have examined the Whole. No one hath an Authority over me. God hath made me free: I know his Commands: after this, no one can enſlave me. I have a proper Aſſertor of my Freedom; proper Judges. Is it not of my Body, that you are the Maſter? What is that to *me* then? Of that Trifle my Eſtate? What is that to *me* then? Is it not of Baniſhment and Chains, that you are the Maſter? Why all theſe again, and my whole Body I give up to you: when-ever you pleaſe, make a Trial of your Power, and you will find how far it extends.

§. 4.

(*c*) The Tranſlation here follows Mr *Upton*'s Manuſcript, and Emendation.

§. 4. Whom then can I any longer fear? Thoſe who belong to the Bed-chamber? Leſt they ſhould do—What? Shut me out? If they find me deſirous to come in, let them.—"Why do you come "to the Door then?"—Becauſe it is fitting for me, that while the Play laſts, I ſhould play too. —"How then are you incapable of being ſhut "out?"—Becauſe, if I am not admitted, I would not wiſh to go in; but would much rather, that Things ſhould be as they are: for I eſteem what God wills, to be better than what I will (*d*). I give myſelf up a Servant and a Follower to him. I purſue, I deſire, in ſhort, I *will* along with Him. Being ſhut out doth not relate to *me*; but to thoſe who puſh to get in. Why then do not I puſh too? Becauſe I know, that there is not any Good diſtributed there to thoſe who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the Favour of *Cæſar*, I ſay, what hath he got?—"A Province (*e*)."—Hath he then got ſuch Principles too, as he ought to have?—"A pub-"lic Charge."—Hath he then got with it the Knowledge how to uſe it too? If not, why ſhould I be thruſt about any longer to get in? Some one ſcatters Nuts and Figs. Children ſcramble and

(*d*) *Nevertheleſs not as I will, but as Thou wilt.* Matth. xxvi. 39.

(*e*) The Tranſlation of this Paſſage follows the Conjecture of *Wolfius*.

count of the Place, but of the Principles, which I ſhall carry away with me; for no one can deprive me of theſe: on the contrary, they alone are my Property, and cannot be taken away; and retaining them, ſuffices me where-ever I am, or what-ever I do.—"But it is now time to die."—What is it that you call dying (*c*)? Do not talk of the Thing in a Tragedy Strain; but ſay, as the Truth is, that it is Time for a compound Piece of Matter to be reſolved back into its Original. And where is the Terror of this? What Part of the World is going to be loſt? What is going to happen new, or prodigious? Is it for this, that a Tyrant is formidable? Is it on this Account, that the Swords of his Guards ſeem ſo large and ſharp? Try theſe Things upon others. For my Part, I have examined the Whole. No one hath an Authority over me. God hath made me free: I know his Commands: after this, no one can enſlave me. I have a proper Aſſertor of my Freedom; proper Judges. Is it not of my Body, that you are the Maſter? What is that to *me* then? Of that Trifle my Eſtate? What is that to *me* then? Is it not of Baniſhment and Chains, that you are the Maſter? Why all theſe again, and my whole Body I give up to you: when-ever you pleaſe, make a Trial of your Power, and you will find how far it extends.

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§. 4. Whom then can I any longer fear? Thoſe who belong to the Bed-chamber? Leſt they ſhould do—What? Shut me out? If they find me deſirous to come in, let them.—"Why do you come "to the Door then?"—Becauſe it is fitting for me, that while the Play laſts, I ſhould play too. —"How then are you incapable of being ſhut "out?"—Becauſe, if I am not admitted, I would not wiſh to go in; but would much rather, that Things ſhould be as they are: for I eſteem what God wills, to be better than what I will (*d*). I give myſelf up a Servant and a Follower to him. I purſue, I deſire, in ſhort, I *will* along with Him. Being ſhut out doth not relate to *me*; but to thoſe who puſh to get in. Why then do not I puſh too? Becauſe I know, that there is not any Good diſtributed there to thoſe who get in. But when I hear any one congratulated on the Favour of *Cæſar*, I ſay, what hath he got?—"A Province (*e*)."—Hath he then got ſuch Principles too, as he ought to have?—"A pub-"lic Charge."—Hath he then got with it the Knowledge how to uſe it too? If not, why ſhould I be thruſt about any longer to get in? Some one ſcatters Nuts and Figs. Children ſcramble and

(*d*) *Nevertheleſs not as I will, but as Thou wilt.* Matth. xxvi. 39.

(*e*) The Tranſlation of this Paſſage follows the Conjecture of *Wolfius*.

quarrel for them; but not Men: for they think them Trifles. But, if any one ſhould ſcatter Shells, not even Children would ſcramble for theſe. Provinces are diſtributing. Let Children look to it. Money. Let Children look to it. Military Command, a Conſulſhip. Let Children ſcramble for them. Let theſe be ſhut out, be beat, kiſs the Hands of the Giver, of his Slaves. But to me, they are but mere Figs and Nuts.—"What then is to be done?"—If you miſs them, while he is throwing them, do not trouble yourſelf about it: but, if a Fig ſhould fall into your Lap, take it, and eat it; for one may pay ſo much Regard even to a Fig. But, if I am to ſtoop and throw down one, or be thrown down by another, and flatter thoſe who are got in, a Fig is not worth this, nor any other of the Things which are not really good, and which the Philoſophers have perſuaded me not to eſteem as good.

§. 5. Show me the Swords of the Guards.—"See how big and how ſharp they are."—What then do theſe great and ſharp Swords do?—"They kill."—And what doth a Fever do?—"Nothing elſe."—And a Tile?—"Nothing "elſe."—Would you have me then be ſtruck with an awful Admiration of all theſe, and worſhip them, and go about a Slave to them all? Heaven forbid! But, having once learnt, that every

every thing that is born muſt likewiſe die, (that the World may not be at a Stand, or the Courſe of it hindered), I no longer make any Difference, whether this be effected by a Fever, or a Tile, or a Soldier: but, if any Compariſon is to be made, I know, that the Soldier will effect it with leſs Pain, and more ſpeedily. Since then I neither fear any of thoſe Things, which he can inflict upon me, nor covet any thing which he can beſtow, why do I ſtand any longer in Awe of a Tyrant? Why am I ſtruck with Aſtoniſhment? Why do I fear his Guards? Why do I rejoice, if he ſpeaks kindly to me, and receives me graciouſly; and relate to others, in what Manner he ſpoke to me? For is He *Socrates* or *Diogenes*, that his Praiſe ſhould ſhow what I am? Or have I ſet my Heart on imitating his Manners? But, to keep up the Play, I go to him, and ſerve him, as long as he commands nothing unreaſonable or improper. But, if he ſhould ſay to me, "Go to *Salamis*, "and bring *Leo* (*f*)," I anſwer him, ſeek another, for I play no longer.—"Lead him away."—I follow, in Sport.—"But your Head will be taken "off."—And will his own always remain on; or yours, who obey him?—"But you will be "thrown out, unburied."—If *I* am the Corpſe, *I* ſhall be thrown out; but if *I* am ſomething elſe

(*f*) An Alluſion to the Story, mentioned in the firſt Chapter of this Book, p. 177. Note (*e*).

than the Corpſe (*g*), ſpeak more handſomely, as the Thing is, and do not think to fright me. Theſe Things are frightful to Children and Fools. But if any one, who hath once entered into the School of a Philoſopher, doth not know what he himſelf is, he deſerves to be frighted, and to flatter what he lately flattered; if he hath not yet learnt, that he is neither Fleſh, nor Bones, nor Nerves; but that which makes uſe of theſe, and regulates and comprehends the Appearances of Things.

§. 6. "Well: but theſe Reaſonings make Men "deſpiſe the Laws."—And what Reaſonings then render thoſe, who uſe them, more obedient to the Laws? But the Law of Fools is no Law. And yet, ſee how theſe Reaſonings render us properly diſpoſed, even towards ſuch Perſons, ſince they teach us, not to claim, in Oppoſition to them, any thing wherein they have it in their Power to be ſuperior to us. They teach us to give up Body, to give up Eſtate, Children, Parents, Brothers, to yield every thing, to let go every thing, excepting only Principles; which even *Jupiter* hath excepted, and decreed to be every one's own Property. What Unreaſonableneſs, what Breach of the Laws, is there in this? Where you are ſuperior and ſtronger, there I give way to *you*. Where, on the contrary, I am ſuperior, do you ſubmit

(*g*) See p. 127. of this Vol. Note (*w*).

ſubmit to *me*; for this hath been my Study, and not yours. Your Study hath been to walk upon a *Moſaic* Floor, to be attended by your Servants and Clients, to wear fine Clothes, to have a great Number of Hunters, Fiddlers, and Players. Do I lay any claim [to theſe?] but [on the other Hand,] have you then ſtudied Principles, or even your own rational Faculty? Do you know, of what Parts it conſiſts? How they are connected; what are its Articulations; what Powers it hath, and of what Kind? Why then do you take it amiſs, if another, who hath ſtudied them, hath the Advantage of you in theſe Things?—"But "they are of all Things the greateſt."—Well: and who reſtrains you from being converſant with them, and attending to them ever ſo carefully? Or who is better provided with Books, with Leiſure, with Aſſiſtants? Only turn your Thoughts now-and-then to theſe Matters; beſtow but a little Time upon your own ruling Faculty. Conſider what it is you have, and whence it came, that uſes all other Things, that examines them all, that chuſes, that rejects. But while you employ yourſelf about Externals, you will have thoſe indeed, ſuch as no one elſe hath; but your ruling Faculty, ſuch as you like to have it, ſordid and neglected.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning ſuch as haſtily run into the philoſophic Dreſs.

§. 1. NEVER commend or cenſure any one for common Actions, nor aſcribe them either to Skilfulneſs or Unſkilfulneſs; and thus you will at once be free both from Raſhneſs and Ill-nature. Such a one bathes in a mighty little Time. Doth he therefore do it ill? Not at all. But what? In a mighty little Time.—"Is every "thing well done then?"—By no means. But what is done from good Principles is well done; what from bad ones, ill. But till you know from what Principle any one acts, neither commend nor cenſure the Action. But the Principle is not eaſily judged of from the external Appearances. Such a one is a Carpenter. Why? He uſes an Axe. What ſignifies that? Such a one is a Muſician: for he ſings. What ſignifies that? Such a one is a Philoſopher. Why? Becauſe he wears a Cloke and long Hair. What then do Mountebanks wear? And ſo, when People ſee any of theſe acting indecently, they preſently ſay, "See (*a*) what "the Philoſopher doth." But they ought rather, from his acting indecently, to ſay, he is no Philoſopher.

(*a*) Perhaps the true Reading is ὃ ἐ φιλοσοφος.

pher. For, if indeed the Idea, which we have of a Philoſopher, and his Profeſſion, was, to wear a Cloke and long Hair, they would ſay right: but if it be rather to keep himſelf free from Faults, ſince he doth not fulfil his Profeſſion, why do not they deprive him of his Title? For this is the Way with regard to other Arts. When we ſee any one handle an Axe aukwardly, we do not ſay, "Where is the Uſe of this Art? See how "ill Carpenters perform." But we ſay the very contrary: "This Man is no Carpenter; for he "handles an Axe aukwardly." So, if we hear any one ſing badly, we do not ſay, "Obſerve "how Muſicians ſing," but rather, "This Fel-"low is no Muſician." It is with regard to Philoſophy alone, that People are thus affected. When they ſee any one acting contrary to the Profeſſion of a Philoſopher, they do not take away his Title; but, laying it down, that he is a Philoſopher, and then aſſuming from the very Fact that he behaves indecently, they infer, that Philoſophy is of no Uſe.

§. 2. "What then is the Reaſon of this?" Becauſe we pay ſome Regard to the Pre-conception which we have of a Carpenter, and a Muſician, and ſo of other Artiſts; but not of a Philoſopher; which being thus vague and confuſed, we judge of it only from external Appearances. And of what other Art do we take up our Judgment from,

the Dreſs and the Hair? Hath it not Theorems too, and Materials, and an End, [to diſtinguiſh it?] What then is the Subject matter of a Philoſopher? Is it a Cloke?—No: but Reaſon. What his End? To wear a Cloke?—No: but to have his Reaſon correct. What are his Theorems? Are they how to get a great Beard, or long Hair? —No: but rather, as *Zeno* expreſſes it, To know the Elements of Reaſon, what each of them is in particular, and how they are adapted to each other, and what are their Conſequences.

§. 3. Why then will you not firſt ſee, whether, by acting in an unbecoming Manner, he anſwers his Profeſſion, and ſo proceed to blame the Study? Whereas now, when you act ſoberly yourſelf, you ſay, from what he appears to do amiſs, "Obſerve "the *Philoſopher!*" As if it was decent to call a Perſon, who doth ſuch Things, a *Philoſopher*. And, again, This is *philoſophical!*" But you do not ſay, "Obſerve the Carpenter, or obſerve the "Muſician," when you know one of them to be an Adulterer, or ſee him to be a Glutton. So, in ſome ſmall Degree, even You perceive, what the Profeſſion of a Philoſopher is; but are miſled, and confounded by your own Careleſſneſs. But indeed even they, who were called Philoſophers, enter upon their Profeſſion by Things which are common to them with others. As ſoon as they have put on a Cloke, and let their Beard grow,

they

they cry, "I am a Philoſopher." Yet no one ſays, "I am a Muſician;" becauſe he hath bought a Fiddle and Fiddleſtick: nor, "I am a Smith;" becauſe he is dreſt in the *Vulcanian* Cap and Apron. But they take their Name from their Art, not from their Habit.

§. 4. For this Reaſon, *Euphrates* was in the Right to ſay, "I long endeavoured to conceal "my embracing the Philoſophic Life; and it was "of Uſe to me. For, in the firſt Place, I knew "that, what I did right, I did it not for Specta-"tors; but for myſelf. I eat in a proper Man-"ner, for myſelf. I had a compoſed Look, and "Walk, all for God and myſelf. Then, as I "fought alone, I was alone in Danger. Philo-"ſophy was in no Danger, on my doing any "thing ſhameful, or unbecoming: nor did I hurt "the reſt of the World; which, by offending as a "Philoſopher, I might have done. For this Rea-"ſon, they who were ignorant of my Intention, "uſed to wonder, that while I converſed, and "lived intirely with Philoſophers, I never took up "the Character. And where was the Harm, "that I ſhould be diſcovered to be a Philoſopher, "by my Actions, and not by the uſual Badges. "See how I eat, how I drink, how I ſleep, how "I bear, how I forbear; how I aſſiſt others; "how I make uſe of my Deſires, how of my "Averſions; how I preſerve the natural and ac-

" quired Relations, without Confuſion, and with-
" out Impediment. Judge of me from hence, if
" you can. But, if you are ſo deaf and blind,
" that you would not ſuppoſe *Vulcan* himſelf to
" be a good Smith, unleſs you ſaw the Cap upon
" his Head, where is the Harm of not being found
" out by ſo fooliſh a Judge?"

§. 5. It was thus too that *Socrates* concealed himſelf from the Generality: and ſome even came and deſired him to recommend them to Philoſophers. Did he uſe to be diſpleaſed then, like us; and ſay, What! do not you take *me* for a Philoſopher? No: he took and recommended them; contented with only being a Philoſopher, and rejoicing in not being vexed, that he was not thought one. For he remembered his Buſineſs: and what is the Buſineſs of a wiſe and good Man? To have many Scholars? By no means. Let thoſe ſee to it, who have made this their Study. Well then: is it to be a perfect Maſter of difficult Theorems? Let others ſee to that too. In what then was he and did he deſire to be, ſomebody? In what conſtituted his Hurt or Advantage? " If, ſays he,
" any one can hurt me, I am doing nothing. If
" I depend for my Advantage upon another, I
" am nothing. Do I wiſh for any thing, and it
" doth not come to paſs; I am unhappy." To ſuch a Combat he invited every one, and, in my Opinion, yielded to no one. But do you think

it

it was by making Proclamation, and ſaying, "I "am ſuch a one?" Far from it: but by *being* ſuch a one. For this, again, is Folly and Inſolence to ſay, "I am paſſive and undiſturbed. Be it known to "you, Mortals, that while *you* are fluctuating "and buſtling about for Things of no Value, *I* "alone am free from all Perturbation."—Are you then ſo far from being contented with having no Pain yourſelf, that you muſt needs make Proclamation: "Come hither, all you who have the "Gout, or the Head-ach, or a Fever, or are "lame, or blind; and ſee *me* free from every "Diſtemper." This is vain and ſhocking, unleſs you could ſhow, like *Æſculapius*, by what Method of Cure they may preſently become as free from Diſtempers as yourſelf, and bring your own Health as a Proof of it.

§. 6. Such is the Cynic, honoured with the Sceptre and Diadem from *Jove:* who ſays, "That "you may ſee, O Mankind, that you do not ſeek "Happineſs and Tranquillity where it is, but "where it is not; behold, I am ſent an Exam-"ple to you, from God; who have neither (*b*) "Eſtate, nor Houſe, nor Wife, nor Children, "nor even a Bed, or Coat, or Furniture. And "ſee how healthy I am. Try me: and, if you "ſee me free from Perturbation, hear the Re-"medies, and by what Means I was cured." This now is benevolent and noble. But conſi-

(*b*) See p. 85. of this Vol. Note (*m*).

der whoſe Buſineſs it is.—*Jupiter*'s, or his whom he judges worthy of this Office; that he may never diſcover any thing to the World, by which he may invalidate his own Teſtimony, which he gives for Virtue, and againſt Externals.

No ſickly Pale his beauteous Features wear,
Nor from his Cheek he wipes the languid Tear.
HOMER.

And not only this, but he doth not deſire or ſeek for Company or Place, or Amuſement, as Boys do the Vintage Time, or Holy-Days: always fortified by virtuous Shame, as others are by Walls, and Gates, and Centinels.

§. 7. But now they, who have only ſuch an Inclination to Philoſophy, as bad Stomachs have to ſome Kinds of Food, of which they will preſently grow ſick, immediately run to the Sceptre, to the Kingdom. They let grow their Hair, aſſume (*d*) the Cloke, bare the Shoulder, wrangle with all they meet; and even, if they ſee any one in a thick warm Coat, wrangle with him. Firſt harden yourſelf againſt all Weather, Man. Conſider your Inclination; whether it be not that of a bad Stomach, or of a longing Woman. Firſt ſtudy to conceal what you are; philoſophiſe a little while by yourſelf. Fruit is produced thus. The Seed muſt firſt be buried in the Ground, lie hid there ſome time, and grow up by degrees, that it may

(*d*) Which were the Characteriſtics of the Cynics.

may come to Perfection. But, if it produces the Ear before the Stalk hath its proper Joints, it is imperfect, and of the Garden of *Adonis* (*e*). Now *you* are a poor Plant of this Kind. You have bloſſomed too ſoon: the Winter will kill you. See what Countrymen ſay about Seeds of any Sort, when the warm Weather comes too early. They are in great Anxiety, for fear the Seeds ſhould ſhoot out too luxuriantly; and then one Froſt taking them (*f*), ſhows how prejudicial their Forwardneſs was. Beware you too, Man. You have ſhot out luxuriantly; you have ſprung forth towards a trifling Fame, before the proper Seaſon. You ſeem to be ſomebody, as a Fool may among Fools. You will be taken by the Froſt: or rather, you are already frozen downward, at the Root: you ſtill bloſſom indeed a little at the Top, and therefore you think you are ſtill alive and flouriſhing. Let *us*, at leaſt, ripen naturally. Why do you lay us open? Why do you force us?

We

(*e*) At the Feaſt of *Adonis*, there were carried about little Earthen Pots, filled with Mould, in which grew ſeveral Sorts of Herbs. Theſe were called Gardens: and from thence the Gardens of *Adonis* came to be proverbially applied to Things unfruitful or fading; becauſe thoſe Herbs were only ſowed ſo long before the Feſtival, as to ſprout forth and be green at that Time, and then were preſently caſt into the Water. See POTTER's *Grecian* Antiquities, Chap. 20. p. 363.

(*f*) Here is a ſtrong Similitude to the Seed in the Goſpels, that ſprung up quickly, and withered.

We cannot yet bear the Air. Suffer the Root to grow; then the firſt, then the ſecond, then the third Joint of the Stalk to ſpring from it; and thus (*g*) Nature will force out the Fruit, whether I will or not. For who that is big with, and full of ſuch Principles, doth not perceive too his own Qualifications, and exert his Efforts to correſpondent Operations? Not even a Bull is ignorant of his own Qualifications, when any wild Beaſt approaches the Herd, nor waits for any one to encourage him; nor a Dog, when he ſpies any Game. And if I have the Qualifications of a good Man, ſhall I wait for you to qualify me for my own proper Operations? But believe me, I have them not yet. Why then would you wiſh *me* to be withered before my Time, as *you* are?

CHAP. IX.

Concerning a Perſon who was grown immodeſt.

(*a*) §. 1 WHEN you ſee another in Power, ſet againſt it, that you have the Advantage of not wanting Power. When you ſee another rich, ſee what you have inſtead of Riches: for, if you have nothing in their Stead, you

(*g*) This Paſſage hath ſome Difficulty in the Original; and, probably, may have been corrupted. The Tranſlation hath given what ſeems to be the Senſe.

(*a*) They, who are deſirous of taking Refuge in Heathenism from the Strictneſs of the Chriſtian Morality, will find no great Conſolation in reading this Chapter of *Epictetus*.

you are miſerable. But if you have the Advantage of not needing Riches, know, that you have ſomething more than he hath, and of far greater Value. Another poſſeſſes a handſome Woman; you the Happineſs of not deſiring a handſome Woman. Do you think theſe are little Matters? And what would thoſe very Perſons, who are rich, and powerful, and poſſeſs handſome Women, give, that they were able to deſpiſe Riches and Power, and thoſe very Women whom they love, and whom they acquire! Do not you know of what Nature the Thirſt of one in a Fever is? It hath no Reſemblance to that of a Perſon in Health. He drinks, and is ſatisfied. But the other, after being delighted a very little while, grows ſick, turns the Water into Choler, throws it up, hath Pain in his Bowels, and becomes more violently thirſty. Of the ſame Nature is it to have Riches, or Dominion, or enjoy a fine Woman, with Fondneſs of any one of theſe Things. Jealouſy takes place; Fear of loſing the beloved Object; indecent Diſcourſes, indecent Deſigns, unbecoming Actions.

§. 2. "And what, ſay you, do I loſe all the "while?"—You were modeſt, Man, and are ſo no longer. Have you loſt nothing? Inſtead of *Chryſippus* and *Zeno*, you read *Ariſtides* (*b*) and *Eucnus* (*c*). Have you loſt nothing then? Inſtead of

(*b*) An indecent Poet of *Miletus*.
(*c*) A Writer of amorous Verſes.

of *Socrates* and *Diogenes*, you admire him who can corrupt and entice the moſt Women. You ſet out your Perſon, and would be handſome, when you are not. You love to appear in fine Clothes, to attract the Eyes of the Women; and, if you anywhere meet with (*d*) a good Perfumer, you eſteem yourſelf a happy Man. But formerly you did not ſo much as think of any of theſe Things; but only where you might find a decent Diſcourſe, a worthy Perſon, a noble Deſign. For this Reaſon, you uſed to ſleep like a Man; to appear in public like a Man; to wear a manly Dreſs; to hold Diſcourſes worthy of a Man. And after this, do you tell me, you have loſt nothing? What then do Men loſe nothing but Money? Is not Modeſty to be loſt? Is not Decency to be loſt? Or may he, who loſes theſe, ſuffer no Damage? You indeed perhaps no longer think any thing of this Sort to be a Damage. But there was once a Time, when you accounted this to be the only Damage and Hurt; when you were anxiouſly afraid, leſt any one ſhould ſhake your Regard from theſe Diſcourſes and Actions. See, it is not ſhaken by another; but by yourſelf. Fight againſt yourſelf, recover yourſelf to Decency, to Modeſty, to Freedom. If you had formerly been told any of theſe Things of me, that any one prevailed on me to commit

(*d*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture of Μυρεψικε.

commit Adultery, to wear ſuch a Dreſs as yours, to be perfumed, would not you have gone and laid violent Hands on the Man, who thus abuſed me? And will you not now then help yourſelf? For how much eaſier is that Aſſiſtance? You need not kill, or fetter, or affront, or go to Law with any one; but merely to talk with yourſelf, who will moſt readily be perſuaded by you, and with whom no one hath greater Credit than you. And, in the firſt Place, condemn your Actions: but when you have condemned them, do not deſpair of yourſelf, nor be like thoſe poor-ſpirited People, who when they have once given Way, abandon themſelves intirely, and are carried along, as by a Torrent. Take Example from the wreſtling Maſters. Hath the Boy fallen down? Get up again, they ſay; wreſtle again, till you have acquired Strength. Be you affected in the ſame Manner. For, be aſſured, that there is nothing more tractable than the human Mind. You need but will, and it is done, it is ſet right: as, on the contrary, you need but nod over the Work, and it is ruined. For both Ruin and Recovery are from within.

§. 3. "And, after all, what Good will this do "me?"—(*e*) What greater Good do you ſeek? From

(*e*) *Epictetus* here aſſerts, that the only Benefit of Reformation is, being reformed; and that they, who look for any

From impudent, you will become modeſt; from indecent, decent; from diſſolute, ſober. If you ſeek any greater Things than theſe, go on as you do. It is no longer in the Power of any God to ſave you.

CHAP. X.

What Things we are to deſpiſe, and on what to place a diſtinguiſhed Value.

§. 1. THE Doubts and Perplexities of all Men are concerning Externals. What they ſhall do? How it may be? What will be the Event? Whether this Thing may happen, or that? All this is the Talk of Perſons engaged in Things independent on Choice. For who ſays, How ſhall I do, not to aſſent to what is falſe? How, not to diſſent from what is true? If any one is of ſuch a good Diſpoſition, as to be anxious about

any other, are incapable of being reformed, even by God himſelf; and ſo may go on, and be as bad as they pleaſe. Suppoſe a Prince ſhould publiſh a Proclamation, that the only Advantage of Loyalty was being loyal; and, if any of his Subjects looked for any other, he might be a Rebel with Impunity: what Effect muſt this have, compared with the Declaration, *Rev.* xxii. 11, 12. *He that is unjuſt, let him be unjuſt ſtill: and he that is filthy, let him be filthy ſtill: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous ſtill: And behold, I come quickly, and my* Reward *is with Me, to give to every Man, according as his Works ſhall be.*

about theſe Things, I will remind him: Why are you anxious? It is in your own Power. Be aſſured. Do not ruſh upon Aſſent before you have applied the natural Rule. Again, if (*a*) he be anxious, for fear his Deſire ſhould be ineffectual and diſappoined, or his Averſion incurred, I will firſt kiſs him, becauſe, ſlighting what others are in a Flutter and terrified about, he takes care of what is his own; where his very Being is: then I will ſay to him; If you will not be diſappointed of your Deſires, or incur your Averſions, deſire nothing that belongs to others; be averſe to nothing not in your own Power; otherwiſe your Deſire muſt neceſſarily be diſappointed, and your Averſion incurred. Where is the Doubt here? Where the room for, *How will it be? What will be the Event?* And, *Will this happen, or that?* Now is not the Event independent on Choice?—"Yes."—And doth not the Eſſence of Good and Evil conſiſt in what depends on Choice?—"Yes."—It is in your Power then, to treat every Event conformably to Nature? Can any one reſtrain you?—"No one."—Then do not ſay to me any more, *How will it be?* For, however it be, you will ſet it right, and the Event to you will be lucky.

§. 2. Pray what would *Hercules* have been, if he had ſaid, "What can be done to prevent a "great

(*a*) I read the Text, in this Place, as *Wolfius* appears by his Tranſlation to have done.

" great Lion, or a great Boar, or ſavage Men, " from coming in my Way?" Why, what is that to you? If a great Boar ſhould come in your Way, you will fight the greater Combat: if wicked Men, you will deliver the World from wicked Men.—" But then if I ſhould die by this " Means?"—You will die a good Man, in the Performance of a gallant Action. For ſince, at all Events, one muſt die, one muſt neceſſarily be found doing ſomething, either tilling, or digging, or trading, or ſerving a Conſulſhip, or ſick of an Indigeſtion, or a Flux. At what Employment then would you have Death find you? For my Part I would have it be ſome humane, beneficent, public ſpirited, gallant Action. But if I cannot be found doing any ſuch great Things, yet, at leaſt, I would be doing what I am incapable of being reſtrained from, what is given me to do, correcting myſelf, improving that Faculty which makes uſe of the Appearances of Things, to procure Tranquillity, and render to the ſeveral Relations of Life their Due; and, if I am ſo fortunate, advancing to the third Topic, a Security of judging right. If Death overtakes me in ſuch a Situation, it is enough for me, if I can ſtretch out my Hands to God, and ſay, " The Opportu- " nities which Thou haſt given me, of compre- " hending and following [the Rules] of thy Ad- " miniſtration, I have not neglected. As far as in

" me

"me lay, I have not diſhonoured Thee. See "how I have uſed my Perceptions: how, my "Pre-conceptions. Have I at any time found "fault with Thee? Have I been diſcontented at "Thy Diſpenſations: or wiſhed them otherwiſe? "Have I tranſgreſſed the Relations of Life? I "thank Thee, that Thou haſt brought me into "Being. I am ſatisfied with the Time that I "have enjoyed the Things, which thou haſt given "me. Receive them back again, and aſſign "them to whatever Place thou wilt; for they "were (*b*) all Thine, and Thou gaveſt them to "me (*c*)."

§. 3. Is it not enough to make one's Exit in this State of Mind? And what Life is better, and more becoming than that of ſuch a one? Or what Concluſion happier? But, in order to attain

(*b*) *Thine they were, and Thou gaveſt them me.* John xvii. 6.

(*c*) I wiſh it were poſſible to palliate the Oſtentation of this Paſſage, by applying it to the ideal perfect Character: but it is in a general Way, that *Epictetus* hath propoſed ſuch a dying Speech, as cannot, without ſhocking Arrogance, be uttered by any one born to die. Unmixt as it is with any Acknowledgment of Faults or Imperfections, at preſent, or with any Senſe of Guilt on Account of the paſt, it muſt give every ſober Reader a very diſadvantageous Opinion of ſome Principles of the Philoſophy, on which it is founded, as contradictory to the Voice of Conſcience, and formed on abſolute Ignorance, or Neglect, of the Condition and Circumſtances of ſuch a Creature as Man.

tain theſe Advantages, there are no inconſiderable Things, both to be taken and loſt. You cannot wiſh both for a Conſulſhip and theſe too, nor take Pains to get an Eſtate and theſe too, or be ſolicitous both about your Servants and yourſelf. But, (*d*) if you wiſh any thing abſolutely of what belongs to others, what is your own is loſt. This is the Nature of the Affair. Nothing is to be had for nothing. And where is the Wonder? If you would be Conſul, you muſt watch, run about, kiſs Hands, be wearied down with waiting at the Doors of others, muſt ſay and do many ſlaviſh Things, ſend Gifts to many, daily Preſents to ſome. And what is the Conſequence [of Succeſs]? Twelve Bundles of Rods (*e*); to ſit three or four times on the Tribunal; to give the *Circenſian* Games, and Suppers (*f*) in Baſkets to all the World: or let any one ſhow me what there is in it more than this. Will you then be at no Expence, no Pains to acquire Apathy, Tranquillity, to ſleep ſound while you do ſleep, to be thoroughly awake while you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious for nothing? But, if any thing belonging to you be loſt, or idly waſted, while you are thus engaged, or another gets what

(*d*) See *Enchiridion*, c. xiii.

(*e*) The Enſigns of the Conſular Office.

(*f*) Theſe were diſtributed by the great Men in *Rome* to their Clients, as a Reward for their Attendance.

what you ought to have had, will you immediately begin fretting at what hath happened? Will you not compare the Exchange you have made? How much for how much? But you would have ſuch great Things for nothing, I ſuppoſe. And how can you? One Buſineſs doth not ſuit with another: you cannot beſtow your Care both upon Externals and your own ruling Faculty (*g*). But, if you would have the former, let the latter alone; or you will ſucceed in neither, while you are drawn different Ways, towards both. On the other Hand, if you would have the latter, let the former alone.—"The Oil will be ſpilled, the "Furniture will be ſpoiled:"—but ſtill I ſhall be free from Paſſion.—"There will be a Fire when "I am not in the Way, and the Books will be "deſtroyed:"—but ſtill I ſhall treat the Appearances of Things conformably to Nature.—"But "I ſhall have nothing to eat."—If I am ſo unlucky, dying is a ſafe Harbour. That is the Harbour for all, Death: that is the Refuge; and, for that Reaſon, there is nothing difficult in Life. You may go out of Doors when you pleaſe, and be troubled with Smoke no longer.

§. 4. Why then are you anxious? Why do you keep yourſelf waking? Why do not you calculate where your Good and Evil lies: and ſay, they are both in my own Power; neither can any

(*g*) *Ye cannot ſerve God and* Mammon. *Matt.* vi. 24.

any deprive me of the one, or involve me againſt my Will in the other. Why then do not I lay myſelf down and ſnore? What is my own, is ſafe. Let what belongs to others look to itſelf, who carries it off, how it is given away by Him, that hath the Diſpoſal of it. Who am I, to will, that it ſhould be ſo and ſo? For is the Option given to me? Hath any one made Me the Diſpenſer of it? What I have in my own Diſpoſal is enough for me. I muſt make the beſt I can of this. Other Things muſt be as the Maſter of them pleaſes.

§. 5. Doth any one, who hath theſe Things before his Eyes, lie awake [like *Achilles*,] and ſhift from Side to Side? What would he have, or what doth he want? *Patroclus*, or *Antilochus* (*b*), or *Menelaus*? Why, did he ever think any one of his Friends immortal? Why, when had not he it before his Eyes, that the Morrow, or the next Day, himſelf, or that Friend, might die? —"Ay, very true, ſays he: but (*i*) I reckoned, "that he would ſurvive me, and bring up my "Son."—Becauſe you were a Fool, and reckoned upon (*k*) Uncertainties. Why then do not you blame

(*b*) *Antilochus* and *Menelaus* are not mentioned, or referred to, in the Paſſage of *Homer*, to which *Epictetus* alludes.

(*i*) Αδηλα ωυ, perhaps, ſhould be αδηλα δηλα ψυ.

(*k*) *I hop'd* Patroclus *might ſurvive, to rear*
My tender Orphan, with a Parent's Care. POPE.

blame yourſelf; but ſit crying, like a Girl?—"But he uſed to (*l*) ſet my Dinner before me."—Becauſe he was alive, Fool; but now he cannot. But *Automedon* will ſet it before you; and, if he ſhould die, you will find ſomebody elſe. What if the Pipkin, in which your Meat uſed to be cooked, ſhould happen to be broken; muſt you die with Hunger, becauſe you have not your old Pipkin (*m*)? Do not you ſend and buy a new one?

What greater Evil (ſays he) *could afflict my Breaſt?*

Is *this* your Evil then? And, inſtead of removing it, do you accuſe your Mother, that ſhe did not foretell it to you, that you might have ſpent your whole Life in grieving from that Time forward?

§. 6. Do not you think now, that *Homer* compoſed all this on Purpoſe to ſhow us, that the no-

(*l*) *Thou too*, Patroclus, (*thus his Heart he vents*)
Haſt ſpread th' inviting Banquet in our Tents. POPE.

(*m*) This is a wretched Idea of Friendſhip; but a neceſſary Conſequence of the Stoic Syſtem. What a fine Contraſt to this gloomy Conſolation are the noble Sentiments of an Apoſtle! Value your deceaſed Friend, ſays *Epictetus*, as a broken Pipkin; forget him, as a Thing worthleſs, loſt, and deſtroyed. St. *Paul*, on the contrary, comforts the mourning Survivors; bidding them, *not ſorrow, as thoſe who have no Hope:* but remember, that the Death of good Perſons is only a Sleep; from which they ſhall ſoon ariſe to a happy Immortality.

bleſt, the ſtrongeſt, the richeſt, the handſomeſt of Men, may, nevertheleſs, be the moſt unfortunate and wretched, if they have not the Principles they ought to have?

CHAP. XI.

Of Purity and Cleanlineſs.

§. 1. SOME doubt whether Sociableneſs be comprehended in the Nature of Man: and yet theſe very Perſons do not ſeem to me to doubt, but that Purity is by all means comprehended in it; and that by this, if by any thing, it is diſtinguiſhed from brute Animals. When therefore we ſee any Animal cleaning itſelf, we are apt to cry, with Wonder, It is like a human Creature. On the contrary, if an Animal is accuſed [of Dirtineſs], we were preſently apt to ſay, by way of Excuſe, that it is not a human Creature. Such Excellence do we ſuppoſe to be in Man, which we firſt received from the Gods. For, as they are by Nature pure and uncorrupt, in proportion as Men approach to them by Reaſon, they are tenacious of Purity and Incorruption. But, ſince it is impracticable that their Eſſence, compoſed of ſuch Materials, ſhould be abſolutely pure, it is the Office of Reaſon to endeavour to render it as pure as poſſible.

§. 2.

§. 2. The firſt and higheſt Purity, or Impurity, then, is that which is formed in the Soul. But you will not find the Impurity of the Soul and Body to be alike. For what elſe [of Impurity] can you find in the Soul, than that which renders it filthy with regard to its Operations? Now the Operations of the Soul are its Purſuits and Avoidances, its Deſires, Averſions, Preparations, Intentions, Aſſents. What then is that which renders it defiled and impure in theſe Operations? Nothing elſe than its perverſe Judgments. So that the Impurity of the Soul conſiſts in wicked Principles; and its Purification in the forming right Principles; and that is pure which hath right Principles; for that alone is unmixed and undefiled in its Operations.

§. 3. Now we ſhould, as far as poſſible, endeavour after ſomething like this in the Body too. It is impoſſible but, in ſuch a Compoſition as Man, there muſt be a Defluxion of Rheum. For this Reaſon, Nature hath made Hands, and the Noſtrils themſelves as Channels to let out the Moiſture. If any one therefore ſnuffs it up again, I ſay, that he performs not the Operation of a Man. It was impoſſible, but that the Feet muſt be bemired and ſoiled from what they paſs through. Therefore Nature hath prepared Water and Hands. It was impoſſible, but that ſome Filth muſt cleave to the Teeth from Eating. There-

fore, ſhe ſays, waſh your Teeth. Why? That you may be a Man, and not a wild Beaſt, or a Swine. It was impoſſible, but, from Perſpiration, and the Preſſure of the Clothes, ſomething dirty, and neceſſary to be cleaned, ſhould remain upon the Body. For this, there is Water, Oil, Hands, Towels, Bruſhes, Sope, and other neceſſary Apparatus, for its Purification.—No: a Smith indeed will get the Ruſt off his Iron, and have proper Inſtruments for that Purpoſe: and you yourſelf will have your Plates waſhed before you eat; unleſs you are quite dirty and ſlovenly: but you will not waſh nor purify your Body.—"Why "ſhould I?" (ſay you.)—I tell you again, in the firſt place, that you may be like a Man; and, in the next, that you may not offend thoſe with whom you converſe. * * * (*a*) Without being ſenſible of it, you do ſomething like this. Do you think you deſerve to ſtink? Be it ſo. But do thoſe deſerve [to ſuffer by] it who ſit near you? who are placed at the Table with you? Who ſalute you? Either go into a Deſert, as you deſerve, or live ſolitary at Home, and ſmell yourſelf: for it is fit you ſhould enjoy your Naſtineſs alone. But, to what Sort of Character doth it belong, to live in a City, and behave ſo careleſsly and inconſiderately? If Nature had truſted even a Horſe

(*a*) Something here ſeems to be loſt. Or, perhaps, the Words, *without being ſenſible of it, you do ſomething like this,* ought to be inſerted after, *neglected him.*

Horſe to your Care, would you have overlooked and neglected him? Now conſider your Body as committed to you, inſtead of a Horſe. Waſh (*b*) it, rub it, take care that it may not be any one's Averſion, nor diſguſt any one. Who is not more diſguſted at a ſtinking, unwholeſome-looking Sloven, than at a Perſon who hath been rolled in Filth? The Stench of the one is adventitious from without; but that which ariſes from Want of Care, is a Kind of inward Putrefaction.—"But "*Socrates* bathed but ſeldom."—But his Perſon looked clean, and was ſo agreeable and pleaſing, that the moſt beautiful and noble Youths were fond of him, and deſired rather to ſit by him, than by thoſe who had the fineſt Perſons. He might have omitted both Bathing and Waſhing, if he had pleaſed: and yet Bathing, though ſeldom, had its Effect.—"But *Ariſtophanes* calls him, one of the "*ſqualid ſlip-ſhod Philoſophers*."—Why, ſo he ſays too, that he walked in the Air, and ſtole Clothes from the *Palæſtra*. Beſides, all who have written of *Socrates*, affirm quite the contrary; that he was not only agreeable in his Converſation, but in his Perſon too. And, again, they write the

(*b*) Here, probably, ſhould be added—if you do not chuſe warm Water, with cold. Theſe Words in the *Greek* are transferred to a Place, where they are abſolutely unintelligible. They were, probably, at firſt, omitted by chance; then ſupplied at the Bottom of the Page; and then tranſcribed, as if that had been their proper Place.

ſame of *Diogenes*. For we ought not to fright the World from Philoſophy, by the Appearance of our Perſon; but to ſhow ourſerves chearful and eaſy, by the Care of our Perſons (*c*), as well as by other Marks. "See, all of you, that I have nothing; "that I want nothing. Without Houſe, with-"out City, and an Exile, (if that happens to be "the Caſe (*d*),) and without a Home, I live more "eaſily and proſperouſly than the Noble and "Rich. Look upon my Perſon too, that it is "not injured by coarſe Fare."—But, if any one ſhould tell me this, with the Habit and the Viſage of a condemned Criminal, what God ſhould perſuade me to come near Philoſophy, while (*e*) it renders Men ſuch Figures? Heaven forbid! I would not do it, even if I was ſure to become a wiſe Man for my Pains. I declare, for my own Part, I would rather that a young Man, on his firſt Inclination to Philoſophy, ſhould come to me finically dreſſed, than with his Hair ſpoiled and dirty. For there appears in him ſome Idea of Beauty, and Deſire of Decency: and where he imagines it to be, there he applies his Endeavours.

One

(*c*) In Times of Mourning or Danger, the Antients expreſſed their Senſe of their Situation by neglecting their Perſons.

(*d*) As it was the Caſe of *Diogenes*.

(*e*) For ὡς, perhaps, ἐς may be the true Reading; and it is ſo tranſlated.

One hath nothing more to do, but to point it out to him, and ſay, "You ſeek Beauty, young Man; "and you do well. Be aſſured then, that it "ſprings from the rational Part of you. Seek it "there, where the Purſuits and Avoidances, the "Deſires and Averſions, are concerned. Herein "conſiſts your Excellence: but the paultry Body "is by Nature Clay. Why do you trouble your-"ſelf, to no Purpoſe, about it? You will be con-"vinced by Time, if not otherwiſe, that it is no-"thing." But, if he ſhould come to me bemired, dirty, with Whiſkers down to his Knees, what can I ſay to him? By what Similitude allure him? For what hath he ſtudied, which hath any Reſemblance to Beauty, that I may transfer his Attention, and ſay, that Beauty is not there, but here? Would you have me tell him, that Beauty doth not conſiſt in Filth, but in Reaſon? For hath he any Deſire of Beauty? Hath he any Appearance of it? Go, and argue with a Hog, not to roll in the Mire.

§. 4. It was in the Quality of a young Man that loved Beauty, that *Polemo* (*f*) was touched by the Diſcourſes of *Xenocrates*. For he entered with ſome Incentives to the Study of Beauty, though he ſought in the wrong Place. And indeed Nature hath not made the very Brutes dirty, which live with Man. Doth a Horſe wallow in the

(*f*) See p. 4. of this Vol. Note (*c*).

Mire? Or a good Dog? But Swine, and filthy Geeſe, and Worms, and Spiders, which are baniſhed to the greateſt Diſtance from human Society. Will you then, who are a Man, chuſe not to be even one of the Animals, that are converſant with Man; but rather a Worm, or a Spider? Will you not bathe ſometimes, be it in whatever Manner you pleaſe? Will you never uſe Water to waſh yourſelf? Will you not come clean, that they who converſe with you may have ſome Pleaſure in you? But will you accompany us, a mere Lump of Naſtineſs, even to the Temples; where it is not lawful for any one ſo much as to ſpit, or blow his Noſe?

§. 5. What then, would any body have you dreſs yourſelf out to the utmoſt? By no means; except in thoſe Things where our Nature requires it; in Reaſon, Principles, Actions: but, in our Perſons, only as far as Neatneſs, as far as not to give Offence. But if you hear, that it is not right to wear Purple, you muſt go, I ſuppoſe, and roll your Cloke in the Mud, or tear it.—"But where "ſhould I have a fine Cloke?"—You have Water, Man; waſh it.—"What an amiable (*g*) "Youth is here? How worthy this old Man, to "love, and be loved!"—A fit Perſon to be truſted with

(*g*) The Youth, probably, means the Scholar, who neglects Neatneſs; and the old Man, the Tutor, that gives him no Precept or Example of it.

with the Inſtruction of our Sons and Daughters, and attended by young People, as Occaſion may require,—to read them Lectures on a Dunghill! Every Deviation proceeds from ſomething human: but this approaches very nearly towards being not human.

CHAP. XII.

Of Attention.

§. 1. WHEN you let go your Attention for a little while, do not fancy you may recover it when-ever you pleaſe: but remember this, That, by means of the Fault of To-day, your Affairs muſt neceſſarily be in a worſe Condition for the future. Firſt, what is the ſaddeſt Thing of all, a Habit ariſes of not attending; and then a Habit of deferring the Attention, and always driving (*a*) off from time to time, and procraſtinating a proſperous Life, a Propriety of Behaviour, and the Thinking and Acting conformably to Nature. Now, if the Procraſtination of any thing is advantageous, the abſolute Omiſſion of it is ſtill more advantageous: but, if it be not advantageous, why do not you preſerve a conſtant Attention?—"I would play To-day."—What then? Ought you not to do it, with proper Attention

(*a*) Ειωθει perhaps, ſhould be αθυται.

to yourſelf?—"I would ſing."—Well: and what forbids but that you may ſing, with Attention to yourſelf? For there is no Part of Life exempted, to which Attention doth not extend. For will you do it the worſe by attending, and the better by not attending? What elſe in Life is beſt performed by inattentive People? Doth a Smith forge the better by not attending? Doth a Pilot ſteer the ſafer by not attending? Or is any other, even of the minuteſt Operations, performed the better by Inattention? Do not you perceive, that, when you have let your Mind looſe, it is no longer in your Power to call it back, either to Propriety, or Modeſty, or Moderation? But you do every thing as it happens: you follow your Inclinations.

§. 2. To what then am I to attend?

Why, in the firſt Place, to thoſe univerſal Maxims, which you muſt always have at hand; and not ſleep, or get up, or drink, or eat, or converſe without them: that no one is the Maſter of another's Choice; and it is in Choice alone that Good and Evil conſiſt. No one therefore is the Maſter either to procure me any Good, or to involve me in any Evil: but I alone have the Diſpoſal of myſelf with regard to theſe Things. Since theſe then are ſecured to me, what need have I to be troubled about Externals? What Tyrant is formidable? What Diſtemper? What Poverty? What Offence?—"I have not pleaſed ſuch a

"one."

" one."—Is he my Concern then? Is he my Conſcience?—" No."—Why do I trouble myſelf any further about him then?—" But he is thought to " be of ſome Conſequence."—Let him look to that, and they who think him ſo. But I have One, whom I muſt pleaſe, to whom I muſt ſubmit, whom I muſt obey; God, and thoſe (*b*) who are next Him. He hath entruſted me with myſelf, and made made my Choice ſubject to myſelf alone, having given me Rules for the right Uſe of it. If I follow the proper Rules in Syllogiſms, in convertible Propoſitions, I do not regard, nor care for any one, who ſays any thing contrary to them. Why then am I vext at being cenſured in Matters of greater Conſequence? What is the Reaſon of this Perturbation? Nothing elſe, but that in this Inſtance I want Exerciſe. For every Science deſpiſeth Ignorance, and the Ignorant; and not only the Sciences, but even the Arts. Take any Shoemaker, take any Smith you will, and he laughs at the reſt of the World, with regard to his own Buſineſs.

§. 3. In the firſt place then, theſe are the Maxims we muſt have ready, and do nothing without them; but direct the Soul to this Mark, to purſue

(*b*) The tutelar Genius, and Fortune. Of the former, ſee B. I. ch. 14. §. 2. Of both, ſee B. IV. ch. 4. §. 4. By changing και τοις into και τοι, the Tranſlation will be; *But, next to Him, He hath in truſted me with myſelf.*

nothing external, nothing that belongs to others, but as He, who hath the Power, hath appointed: Things dependent on Choice are to be purſued always; and the reſt, as it is permitted. Beſides this, we muſt remember, who we are, and what Name we bear, and endeavour to direct the ſeveral Offices of Life to the rightful Demands of its ſeveral Relations: what is the proper Time for Singing, what for Play, in what Company: what will be the Conſequence of our Performance: whether our Companions will deſpiſe us, or we ourſelves: when to employ Raillery, and whom to ridicule: upon what Occaſions to comply, and with whom; and then, in complying, how to preſerve our own Character.

§. 4. Where-ever you deviate from any of theſe Rules, the Damage is immediate; not from any thing external, but from the very Action itſelf.— "What then, is it poſſible, by theſe Means, to be "faultleſs?" Impracticable: but this is poſſible, to uſe a conſtant Endeavour to be faultleſs. For we ſhall have Cauſe to be ſatisfied, if, by never remitting this Attention, we ſhall be exempt at leaſt from a few Faults. But now, when you ſay, I will begin to attend To-morrow; be aſſured, it is the ſame Thing, as if you ſay, "I will be ſhame-"leſs, impertinent, baſe, To-day: it ſhall be in "the Power of others to grieve me: I will be "paſſionate, I will be envious To-day." See to how

how many Evils you give yourſelf up.—"But all "will be well To-morrow."—How much better To-day? If it be for your Intereſt To-morrow, much more To-day, that it may be in your Power To-morrow too, and that you may not defer it again to the third Day.

CHAP. XIII.

Concerning Such as readily diſcover their own Affairs.

§. 1. WHEN any one appears to us to diſcourſe frankly of his own Affairs, we too are ſome Way induced to diſcover our Secrets to him; and we ſuppoſe this to be acting with Frankneſs. Firſt, becauſe it ſeems unfair, that, when we have heard the Affairs of our Neighbour, we ſhould not, in return, communicate ours to him; and, beſides, we think, that we ſhall not appear of a frank Character in concealing what belongs to ourſelves. Indeed it is often ſaid, "I "have told you all my Affairs; and will you "tell me none of yours? Where do People act "thus?" Laſtly, it is ſuppoſed, that we may ſafely truſt him who hath already truſted us: for we imagine, that he will never diſcover our Affairs, for fear we, in our Turn, ſhould diſcover his. It is thus that the Inconſiderate are caught by the Soldiers at *Rome*. A Soldier ſits by you, in

in a common Dreſs, and begins to ſpeak ill of *Cæſar*. Then you, as if you had received a Pledge of his Fidelity, by his firſt beginning the Abuſe, ſay likewiſe what you think; and ſo you are led away in Chains to Execution.

§. 2. Something like this is the Caſe with us in general. But when one hath ſafely intruſted his Secrets to me, ſhall I, in Imitation of him, truſt mine to any one who comes in my Way? The Caſe is different. I indeed hold my Tongue, (ſuppoſing me to be of ſuch a Diſpoſition) but he goes, and diſcovers them to every body: and then, when I come to find it out, if I happen to be like him, from a Deſire of Revenge, I diſcover his; and aſperſe, and am aſperſed. But, if I remember, that one Man doth not hurt another, but that every one is hurt and profited by his own Actions, I indeed keep to this, not to do any thing like him: yet, by my own talkative Folly, I ſuffer what I do ſuffer.

§. 3. "Ay: but it is unfair, when you have "heard the Secrets of your Neighbour, not to "communicate any thing to him in return."— Why, did I aſk you to do it, Sir? Did you tell me your Affairs, upon Condition that I ſhould tell you mine, in return? If you are a Blab, and believe all you meet to be Friends, would you have *me* too become like you? But, what if the Caſe be this: that you did right in truſting your Affairs

fairs to *me*, but it is not right that I ſhould truſt *you?* Would you have me run headlong, and fall? This is juſt as if I had a ſound Barrel, and you a leaky one: and you ſhould come and depoſite your Wine with me to put it into my Barrel; and then ſhould take it ill, that, in my Turn, I did not truſt you with my Wine. No. You have a leaky Barrel. How then are we any longer upon equal Terms? You have depoſited your Affairs with an honeſt Man, and a Man of Honour; one who eſteems his own Actions alone, and nothing external, to be either hurtful or profitable. Would you have me depoſite mine with you: a Man who have diſhonoured your own Faculty of Choice, and who would get a paultry Sum, or a Poſt of Power or Preferment at Court, even if, for the Sake of it, you were to kill your own Children, like *Medea?* Where is the Equality of this? But ſhow me, that you are faithful; a Man of Honour, ſteady; ſhow me, that you have friendly Principles; ſhow me, that your Veſſel is not leaky; and you ſhall ſee, that I will not ſtay till you have truſted your Affairs to me; but I will come and intreat you to hear an Account of mine. For who would not make uſe of a good Veſſel? Who deſpiſes a benevolent and friendly Adviſer? Who will not gladly receive one to ſhare the Burden, as it were, of his Difficulties; and, by ſharing, to make it lighter?—

"Well:

"Well: but I truſt *you*, and you do not truſt "*me*."—In the firſt place, you do not really truſt me; but you are a Blab, and therefore can keep nothing in. For, if the former be the Caſe, truſt *only* me. But now, whomever you ſee at leiſure, you ſit down by him, and ſay, "My dear Friend, "there is not a Man in the World that wiſhes "me better, or hath more Kindneſs for me, than "you; I entreat you to hear my Affairs." And this you do to thoſe, with whom you have not the leaſt Acquaintance. But, if you do [really] truſt me, it is plainly as [thinking me] a Man of Fidelity and Honour; and not becauſe I have told you my Affairs. Let me alone then, till I too am of this Opinion [with regard to You]. Show me, that, if a Perſon hath told his Affairs to any one, it is a Proof of his being a Man of Fidelity and Honour. For, if this was the Caſe, I would go about and tell my Affairs to the whole World; if, upon that Account, I ſhould become a Man of Fidelity and Honour. But that is no ſuch Matter; but requires a Perſon to have no ordinary Principles.

§. 4. If then you ſee any one taking Pains for Things that belong to others, and ſubjecting his Choice to them, be aſſured, that this Man hath a thouſand Things to compel and reſtrain him. He hath no need of burning Pitch, or the torturing

ing Wheel, to make him tell what he knows; but the Nod of a Girl for Inſtance, will ſhake his Purpoſe; the Good-will of a Courtier, the Deſire of a public Poſt, of an Inheritance; ten thouſand other Things of that Sort. It muſt therefore be remembered in general, that ſecret Diſcourſes require Fidelity, and a certain Sort of Principles. And where at this time, are theſe eaſily to be found? Pray let any one ſhow me a Perſon of ſuch a Diſpoſition as to ſay, I trouble myſelf only with thoſe Things which are my own, incapable of Reſtraint, by Nature free. This I eſteem the Eſſence of Good. Let the reſt be as it may happen. It makes no Difference to me.

END *of the* DISCOURSES.

THE
ENCHIRIDION,
OR
MANUAL,
OF
EPICTETUS.

THE
ENCHIRIDION,
OR
MANUAL,
OF
EPICTETUS.

THE ENCHIRIDION.

I.

OF Things, ſome are in our Power, and others not. In our Power are Opinion, Purſuit, Deſire, Averſion, and in one Word, whatever are our own Actions. Not in our Power, are Body, Property, Reputation, Command, and, in one Word, whatever are not our own Actions.

Now, the Things in our Power are, by Nature, free, unreſtrained, unhindered: but thoſe not in our Power, weak, ſlaviſh, reſtrained, belonging to others. Remember then, that, if you ſuppoſe Things by Nature ſlaviſh, to be free; and what belongs to others, your own; you will be hindered; you will lament; you will be diſturbed; you will

will find fault both with Gods and Men. But, if you ſuppoſe, that only to be your own, which is your own; and what belongs to others, ſuch as it really is; no one will ever compel you; no one will reſtrain you: you will find fault with no one; you will accuſe no one, you will do no one Thing againſt your Will: no one will hurt you: you will not have an Enemy; for you will ſuffer no Harm.

Aiming therefore at ſuch great Things, remember, that you muſt not allow yourſelf to be carried, even with a ſlight Tendency, towards the Attainment of the others (*a*): but that you muſt entirely quit ſome of them, and for the preſent poſtpone the reſt. But, if you would both have theſe, and Command, and Riches, at once, perhaps you will not gain ſo much as the latter; becauſe you aim at the former too: but you will abſolutely fail of the former; by which alone Happineſs and Freedom are procured.

Study, therefore, to be able to ſay to every harſh Appearance, "You are but an Appearance, and "not abſolutely the Thing you appear to be." And then examine it by thoſe Rules which you have: and firſt, and chiefly, by this: Whether it concerns the Things which are in our own Power, or thoſe which are not; and, if it concerns any thing

(*a*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Conjecture, of αλλων for αυτων.

thing not in our Power, be prepared to ſay, that it is nothing to *you*.

II.

Remember that *Deſire* promiſes the Attainment of that of which you are deſirous; and *Averſion* promiſes the Avoiding of that to which you are averſe: that he who fails of the Object of his Deſire, is diſappointed: and he who incurs the Object of his Averſion, wretched. If then, you confine your Averſion to thoſe Objects only, which are contrary to that natural Uſe of your Faculties, which you have in your own Power, you will never incur any thing to which you are averſe. But if you are averſe to Sickneſs, or Death, or Poverty, you will be wretched. Remove Averſion, then, from all Things that are not in our Power, and transfer it to Things contrary to the Nature of what is in our Power. But, for the preſent, totally ſuppreſs Deſire: for, if you deſire any of the Things not in our own Power, you muſt neceſſarily be diſappointed; and of thoſe which are, and which it would be laudable to deſire, nothing is yet in your Poſſeſſion. (*b*) Uſe only

(*b*) The Senſe is, that he, who is only beginning to philoſophiſe, hath yet nothing right within him to deſire, or ſet his Heart upon; therefore, till he hath, he muſt not ſet his Heart upon any thing. But in the mean time, he muſt make uſe of the *Purſuits* and *Avoidances*; *i. e.* perform the common

only [the requiſite Acts] of Purſuit and Avoidance; and even theſe lightly, and with Gentleneſs, and Reſervation.

III.

With regard to whatever Objects either delight the Mind, or contribute to Uſe, or are loved with fond Affection, remember to tell yourſelf, of what Nature they are, beginning from the moſt trifling Things. If you are fond of an Earthen Cup, that it is an Earthen Cup of which you are fond: for thus, if it is broken, you will not be diſturbed. If you kiſs your Child, or your Wife, that you kiſs a Being ſubject to the Accidents of Humanity; and thus you will not be diſturbed, if either of them dies.

IV.

When you are going about any Action, remind yourſelf of what Nature the Action is. If you are going to bathe, repreſent to yourſelf the Things, which uſually happen in the Bath: ſome Perſons daſhing the Water: ſome puſhing and crowding, others giving abuſive Language; and others ſtealing [the Clothes]. And thus you will more ſafely go about this Action, if you ſay to yourſelf, "I will now go bathe, and preſerve my "own Mind in a State conformable to Nature."

And

mon Actions of Life: but theſe outward Movements muſt be cautious and gentle; and the inward Movements of Deſire be quite reſtrained.

in the ſame manner with regard to every other Action. For thus, if any Impediment ariſes in Bathing, you will have it to ſay, "It was not "only to bathe that I deſired, but to preſerve my "Mind in a State conformable to Nature; and "I ſhall not preſerve it ſo, if I am out of Hu-"mour at Things that happen."

V.

Men are diſturbed, not by Things, but by the Principles and Notions, which they form concerning Things. Death, for Inſtance, is not terrible, elſe it would have appeared ſo to *Socrates*. But the Terror conſiſts in our Notion of Death, that it is terrible. When therefore we are hindered, or diſturbed, or grieved, let us never impute it to others, but to ourſelves; that is, to our own Principles. It is the Action of an uninſtructed Perſon to lay the Fault of his own bad Condition upon others; of one entering upon Inſtruction, to lay the Fault on himſelf; and of one perfectly inſtructed, neither on others, nor on himſelf.

VI.

Be not elated on any Excellence not your own. If a Horſe ſhould be elated, and ſay, "I am hand-"ſome," it would be ſupportable. But when you are elated, and ſay, "I have a handſome Horſe," know, that you are elated on what is, in fact,

only the Good of the Horſe. (*c*) What then is your own? The Uſe of the Appearances of Things. So that when you behave conformably to Nature, in the Uſe of theſe Appearances, you will be elated with Reaſon; for you will be elated on ſome Good of your own.

VII.

As in a Voyage, when the Ship is at Anchor, if you go on Shore to get Water, you may amuſe yourſelf with picking up a Shell-fiſh, or an Onion, in your Way; but your Thoughts ought to be bent towards the Ship, and perpetually attentive, leſt the Captain ſhould call; and then you muſt leave all theſe Things, that you may not be thrown into the Veſſel, bound Neck and Heels, like a Sheep. Thus likewiſe in Life, if, inſtead of an Onion, or Shell-fiſh, ſuch a Thing as a Wife or a Child be granted you, there is no Objection: but if the Captain calls, run to the Ship, leave all theſe Things, regard none of them. But, if you are old, never go far from the Ship: leſt, when you are called, you ſhould be unable to come in time.

VIII.

Require not Things to happen as you wiſh; but wiſh them to happen as they do happen; and you will go on well.

IX.

(*c*) The Tranſlation follows Mr. *Upton*'s Correction of the Text in this Chapter.

IX.

Sickneſs is an Impediment to the Body, but not to the Faculty of Choice, unleſs itſelf pleaſes. Lameneſs is an Impediment to the Leg, but not to the Faculty of Choice: and ſay this to yourſelf with regard to every thing that happens. For you will find it to be an Impediment to ſomething elſe; but not to yourſelf.

X.

Upon every Accident, remember to turn towards yourſelf, and enquire, what Powers you have for making a proper Uſe of it. If you ſee a handſome Perſon, you will find Continence a Power againſt this: if Pain be preſented to you, you will find Fortitude: if Ill-Language, you will find Patience. And thus habituated, the Appearances of Things will not hurry you away along with them.

XI.

Never ſay of any thing, "I have loſt it;" but, "I have reſtored it." Is your Child dead? It is reſtored. Is your Wife dead? She is reſtored. Is your Eſtate taken away? Well: and is not that likewiſe reſtored? "But he who took it "away is a bad Man." What is it to you, by whoſe Hands He, who gave it, hath demanded it back again? While He gives you to poſſeſs it, take care of it; but as of ſomething not your own, as Paſſengers do of an Inn.

XII.

If you would improve, lay aſide ſuch Reaſonings as theſe. "If I neglect my Affairs, I ſhall "not have a Maintenance: if I do not correct "my Servant, he will be good for nothing." For it is better to die with Hunger, exempt from Grief and Fear, than to live in Affluence with Perturbation: and it is better your Servant ſhould be bad, than you unhappy.

Begin therefore from little Things. Is a little Oil ſpilt? A little Wine ſtolen? Say to yourſelf, "This is the Purchaſe paid for Apathy, for Tran-"quillity; and nothing is to be had for no-"thing." And when you call your Servant, conſider, it is poſſible he may not come at your Call; or, if he doth, that he may not do what you would have him do. But he is by no means of ſuch Importance (*d*), that it ſhould be in his Power to give you any Diſturbance.

XIII.

(*e*) If you would improve, be content to be thought fooliſh and ſtupid with regard to Externals. Do not wiſh to be thought to know any thing; and though you ſhould appear to be ſomebody

(*d*) Thus ſome MSS. Changing in others καλως into κακως, the Tranſlation will be—It is not ſo well with Him, and ill with You.

(*e*) There is a great Likeneſs to Chriſtian Phraſes and Doctrines in this Chapter.

body to others, diſtruſt yourſelf. For, be aſſured, it is not eaſy at once to preſerve your Faculty of Choice in a State conformable to Nature, and [to ſecure] Externals: but while you are careful about the one, you muſt of Neceſſity neglect the other.

XIV.

If you wiſh your Children, and your Wife, and your Friends, to live for ever, you are ſtupid: for you wiſh Things to be in your Power, which are not ſo; and, what belongs to others, to be your own. So likewiſe, if you wiſh your Servant to be without Fault, you are a Fool; for you wiſh Vice not to be Vice *(f)*, but ſomething elſe. But, if you wiſh to have your Deſires undiſappointed, that is in your own Power. Exerciſe, therefore, what is in your Power. He is the Maſter of every other Perſon, who is able to confer, or remove, whatever that Perſon wiſhes either to have or to avoid. Whoever then would be free, let him wiſh nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others; elſe he muſt neceſſarily be a Slave.

XV.

Remember that you muſt behave [in Life] as at an Entertainment *(g)*. Is any thing brought

(f) i. e. Dependent on Perſons own Choice.

(g) An Alluſion to the Cuſtom, in the antient Entertainments, of carrying round the Diſhes to each of the Gueſts. UPTON.

round to you? Put out your Hand, and take your Share, with Moderation. Doth it paſs by you? Do not ſtop it. Is it not yet come? Do not ſtretch forth your Deſire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. Thus [do] with regard to Children, to a Wife, to public Poſts, to Riches; and you will be ſome time or other a worthy Partner of the Feaſts of the Gods. And if you do not ſo much as take the Things which are ſet before you, but are able even to deſpiſe them, then you will not only be a Partner of the Feaſts of the Gods, but of their Empire alſo. For, by thus doing, *Diogenes* and *Heraclitus* (*b*), and others like them, deſervedly became, and were called, divine.

XVI.

When you ſee any one weeping for Grief, either that his Son is gone abroad, or dead, or that he hath ſuffered in his Affairs; take heed, that the Appearance may not hurry you away with it. But immediately make the Diſtinction within your own Mind; and have it ready to ſay, "It "is not the Accident [itſelf] that diſtreſſes this "Perſon, for it doth not diſtreſs another Man; "but the Judgment which he forms concerning "it." As far as Words go, however, do not diſdain to condeſcend to him; and even, if it ſhould ſo happen, to groan with him. Take heed, however, not to groan inwardly too.

XVII.

(*b*) For *Heraclitus*, I ſuſpect, ſhould be read *Hercules*.

XVII.

Remember that you are an Actor in a Drama, of ſuch a Kind as the Author pleaſes to make it. If ſhort, of a ſhort one; if long, of a long one. If it be his Pleaſure you ſhould act a poor Man, a Cripple, a Governor, or a private Perſon, ſee that you act it naturally. For this is your Buſineſs, to act well the Character aſſigned you: to chuſe it, is another's.

XVIII.

When a Raven happens to croak unluckily, let not the Appearance hurry you away with it: but immediately make the Diſtinction to yourſelf; and ſay, "None of theſe Things is portended to "*me*; but either to my paultry Body, or Pro- "perty, or Reputation, or Children, or Wife. "But to *me* all Portents are lucky, if I will. "For which-ever of theſe Things happens, it is "in my Power to derive Advantage from it."

XIX.

You may be unconquerable, if you enter into no Combat, in which it is not in your own Power to conquer. When therefore you ſee any one eminent in Honours, or Power, or in high Eſteem on any other Account, take heed not to be hurried away with the Appearance, and to pronounce him happy: for, if the Eſſence of Good conſiſts in Things in our own Power, there will be no room for Envy, or Emulation. But, for your

Part, do not wiſh to be a General, or a Senator, or a Conſul, but [to be] free: and the only Way to this, is, a Contempt of Things not in our own Power.

XX.

Remember, not he who gives Ill-Language, or a Blow, affronts; but the Principle, which repreſents theſe Things as affronting. When therefore, any one provokes you, be aſſured, that it is your own Opinion which provokes you. Try, therefore, in the firſt Place, not to be hurried away with the Appearance. For, if you once gain Time and Reſpite, you will more eaſily command yourſelf.

XXI.

Let Death and Exile, and all other Things which appear terrible, be daily before your Eyes; but chiefly Death: and you will never entertain any abject Thought, nor too eagerly covet any thing.

XXII.

If you have an earneſt Deſire of attaining to Philoſophy, prepare yourſelf from the very firſt, to be laughed at, to be ſneered by the Multitude, to hear them ſay, "He is returned to us a Philo-"ſopher all at once;" and, "Whence this ſu-"percilious Look?" Now, for your Part, do not have a ſupercilious Look indeed; but keep ſteadily to thoſe Things which appear beſt to you, as one

one appointed by God to this Station. For remember, that, if you adhere to the ſame Point, thoſe very Perſons who at firſt ridiculed, will afterwards admire you. But, if you are conquered by them, you will incur a double Ridicule.

XXIII.

If you ever happen to turn your Attention to Externals ſo as to wiſh to pleaſe any one, be aſſured, that you have ruined your Scheme of Life (*i*). Be contented then, in every thing, with being a Philoſopher: and, if you wiſh to be thought ſo likewiſe by any one, appear ſo to yourſelf, and it will ſuffice you.

XXIV.

Let not ſuch Conſiderations as theſe diſtreſs you. "I ſhall live in Diſhonour; and be no-body any-"where." For, if Diſhonour is an Evil, you can no more be involved in any Evil by the Means of another, than be engaged in any thing baſe. Is it any Buſineſs of yours then, to get Power, or to be admitted to an Entertainment? By no means. How then, after all, is this a Diſhonour? And how is it true, that you will be *no-body any-where*: when you ought to be ſome-body in thoſe Things only, which are in your own Power, in which you may be of the greateſt Conſequence? "But "my Friends will be unaſſiſted."—What do you

(*i*) *If I yet pleaſed Men, I ſhould not be the Servant of Chriſt.* Gal. i. 10.

mean by unaſſiſted? They will not have Money from you; nor will you make them *Roman* Citizens. Who told you then, that theſe are among the Things in our own Power; and not the Affair of others? And who can give to another the Things which he hath not himſelf? "Well: "but get them then, that we too may have a "Share." If I can get them with the Preſervation of my own Honour, and Fidelity, and Greatneſs of Mind, ſhow me the Way, and I will get them: but, if you require me to loſe my own proper Good, that you may gain what is no Good, conſider how unequitable and fooliſh you are. Beſides: which would you rather have, a Sum of Money; or a Friend of Fidelity and Honour? Rather aſſiſt me then to gain this Character, than require me to do thoſe Things by which I may loſe it. Well: but my Country, ſay you, as far as depends upon me, will be unaſſiſted. Here again, what Aſſiſtance is this you mean? "It will not have Porticos, nor Baths, of "your providing." And what ſignifies that? Why, neither doth a Smith provide it with Shoes, or a Shoemaker with Arms. It is enough, if every one fully performs his own proper Buſineſs. And were you to ſupply it with another Citizen of Honour and Fidelity, would not (*k*) he be of Uſe

(*k*) I have followed the Conjecture of a Friend, who thinks ωφελει; ſhould be ωφελει, to preſerve an Oppoſition between the Perſon ſignified by it, and the συ αυτ⊖ in the next Sentence.

Uſe to it? Yes. Therefore neither are you yourſelf uſeleſs to it. "What Place then, ſay you, "ſhall I hold in the State?" Whatever you can hold with the Preſervation of your Fidelity and Honour. But if, by deſiring to be uſeful to that, you loſe theſe, of what Uſe can you be to your Country, when you are become faithleſs, and void of Shame?

XXV.

Is any one preferred before you at an Entertainment, or in a Compliment, or in being admitted to a Conſultation? If theſe Things are good, you ought to rejoice, that *he* hath got them: and, if they are evil, do not be grieved, that *you* have not got them. And remember, that you cannot, without uſing the ſame Means [which others do] to acquire Things not in our own Power, expect to be thought worthy of an equal Share of them. For how can he, who doth not frequent the Door of any [great] Man, doth not attend him, doth not praiſe him, have an equal Share with him who doth? You are unjuſt then, and unſatiable, if you are unwilling to pay the Price for which theſe Things are ſold, and would have them for nothing. For how much are Lettuces ſold? A Half-penny, for Inſtance. If another then, paying a Half-penny, takes the Lettuces, and you, not paying it, go without them, do not imagine,

that he hath gained any Advantage over you. For as he hath the Lettuces, ſo you have the Halfpenny, which you did not give. So, in the preſent Caſe, you have not been invited to ſuch a Perſon's Entertainment; becauſe you have not paid him the Price for which a Supper is ſold. It is ſold for Praiſe: it is ſold for Attendance. Give him then the Value, if it be for your Advantage. But, if you would, at the ſame time, not pay the one, and yet receive the other, you are inſatiable, and a Blockhead. Have you nothing then, inſtead of the Supper? Yes indeed you have; the not praiſing him, whom you do not like to praiſe: the not bearing with his Behaviour at coming in (*l*).

XXVI.

The Will of Nature may be learned from thoſe Things, in which we do not differ from each other. As, when our Neighbour's Boy hath broken a Cup, or the like, we are preſently ready to ſay, "Theſe are Things that will happen." Be aſſured then, that when your own Cup likewiſe is broken, you ought to be affected juſt as when another's Cup was broken. Transfer this, in like manner, to greater Things. Is the Child or Wife of another dead? There is no one who would

(*l*) Or, according to the Reading of *Simplicius*—the Attendants in his Antichamber.

would not ſay, "This is a human Accident." But if any one's (*m*) own Child happens to die, it is preſently, "Alas! how wretched am I!" But it ſhould be remembered, how we are affected in hearing the ſame Thing concerning others.

XXVII.

As a Mark (*n*) is not ſet up for the Sake of miſſing the Aim, ſo neither doth the Nature of Evil exiſt in the World.

XXVIII.

If a Perſon had delivered up your Body to any one, whom he met in his Way, you would certainly be angry. And do you feel no Shame in delivering up your own Mind to be diſconcerted, and confounded by any one, who happens to give you Ill-Language?

XXIX.

(*m*) Natural Affection prompts us to grieve for a Wife or a Child, and to ſympathize with the Griefs of others: whence Chriſtianity teaches us *to weep with them who weep*: yet forbidding us, in any Caſe, to *ſorrow as without Hope*. Stoiciſm carries Truth into Abſurdity; while Chriſtian Philoſophy makes all Truths coincide, uniting Fortitude with Tenderneſs and Compaſſion.

(*n*) Happineſs, the Effect of Virtue, is the Mark which God hath ſet up for us to aim at. Our miſſing it, is no Work of His; nor ſo properly any Thing real, as a mere Negative and Failure of our own.

XXIX (*o*).

XXX.

Duties are univerſally meaſured by Relations. Is any one a Father? In this are implied, as due, Taking Care of him; ſubmitting to him in all Things; patiently receiving his Reproaches, his Correction. But he is a bad Father. Is your natural Tie then to a *good* Father? No: but to a Father. Is a Brother unjuſt? Well: preſerve your own Situation towards him. Conſider not what *he* doth; but what *you* are to do, to keep your own Faculty of Choice in a State conformable to Nature. For another will not hurt you, unleſs you pleaſe. You will then be hurt, when you *think* you are hurt. In this manner, therefore, you will find, from [the Idea of] a Neighbour, a Citizen, a General, the [correſponding] Duties, if you accuſtom yourſelf to contemplate the [ſeveral] Relations.

XXXI.

Be aſſured, that the eſſential Property of Piety towards the Gods, is, to form right Opinions concerning them, as exiſting (*p*), and as governing the

(*o*) This Chapter, except ſome very trifling Differences, is the ſame with the Fifteenth of the Third Book of the Diſcourſes; therefore unneceſſary to be repeated here.

(*p*) *He that cometh to God, muſt believe that He is; and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek Him.* Heb. xi. 6.

the Univerſe with Goodneſs and Juſtice. And fix yourſelf in this Reſolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all Events, as produced by the moſt perfect Underſtanding. For, thus you will never find Fault with the Gods, nor accuſe them of neglecting you. And it is not poſſible for this to be effected any other Way (*q*), than by withdrawing yourſelf from Things not in our own Power, and placing Good or Evil in thoſe only which are. For if you ſuppoſe any of the Things, not in our own Power, to be either good or evil; when you are diſappointed of what you wiſh, or incur what you would avoid, you muſt neceſſarily find fault with, and blame, the Authors. For every Animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor Things that appear hurtful, and the Cauſes of them; and to purſue and admire thoſe which appear beneficial, and the Cauſes of them. It is impracticable then, that one who ſuppoſes himſelf to be hurt, ſhould rejoice in the Perſon who, he thinks, hurts him; juſt as it is impoſſible to rejoice in the Hurt itſelf. Hence, alſo, a Father is reviled by a Son, when he doth not impart to him the Things which he takes to be good: and the ſuppoſing Empire to be a Good, made *Polynices* and *Eteocles* mutually Enemies. On this account the Huſbandman, the Sailor, the Merchant; on this account thoſe who

(*q*) Αλλως τε, perhaps ſhould be αλλως δε.

who loſe Wives and Children, revile the Gods. For where Intereſt is, there too is Piety placed. So that, whoever is careful to regulate his Deſires and Averſions as he ought, is, by the very ſame Means, careful of Piety likewiſe. But it is alſo incumbent on every one to offer Libations, and Sacrifices, and Firſt-Fruits, conformably to the Cuſtoms of his Country, with Purity; and not in a ſlovenly manner, nor negligently, nor ſparingly, nor beyond his Ability.

XXXII.

When you have Recourſe to Divination, remember, that you know not what the Event will be, and you come to learn it of the Diviner: but of what Nature it is, you know before you come; at leaſt, if you are a Philoſopher. For if it is among the Things not in our own Power, it can by no means be either good or evil. Do not, therefore, bring either Deſire or Averſion with you to the Diviner, (elſe you will approach him trembling;) but firſt acquire a diſtinct Knowledge, that every Event is indifferent, and nothing to *you*, of whatever Sort it may be; for it will be in your Power to make a right Uſe of it; and this no one can hinder: then come with Confidence to the Gods, as your Counſellors: and afterwards, when any Counſel is given you, remember what Counſellors you have aſſumed; and whoſe Advice you will neglect, if you diſobey.

Come

Come to Divination, as *Socrates* preſcribed, in Caſes, of which the whole Conſideration relates to the Event, and in which no Opportunities are afforded by Reaſon, or any other Art, to diſcover the Thing propoſed to be learned. When, therefore, it is our Duty to ſhare the Danger of a Friend, or of our Country, we ought not to conſult the Oracle, whether we ſhall ſhare it with them, or not. For though the Diviner ſhould forewarn you, that the Victims are unfavourable, this means no more, than that either Death, or Mutilation, or Exile, is portended. But we have Reaſon within us: and it directs, even with theſe Hazards, to ſtand by our Friend and our Country. Attend therefore to the greater Diviner, the *Pythian* God; who caſt out of the Temple, the Perſon who gave no Aſſiſtance to his Friend, while another was murdering him.

XXXIII.

Immediately preſcribe ſome Character and Form [of Behaviour] to yourſelf, which you may preſerve, both alone, and in Company.

Be for the moſt part ſilent: or ſpeak merely what is neceſſary, and in few Words. We may however enter, though ſparingly, into Diſcourſe ſometimes, when Occaſion calls for it: but not on any of the common Subjects, of Gladiators, or Horſe Races, or athletic Champions, or Feaſts; the vulgar Topics of Converſation: but principally

pally not of Men, ſo as either to blame, or praiſe, or make Compariſons. If you are able then, by your own Converſation, bring over that of your Company to proper Subjects: but, if you happen to be taken among Strangers, be ſilent.

Let not your (*r*) Laughter be much, nor on many Occaſions, nor profuſe.

Avoid Swearing, if poſſible, altogether; if not, as far as you are able.

Avoid public and vulgar Entertainments: but, if ever an Occaſion calls you to them, keep your Attention upon the Stretch, that you may not imperceptibly ſlide into vulgar Manners. For be aſſured, that if a Perſon be ever ſo ſound himſelf, yet, if his Companion be infected, he who converſes with him will be infected likewiſe.

Provide Things relating to the Body no farther than mere Uſe; as Meat, Drink, Cloathing, Houſe, Family. But ſtrike off, and reject, every thing relating to Show and Delicacy.

As far as poſſible, before Marriage, preſerve yourſelf pure from Familiarities with Women: and, if you indulge them, let it be lawfully (*s*). But

(*r*) See *Eccleſ.* ii. 2. vii. 3—6. *Ecclus.* xix. 30. xxi. 20.

(*s*) Public Proſtitutes were allowed by the Laws at *Rome* and in *Greece*. The Miſchiefs, occaſioned by Perſons of this Character, ſcarcely ſo much as hinted by the Stoic Philoſopher, are the Subject of many beautiful Reflexions in the Book of *Proverbs*.

But do not therefore be troubleſome, and full of Reproofs, to thoſe who uſe theſe Liberties; nor frequently boaſt, that you yourſelf do not.

If any one tells you, that ſuch a Perſon ſpeaks ill of you, do not make Excuſes about what is ſaid of you, but anſwer; "He doth not know my "other Faults, elſe he would not have mentioned "only theſe."

It is not neceſſary for you to appear often at public Spectacles: but if ever there is a proper Occaſion for you to be there, do not appear more ſolicitous for any one, than for yourſelf; that is, wiſh Things to be only juſt as they are, and him only to conquer who is the Conqueror; for thus you will meet with no Hindrance. But abſtain entirely from Acclamations, and Deriſion, and violent Emotions. And when you come away, do not diſcourſe a great deal on what hath paſſed, and what doth not contribute to your own Amendment. For it would appear by ſuch Diſcourſe, that you were immoderately ſtruck with the Show.

Go not [of your own Accord] to the Rehearſals of any [Authors], nor appear [at them] readily. But if you do appear, preſerve your Gravity and Sedateneſs, and at the ſame time avoid being moroſe.

When you are going to confer with any one, and particularly of thoſe in a ſuperior Station, repreſent

represent to yourself how *Socrates* (*t*), or *Zeno*, would behave in such a Case, and you will not be at a Loss to make a proper Use of whatever may occur.

When you are going to any of the People in Power, represent to yourself, that you will not find him at home: that you will not be admitted [into the House]: that the Doors [of his Apartment] will not be opened to you: that he will take no Notice of you. If, with all this, it be your Duty to go, bear what happens, and never say [to yourself], "It was not worth so much." For this is vulgar, and like a Man disconcerted by Externals (*u*).

In Parties of Conversation, avoid a frequent and excessive mention of your own Actions, and Dangers. For, however agreeable it may be to yourself to mention the Risques you have run, it is not equally agreeable to others to hear your Adventures. Avoid, likewise, an Endeavour to excite Laughter.

(*t*) It should be observed here, that, the Mind being thus naturally affected by the Thought of imitating a superior Character, Christians enjoy a singular Advantage, in not being left to study and copy the imperfect and faulty Patterns of Persons no way particularly related to them; but having an authentic Delineation of divine Excellence, familiarized to their Apprehensions, in Him, who, both in acting and suffering for us, *hath left us an Example, that we should follow his Steps*.

(*u*) A late Editor of the *Enchiridion* hath proposed to read διαπεπληγμενυ instead of διαβεβλημενυ.

Laughter. For this is a ſlippery Point, which may throw you into vulgar Manners: and, beſides, may be apt to leſſen you in the Eſteem of your Acquaintance. Approaches to indecent Diſcourſe are likewiſe dangerous. Whenever, therefore, any thing of this Sort happens, if there be a proper Opportunity, rebuke him who makes Advances that Way: or, at leaſt, by Silence, and Bluſhing, and a forbidding Look, ſhow yourſelf to be diſpleaſed by ſuch Talk.

XXXIV.

If you are ſtruck by the Appearance of any promiſed Pleaſure, guard yourſelf againſt being hurried away by it: but let the Affair wait your Leiſure, and procure yourſelf ſome Delay. Then bring to your Mind both Points of Time; that in which you ſhall enjoy the Pleaſure, and that in which you will repent and reproach yourſelf, after you have enjoyed it: and ſet before you, in Oppoſition to theſe, how you will rejoice and applaud yourſelf, if you abſtain. And even, though it ſhould appear to you a ſeaſonable Gratification, take heed, that its enticing, and agreeable, and attractive Force may not ſubdue you: but ſet in Oppoſition to this, how much better it is, to be conſcious of having gained ſo great a Victory.

XXXV.

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When you do any thing from a clear Judgment that it ought to be done, never ſhun the being ſeen to do it, even though the World ſhould make a wrong Suppoſition about it: for, if you do not act right, ſhun the Action itſelf; if you do, why are you afraid of thoſe who cenſure you wrongly?

XXXVI.

As the Propoſition, *Either it is Day, or it is Night*, is extremely proper for a disjunctive Argument, but quite improper in a conjunctive one (*w*): ſo, at a Feaſt, to chuſe the largeſt Share, is very ſuitable to the bodily Appetite, but utterly inconſiſtent with the ſocial Spirit of an Entertainment. When you eat with another, then remember, not only the Value of thoſe Things which are ſet before you, to the Body; but the Value of that Behaviour, which ought to be obſerved towards the Perſon who gives the Entertainment.

XXXVII.

If you have aſſumed any Character above your Strength, you have both made an ill Figure in that, and quitted one which you might have ſupported.

XXXVIII.

(*w*) The Stoics were ſo fond of Logic, that we muſt not wonder if *Epictetus* took a Simile from thence, which to others muſt appear a ſtrange one.

XXXVIII.

As, in walking, you take care not to tread upon a Nail, or turn your Foot; ſo likewiſe take care not to hurt the ruling Faculty of your Mind. And, if we were to guard againſt this in every Action, we ſhould undertake the Action with the greater Safety.

XXXIX.

The Body is to every one the Meaſure of the Poſſeſſions proper for it; as the Foot is of the Shoe. If, therefore, you ſtop at this, you will keep the Meaſure: but, if you move beyond it, you muſt neceſſarily be carried forward, as down a Precipice: as in the Caſe of a Shoe, if you go beyond its Fitneſs to the Foot, it comes firſt to be gilded, then purple (*x*), and then ſtudded with Jewels. For to that which once exceeds a due Meaſure, there is no Bound.

XL.

Women from fourteen Years old are flattered with the Title of Miſtreſſes, by the Men. Therefore, perceiving that they are regarded only as qualified to give the Men Pleaſure, they begin to adorn themſelves; and in that to place all their Hopes. It is worth while, therefore, to fix our Attention on making them ſenſible, that they are eſteemed

(*x*) Purple was of high Honour and Price among the Antients.

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(*x*) Purple was of high Honour and Price among the Antients.

eſteemed for nothing elſe, but the Appearance of a decent, and modeſt, and diſcreet Behaviour (*y*).

XLI.

It is a Mark of want of Genius, to ſpend much Time in Things relating to the Body; as, to be long in our Exerciſes, in Eating, and Drinking, and in the Diſcharge of other animal Functions. Theſe ſhould be done incidentally, and ſlightly; and our whole Attention be engaged in the Care of the Underſtanding.

XLII.

When any Perſon doth ill by you, or ſpeaks ill of you, remember that he acts, or ſpeaks, from a Suppoſition of its being his (*z*) Duty. Now, it is not poſſible, that he ſhould follow what appears right to you, but what appears ſo to himſelf.

(*y*) The original Words here, κοσμιαι και αιδημονες εν σωφροσυνη, are almoſt the ſame with, εν καταςολη κοσμιω μετα αιδους και σωφροσυνης, 1 Tim. ii. 9.

(*z*) *Epictetus* ſeems, in part, to be miſtaken here. For, perhaps, it is oftener from having no Thought at all about Duty, or preferring Inclination to it, than from having a wrong Notion of it, that Perſons are ſlanderous and injurious: beſides, that wrong Notions often ariſe from Neglect, or Partiality. Suppoſing all bad Actions to proceed intirely from Ignorance, or Miſtake, puts them on a Level, in Point of Freedom from Guilt, with good ones. But, ſince many proceed from thence, more or leſs, the Doctrine of this Chapter is, in a conſiderable Degree, right: and, ſo far as it is, very ſtrongly calls to one's Mind that divine Interceſſion – *Forgive them! for they know not what they do.*

ſelf. Therefore, if he judges from a wrong Appearance, He is the Perſon hurt; ſince He too is the Perſon deceived. For, if any one ſhould ſuppoſe a true Propoſition to be falſe, the Propoſition is not hurt; but he who is deceived [about it]. Setting out then from theſe Principles, you will meekly bear a Perſon who reviles you: for you will ſay, upon every Occaſion, "It ſeemed ſo to "him."

XLIII.

Every thing hath two Handles; the one, by which it may be borne; the other, by which it cannot. If your Brother acts unjuſtly, do not lay hold on the Action by the Handle of his Injuſtice; for by that it cannot be borne: but by the Oppoſite, that he is your Brother, that he was brought up with you: and thus you will lay hold on it, as it is to be borne.

XLIV.

Theſe Reaſonings are unconnected: "I am "richer than you; therefore I am better: "I "am more eloquent than you; therefore I am "better." The Connexion is rather this: "I "am richer than you; therefore my Property is "greater than yours:" "I am more eloquent "than you; therefore my Style is better than "yours." But *you*, after all, are neither Property, nor Style.

XLV.

Doth any one bathe (*a*) in a mighty little Time? Do not ſay, that he doth it ill; but, in a mighty little Time. Doth any one drink a great Quantity of Wine? Do not ſay that he doth ill; but, that he drinks a great Quantity. For, unleſs you perfectly underſtand the Principle, [from which any one acts], how ſhould you know, if he acts ill? Thus you will not run the Hazard of aſſenting to any Appearances, but ſuch as you fully comprehend.

XLVI.

Never call yourſelf a Philoſopher; nor talk a great deal among the Unlearned about Theorems; but act conformably to them. Thus, at an Entertainment, do not talk how Perſons ought to eat; but eat as you ought. For remember, that in this manner *Socrates* alſo univerſally avoided all Oſtentation. And when Perſons came to him, and deſired to be recommended by him to Philoſophers, he took and recommended them: ſo well did he bear being overlooked. So that if ever any Talk ſhould happen among the Unlearned, concerning [philoſophic] Theorems, be you, for the moſt part ſilent. For there is great Danger in immediately throwing out what you have not digeſted. And, if any one tells you, that you know nothing, and you are not nettled at it, then you

(*a*) See B. IV. c. 8. of the Diſcourſes.

you may be ſure, that you have begun your Buſineſs. For Sheep do not throw up the Graſs, to ſhow the Shepherds how much they have eaten: but, inwardly digeſting their Food, they outwardly produce Wool, and Milk. Thus, therefore, do you likewiſe, not ſhow Theorems to the Unlearned; but the Actions produced by them, after they have been digeſted.

XLVII.

When you have brought yourſelf to ſupply the Neceſſities of your Body, at a ſmall Price, do not pique yourſelf upon it: nor, if you drink Water, be ſaying upon every Occaſion, "I drink Water." But firſt conſider, how much more ſparing and patient of Hardſhip the Poor are, than we. But if at any time you would enure yourſelf by Exerciſe to Labour, and bearing hard Trials, [do it] for your own Sake, and for the World: do not graſp (*b*) Statues; but, when you are violently thirſty, take a little cold Water in your Mouth, and ſpurt it out, and tell no body.

XLVIII.

The Condition and Characteriſtic of a vulgar Perſon is, that he never expects either Benefit or Hurt from himſelf; but from Externals. The Condition and Characteriſtic of a Philoſopher is, that he expects all Hurt and Benefit from himſelf. The Marks of a Proficient are, that he cenſures no

(*b*) See B. III. c. 12. of the Diſcourſes.

one, praiſes no one, blames no one, accuſes no one; ſays nothing concerning himſelf as being any body, or knowing any thing: when he is, in any Inſtance, hindered, or reſtrained, he accuſes himſelf; and, if he is praiſed, he ſecretly laughs at the Perſon who praiſes him; and, if he is cenſured, he makes no Defence. But he goes about with the Caution of infirm People [after Sickneſs, or an Accident], dreading to move any thing that is ſet right, before it is perfectly fixed. He ſuppreſſes (*c*) all Deſire in himſelf: he transfers his Averſion to thoſe Things only, which thwart the proper Uſe of our own Faculty of Choice: the Exertion of his active Powers towards any thing is very gentle: if he appears ſtupid, or ignorant, he doth not care; and, in a Word, he watches himſelf as an Enemy, and one in Ambuſh.

XLIX.

When any one ſhows himſelf vain, on being able to underſtand and interpret the Works of *Chryſippus*, ſay to yourſelf, "Unleſs *Chryſippus* had "written obſcurely, this Perſon would have had "no Subject for his Vanity. But what do *I* "deſire? To underſtand Nature, and follow "her. I aſk then, who interprets her; and, "finding *Chryſippus* doth, I have Recourſe to "him.

(*c*) See c. 2. Note (*b*).

"him. I do not underſtand his Writings. I "ſeek therefore one to interpret *them*." So far there is nothing to value myſelf upon. And when I find an Interpreter, what remains is, to make uſe of his Inſtructions. This alone is the valuable Thing. But, if I admire nothing but merely the Interpretation, what do I become more than a Grammarian, inſtead of a Philoſopher? Except, indeed, that, inſtead of *Homer*, I interpret *Chryſippus*. When any one therefore deſires me to read *Chryſippus* to him, I rather bluſh, when I cannot ſhow my Actions agreeable, and conſonant to, his Diſcourſe.

L.

Whatever Rules you have deliberately propoſed to yourſelf [for the Conduct of Life,] abide by them, as ſo many Laws, and as if you would be guilty of Impiety in tranſgreſſing any of them: and do not regard what any one ſays of you; for this, after all, is no Concern of yours. How long then will you defer to think yourſelf worthy of the nobleſt Improvements, and, in no Inſtance, to tranſgreſs the Diſtinctions of Reaſon? You have received the Philoſophic Theorems, with which you ought to be converſant: and you have been converſant with them. What other Maſter then do you wait for, to throw upon that the Delay of reforming yourſelf? You are no longer

a Boy; but a grown Man (*d*). If therefore you will be negligent and ſlothful, and always add Procraſtination to Procraſtination, Purpoſe to Purpoſe, and fix Day after Day, in which you will attend to yourſelf; you will inſenſibly continue without Proficiency, and, living and dying, perſevere in being one of the Vulgar. This Inſtant then think yourſelf worthy of living as a Man grown up, and a Proficient. Let whatever appears to be the beſt, be to you an inviolable Law. And if any Inſtance of Pain or Pleaſure, or Glory, or Diſgrace be ſet before you, remember, that now is the Combat, now the *Olympiad* comes on, nor can it be put off; and that, by once being worſted, and giving way, Proficiency is loſt, or [by the contrary] preſerved. Thus *Socrates* became perfect, improving himſelf by every thing; (*e*) attending to nothing but Reaſon. And though you are not yet a *Socrates*, you ought however to live as one deſirous of becoming a *Socrates*.

LI.

(*d*) The ſame Words, Ανηρ τελειος, in the ſame Senſe, are uſed *Eph.* iv. 13. (where they are oppoſed to νηπιοι, v. 14.) *James* iii. 2. and Ανθρωπος τελειος, *Col.* i. 28. and τελειος, ſingly, 1 *Cor.* ii. 6. *Phil.* iii. 15. *Heb.* v. 14. where it is oppoſed to νηπιος, v. 13. Which Word is uſed alſo, 1 *Cor.* iii. 1, as μειραξιον is here.

(*e*) *Plato*, in his *Crito*, introduces *Socrates* ſaying this of himſelf. UPTON.

LI.

The firſt and moſt neceſſary Topic in Philoſophy is, that of the Uſe of [practical] Theorems; as that, *We ought not to lie:* the ſecond is, that of Demonſtrations; as, *Whence it is, that we ought not to lie:* the third, that which gives Strength and Articulation to the other two; as, *Whence this is a Demonſtration.* For what is Demonſtration? What is Conſequence? What Contradiction? What Truth? What Falſhood? The third Topic then is neceſſary, on the Account of the Second: and the ſecond, on the Account of the firſt. But the moſt neceſſary, and that whereon we ought to reſt, is the firſt. But we act juſt on the contrary. For we ſpend all our Time on the third Topic, and employ all our Diligence about that, and entirely neglect the firſt. Therefore, at the ſame time that we lie, we are mighty ready to ſhow how it is demonſtrated, that Lying is not right.

LII.

Upon all Occaſions, we ought to have theſe Maxims ready at hand.

Conduct me, Jove, *and Thou, O* Deſtiny,
Where-ever Your Decrees have fix'd my Station.
I follow chearfully: and, did I not,
Wicked and wretched, I muſt follow ſtill (f).

(f) From a Poem of *Cleanthes.*

Who-e'er yields properly to Fate, is deem'd
Wise among Men, and knows the Laws of Heaven (*g*).

And this Third:

(*h*) "O *Crito*, if it thus pleases the Gods, thus "let it be. *Anytus* and *Melitus* may kill me in-"deed: but hurt me they cannot."

(*g*) From *Euripides*.
(*h*) From *Plato's Crito*, and *Apology*.

The END *of the* ENCHIRIDION.

FRAGMENTS

OF

EPICTETUS.

FRAGMENTS OF *EPICTETUS*, FROM STOBÆUS, ANTONIUS, *and* MAXIMUS (*a*).

I.

A LIFE entangled with Fortune, reſembles a wintry Torrent: for it is turbulent, and muddy, and difficult to paſs, and violent and noiſy, and of ſhort Continuance.

A Soul

(*a*) According to *Fabricius*, in his *Bibliotheca Græca*, L. V. c. 30. *Stobæus* was a Heathen: at leaſt, he cites only Heathen Authors. He lived about the Beginning of the Fifth Century. *Maximus* was a Chriſtian, of the Seventh: and *Antonius*, ſurnamed *Meliſſa*, or the Bee, of the Eighth

A Soul converſant with Virtue, reſembles a perpetual Fountain: for it is clear, and gentle, and potable, and ſweet, and communicative, and rich, and harmleſs, and innocent.

II.

If you would be good, firſt believe that you are bad.

III.

It is better to offend ſeldom (owning it when we do), and act often wiſely, than to ſay, we ſeldom err, and offend frequently.

IV.

Chaſtiſe your Paſſions, that they may not puniſh you.

V.

Be not ſo much aſhamed of what is void of Glory, as ſtudious to ſhun what is void of Truth.

VI.

If you would be well ſpoken of, learn to ſpeak well of others. And, when you have learned to ſpeak

Century, or later; ſome ſay, of the Twelfth. Their Collections are printed together. The Editions of *Stobæus* are extremely incorrect: and in him and *Maximus*, the Names of the Authors quoted, either were frequently wrong originally, or have been altered ſince. This may have happened to *Antonius* alſo: and, conſequently, ſome of the Sayings aſcribed to *Epictetus* may not have been his. Indeed, many of theſe Fragments have very little the Turn of his other Diſcourſes. The two firſt, particularly, have a much ſtronger Reſemblance of the Style and Manner of *M. Antonius*.

ſpeak well of them, endeavour likewiſe to do well to them; and thus you will reap the Fruit of being well ſpoken of by them.

VII.

Freedom is the Name of Virtue; and Slavery of Vice: and both theſe are Actions of Choice. But neither of them belongs to Things, in which Choice hath no Share. But Fortune (*b*) is accuſtomed to diſpoſe at her Pleaſure of the Body, and thoſe Things relating to the Body in which Choice hath no Share. For no one is a Slave, whoſe Choice is free. Fortune is an evil Chain to the Body; and Vice, to the Soul. For he whoſe Body is unbound, and whoſe Soul is chained, is a Slave. On the contrary, he whoſe Body is chained, and his Soul unbound, is free. The Chain of the Body, Nature unbinds by Death; and Vice, by (*c*) Money: the Chain of the Soul, Virtue unbinds, by Learning, and Experience, and philoſophic Exerciſe.

VIII.

If you would live with Tranquillity and Content, endeavour to have all who live with you, good. And you will have them good, by inſtructing the Willing, and diſmiſſing the Unwilling.

(*b*) The Senſe abſolutely requires, that ψυχη ſhould be πυχη; and it is ſo tranſlated.

(*c*) Perhaps, by bribing a Judge, or a Jailor. However, the Senſe is not clear.

ing (*d*). For together with the Fugitives, will Wickedneſs and Slavery fly: and with thoſe who remain with you, will Goodneſs and Liberty be left.

IX.

(*e*) It is ſcandalous, that he who ſweetens his Drink by the Gifts of the Bees, ſhould, by Vice, embitter Reaſon, the Gift of the Gods.

X.

No one, who is a Lover of Money, a Lover of Pleaſure, or a Lover of Glory, is likewiſe a Lover of Mankind: but only he who is a Lover of Virtue.

XI.

As you would not wiſh to ſail in a large, and finely decorated, and gilded Ship, and ſink: ſo neither is it eligible to inhabit a grand and ſumptuous Houſe, and be in a Storm [of Paſſions and Cares].

XII.

When we are invited to an Entertainment, we take what we find: and, if any one ſhould bid the Maſter of the Houſe ſet Fiſh, or Tarts, before him, he would be thought abſurd. Yet, in the World, we aſk the Gods for what they do not give

(*d*) The Tranſlation omits επειτα χειχειρωμενους, which is in *Antonius* and *Maximus*, but not in *Stobæus*.

(*e*) This Sentence is aſcribed to *Pythagoras*, by *Antonius* and *Maximus de rationali*. *Serm*. 27. p. 75.

give us; and that, though they have given us ſo many Things.

XIII.

They are pretty Fellows indeed, ſaid he, who value themſelves on Things not in our own Power. I am a better Man than you, ſays one; for I have many Eſtates, and you are pining with Hunger. I have been Conſul, ſays another: I am a Governor, a third; and I have a fine Head of Hair, ſays a fourth. Yet one Horſe doth not ſay to another, "I am better than you; for I "have a great deal of Hay, and a great deal of "Oats; and I have a Gold Bridle, and embroid-"ered Trappings:" but, "I am ſwifter than "you." And every Creature is better or worſe from its own good or bad Qualities. Is Man, then, the only Creature, which hath no natural good Quality? And muſt we conſider Hair, and Clothes, and Anceſtors, [to judge of him]?

XIV.

Patients are diſpleaſed with a Phyſician, who doth not preſcribe to them; and think he gives them over. And why are none ſo affected towards a Philoſopher, as to conclude, he deſpairs of their Recovery to a right Way of Thinking, if he tells them nothing, which may be for their Good?

XV.

XV.

They who have a good Conſtitution of Body, ſupport Heats and Colds: and ſo they, who have a right Conſtitution of Soul, bear [the Attacks of] Anger, and Grief, and immoderate Joy, and the other Paſſions.

XVI.

Examine yourſelf, whether you had rather be rich, or happy: and, if rich, be aſſured, that this is neither a Good, nor altogether in your own Power: but, if happy, that this is both a Good, and in your own Power: ſince the one is a temporary Loan of Fortune *(f)*, and the other depends on Choice.

XVII.

As when you ſee a Viper, or an Aſp, or a Scorpion, in an Ivory or Gold Box, you do not love, or think it happy, on Account of the Magnificence of the Materials, in which it is incloſed; but ſhun and deteſt it, becauſe it is of a pernicious Nature: ſo likewiſe, when you ſee Vice lodged in the midſt of Wealth, and the ſwelling Pride of Fortune, be not ſtruck by the Splendour of the Materials, with which it is ſurrounded; but deſpiſe the baſe Alloy of its Manners.

XVIII.

(f) Της ευδαιμονιας ſeems to be merely an Interpolation, and is omitted in the Tranſlation.

XVIII.

Riches are not among the Number of Things, which are good: Prodigality is of the Number of thoſe, which are evil: Rightneſs of Mind, of thoſe which are good. Now Rightneſs of Mind invites to Frugality, and the Acquiſition of Things that are good: but Riches invite to Prodigality, and ſeduce from Rightneſs of Mind. It is difficult therefore for a rich Perſon to be right-minded, or a right-minded Perſon, rich (*g*).

XIX.

(*h*)——Juſt as you had been bred and born in a Ship, you would not *be* eager to become the Pilot. For neither would the Ship have any natural and perpetual Connexion (*i*) with you there, nor have Riches here; but Reaſon every where. That therefore, which is natural and congenial to you, Reaſon, think likewiſe to be in a peculiar Manner your own, and take care of it.

XX.

If you were born in *Perſia*, you would not endeavour to live in *Greece*; but to be happy in the Place where you are. Why then, if you are born in

(*g*) *How hardly ſhall they that have Riches, enter into the Kingdom of God!* Mark x. 23.

(*h*) The former Part of the Sentence ſeems to be wanting; in which, probably, the Author had ſaid, That they who have hereditary Wealth, ſhould not think the Management of it their chief Concern: juſt as, &c.

(*i*) Συνεργα ſhould, perhaps, be συγγενη.

in Poverty, do you endeavour to be rich, and not to be happy in the Condition where you are?

XXI.

As it is better to lie ſtraitened for Room upon a little Couch in Health, than to toſs upon a wide Bed in Sickneſs; ſo it is better to contract yourſelf within the Compaſs of a ſmall Fortune, and be happy, than to have a great one, and be wretched.

XXII.

It is not Poverty that cauſes Sorrow; but covetous (*k*) Deſires: nor do Riches deliver from Fear; but Reaſoning. If, therefore, you acquire a Habit of Reaſoning, you will neither deſire Riches, nor complain of Poverty.

XXIII.

A Horſe is not elated, and doth not value himſelf on his fine Manger or Trappings, or Saddle-cloths: nor a Bird, on the warm Materials of its Neſt: but the former, on the Swiftneſs of his Feet; and the latter, of its Wings. Do not you, therefore, glory in your Eating, or Dreſs; or, briefly, in any external Advantage; but in Good-nature and Beneficence.

XXIV.

There is a Difference between living well, and living profuſely. The one ariſes from Content-

ment,

(*k*) The *Latin* Tranſlator ſuppoſes, that ευθυμια ſhould be επιθυμια, which the Senſe requires.

ment, and Order, and Decency, and Frugality: the other from Diſſoluteneſs, and Luxury, and Diſorder, and Indecency. In ſhort, to the one belongs true Praiſe; to the other, Cenſure. If, therefore, you would live well, do not ſeek to be praiſed for Profuſeneſs.

XXV.

Let the firſt ſatisfying of Appetite be always the Meaſure to you of eating and drinking; and Appetite itſelf the Sauce and the Pleaſure. Thus you will never take more [Food] than is neceſſary, nor will you want Cooks: and you will be contented with whatever Drink falls in your Way (*l*).

XXVI.

Be careful not to (*m*) thrive by the Meats in your Stomach; but by Chearfulneſs in the Soul. For the former, as you ſee, are evacuated, and carried off together; but the latter, though the Soul be (*n*) ſeparated, remains uncorrupted, and ſincere.

XXVII.

(*l*) I have not tranſlated the Fragment which follows this in Mr. *Upton*; becauſe I do not underſtand it.

(*m*) There are various Readings of this Fragment; but none which makes the Senſe very clear.

(*n*) It is doubtful whether the Meaning be, that the Effect of a chearful Behaviour will remain after the Perſon is dead, or after he is ſeparated from the Company.

XXVII.

In every Feast remember, that there are two Guests to be entertained, the Body, and the Soul: and that what you give the Body, you presently lose; but what you give the Soul, remains for ever.

XXVIII.

Do not mix Anger wirh Profusion, and set them before your Guests. Profusion makes its Way through the Body, and is quickly gone; but Anger, when it hath penetrated the Soul, abides for a long Time. Take care, not to be transported with Anger, and affront your Guests, at a great Expence; but rather delight them at a cheap Rate, by gentle Behaviour.

XXIX.

Take care at your Meals, that the Attendants be not more in Number than those whom they are to attend. For it is absurd, that many Persons should wait on a few Chairs.

XXX.

It would be best, if both while you are personally making your Preparations, and while you are feasting at Table, you could give among the Servants Part of what is before you (a). But, if such a Thing be difficult at that Time, remember, that you, who are not weary, are attended by

(a) *Gesner*, for κυβερνας, reads κοινωνεις, which seems the best Sense, and is followed in the Translation.

by thoſe who are; you, who are eating and drinking, by thoſe who are not; you who are talking, by thoſe who are ſilent; you who are at Eaſe, by thoſe who are under Conſtraint (p): and thus you will never be heated into any unreaſonable Paſſion yourſelf; nor do any Miſchief, by provoking another.

XXXI.

Strife and Contention are always abſurd; but particularly unbecoming at Table Converſations. For a Perſon warmed with Wine will never either teach, or be convinced by, one who is ſober. And where-ever Sobriety is wanting, the End will ſhow, that you have exerted yourſelf to no Purpoſe.

XXXII.

Graſhoppers are muſical; but Snails are dumb. The one rejoice in being wet; and the others, in being warm. Then the Dew calls out the one; and for this they come forth: but, on the contrary, the Noon-day Sun awakens the other; and in this they ſing. If, therefore, you would be a muſical and harmonious Perſon, whenever, in Parties of Drinking, the Soul is bedewed with Wine, ſuffer her not to go forth, and defile herſelf. But when, in Parties of Converſation, ſhe glows by the Beams of Reaſon, then command her

(p) There is ſomething ſtrikingly beautiful and humane in this Conſideration about Servants.

her to ſpeak from Inſpiration, and utter the Oracles of Juſtice.

XXXIII.

Conſider him, with whom you converſe, in one of theſe three Ways; either as ſuperior to you [in Abilities], or inferior, or equal. If ſuperior, you ought to hear him, and be convinced: if inferior, to convince (q) him: if equal, to agree with him: and thus you will never be found guilty of Litigiouſneſs.

XXXIV.

It is better, by yielding to Truth, to conquer Opinion; than by yielding to Opinion, to be defeated by Truth.

XXXV.

If you ſeek Truth, you will not ſeek to conquer by all poſſible Means: and, when you have found Truth, you will have a Security againſt being conquered.

XXXVI.

Truth conquers by itſelf; Opinion, by foreign Aids.

XXXVII.

It is better, by living with one free Perſon, to be fearleſs, and free, than to be a Slave in Company with many.

XXXVIII.

(q) Αντιθειν, probably, ſhould be πειθειν; and is ſo tranſlated. The α ſeems to have been added from the preceding Word.

XXXVIII.

What you avoid ſuffering yourſelf, attempt not to impoſe on others. You avoid Slavery, for inſtance: take care not to enſlave. For, if you can bear to exact Slavery from others, you appear to have been firſt yourſelf a Slave. For Vice hath no Communication with Virtue; nor Freedom with Slavery. As a Perſon in Health would not wiſh to be attended by the Sick, nor to have thoſe who live with him be in a State of Sickneſs; ſo neither would a Perſon who is free, bear to be ſerved by Slaves, or to have thoſe who live with him in a State of Slavery.

XXXIX.

Whoever you are, that would live at a Diſtance from Slaves, deliver yourſelf from Slavery. And you will be free, if you deliver yourſelf from [the Power of] Appetite. For neither was *Ariſtides* called Juſt, nor *Epaminondas*, Divine, nor *Lycurgus*, a Preſerver, becauſe they were rich, and were ſerved by Slaves; but becauſe, being poor, they delivered *Greece* from Slavery.

XL.

If you would have your Houſe ſecurely inhabited, imitate the *Spartan Lycurgus*. And as he did not incloſe his City with Walls, but fortified the Inhabitants with Virtue, and preſerved the City always free; ſo do you likewiſe: not ſurround

ſurround yourſelf with a great Court-yard, nor raiſe high Towers; but ſtrengthen thoſe that live with you by Benevolence, and Fidelity, and Friendſhip. And thus nothing hurtful will enter, even if the whole Band of Wickedneſs was ſet in Array againſt it.

XLI.

Do not hang your Houſe round with Tablets, and Pictures; but adorn it with Sobriety. For thoſe are merely foreign, and a (r) fading Deception of the Eyes: but this, a congenial, and indelible, and perpetual Ornament to the Houſe.

XLII.

Inſtead of Herds of Oxen, endeavour to aſſemble Flocks of Friends about your Houſe.

XLIII.

As a Wolf reſembles a Dog, ſo doth a Flatterer, and an Adulterer, and a Paraſite, reſemble a Friend. Take heed, therefore, that inſtead of Guardian Dogs, you do not inadvertently admit ravening Wolves.

XLIV.

He is void of true Taſte, who ſtrives to have his Houſe admired, by decorating it with a ſhowiſh Outſide: but to adorn our Characters by the Gentleneſs

(r) In *Stobæus* the Word is επινουρ⊙. *Geſner*, whom Mr. *Upton* follows, gueſſed it ſhould be επιηρ⊙. Επιχηρ⊙, which the Tranſlation ſuppoſes, is a leſs Alteration, and makes a proper Oppoſition to what follows.

tleneſs of a communicative Temper, is at once a Proof of good Taſte, and Good-nature.

XLV.

If you admire little Things, in the firſt Place, you will never (*s*) be thought to deſerve great ones: but, if you deſpiſe little Things, you will be greatly admired.

XLVI.

Nothing is meaner than the Love of Pleaſure, the Love of Gain, and Inſolence. Nothing is nobler than Magnanimity, Meekneſs, and Good-nature.

XLVII.

——Producing the Sentiments of thoſe intractable Philoſophers, who do not think [the Enjoyment of] Pleaſure to be [in itſelf] the natural State of Man; but merely an adventitious Circumſtance of thoſe Things, in which his natural State conſiſts, Juſtice, Sobriety, and Freedom. For what manner of Reaſon then ſhould the Soul rejoice, and feel a Serenity from the leſſer Good of the Body, as *Epicurus* ſays [it doth]; and not be pleaſed with its own Good, which is the very greateſt? And yet Nature hath given me likewiſe a Senſe of Shame: and I am covered with Bluſhes, when I think I have uttered any indecent

(*s*) Πρωτον μεγαλων αξιωθησῃ is the Text of *Stobæus*. Mr. *Upton* puts in ουκ, which the Tranſlation follows. Απαξιωθησῃ is a ſmaller Change, and the ſame Senſe.

Expreſſion. This Emotion will not ſuffer me to lay down Pleaſure as [in itſelf] a Good, and the End of Life.

XLVIII.

The Ladies at *Rome* have *Plato*'s *Republic* in their Hands, becauſe he allows a Community of Wives: for they attend merely to the Words of the Author, and not to his Senſe. For he doth not firſt order one Man and one Woman to marry and live together, and then allow a Community of Wives: but he aboliſhes that kind of Marriage, and introduces one of another kind (*t*). And, in general, Men are pleaſed in finding out Excuſes for their own Faults. Yet Philoſophy ſays, it is not fit even to move a Finger without ſome Reaſon.

XLIX.

The more rarely the Objects of Pleaſure occur, the more delightful they are.

L.

Whenever any one exceeds Moderation, the moſt delightful Things may become the moſt undelightful.

LI.

Agrippinus was juſtly entitled to Praiſe on this Account, that, though he was a Man of the higheſt Worth, he never praiſed himſelf; but bluſhed, even

(*t*) This, and other ſhocking Things in *Plato*'s *Republic*, ſhew how apt even wiſe Men are to err, without a Guide.

even if another praiſed him. And he was a Man of ſuch a Character, as to write in Praiſe of every harſh Event that befel him: if he was feveriſh, of a Fever; if diſgraced, of Diſgrace; if baniſhed, of Baniſhment. And, when once, as he was going to dine, a Meſſenger brought him Word, that *Nero* ordered him to Baniſhment; Well then, ſays *Agrippinus*, we will dine at *Aricia* (*u*).

LII.

Diogenes affirmed no Labour to be good, unleſs the End was a due State and Tone of the Soul, and not of the Body.

LIII.

As a true Balance is neither ſet right by a true one, nor judged by a falſe one: (*w*) ſo likewiſe a juſt Perſon is neither ſet right by juſt Perſons, nor judged by unjuſt ones.

LIV.

As what is ſtraight hath no need of what is ſtraight, ſo neither what is juſt, of what is juſt, [to aſſiſt or amend it].

LV.

Do not give Judgment from another Tribunal, before you have been judged yourſelf at the Tribunal of Juſtice (*x*).

(*u*) See Diſcourſes, B. I. c. 1.

(*w*) Compare this and the next Fragment with 1 *Cor.* ii. 15.

(*x*) See *Rom.* xiv. 10.

LVI.

If you would give a juſt Sentence, mind neither Parties nor Pleaders; but the Cauſe itſelf.

LVII.

You will commit the feweſt Faults in judging, if you are faultleſs in your own Life.

LVIII.

It is better, by giving a juſt Judgment, to be (*y*) blamed by him who is deſervedly condemned, than by giving an unjuſt Judgment, to be juſtly cenſured by Nature.

LIX.

As the Touch-ſtone which tries Gold, is not itſelf tried by the Gold; ſuch is he, who hath the Rule of judging.

LX.

It is ſcandalous for a Judge to be judged by others.

LXI.

As nothing is ſtraighter than what is ſtraight, ſo nothing is juſter than what is juſt (*z*).

LXII.

Who among you do not admire the Action of *Lycurgus* the *Lacedemonian?* For when he had been

(*y*) The Antitheſis ſeems to require, that ἀξίως ſhould be ἀδίκως, and the Tranſlation—unjuſtly blamed by him, who is condemned.

(*z*) The Stoics held all Virtues, and all Faults to be equal: and this Fragment is one of their Illuſtrations of that Paradox.

been deprived of one of his Eyes, by one of the Citizens, and the People had delivered the young Man to him, to be puniſhed in whatever Manner he ſhould think proper; *Lycurgus* forbore to give him any Puniſhment. But, having inſtructed, and rendered him a good Man, he brought him into the Theatre: and, while the *Lacedemonians* were ſtruck with Admiration; "I received," ſays he, "this Perſon from you, injurious and "violent, and I reſtore him to you gentle, and a "good Citizen."

LXIII.

When *Pittacus* had been unjuſtly treated by ſome Perſon, and had the Power of chaſtiſing him, he let him go; ſaying, "Forgiveneſs is better than Pu-"niſhment: for the one is the Proof of a gentle, "the other of a ſavage Nature."

LXIV.

——But, above all, this is the Buſineſs of Nature, to connect and mutually adapt the Exertion of the active Powers (*a*) to the Appearance of what is fit and beneficial.

LXV.

It is the Character of the moſt mean-ſpirited and fooliſh Men, to ſuppoſe they ſhall be deſpiſed

(*a*) The Text has τῆς—φαντασιας; but the true Reading ſeems evidently to be τῃ φαντασιᾳ; and this the Tranſlation follows.

by others; unleſs, by every Method, they hurt thoſe who are firſt their Enemies (*b*).

LXVI.

When you are going to attack any one with Vehemence and Threatning, remember to ſay firſt to yourſelf, that you are [by Nature] a gentle Animal, and that by doing nothing violent, you ſhall live without Repentance, and without need of being ſet right.

LXVII.

We ought to know, that it is not eaſy for a Man to form a Principle of Action, unleſs he daily ſpeaks and hears the ſame Things, and, at the ſame time, accommodates them to the Uſe of Life.

LXVIII.

Nicias was ſo intent on Buſineſs, that he often aſked his Domeſtics, whether he had bathed, and whether he had dined.

LXIX.

While *Archimedes* was intent on his *Diagrams*, his Servants drew him away by Violence, and anointed

(*b*) Το δε οιεσθαι ευκαταφρονητους τοις αλλοις εσεσθαι, εαν μη τους πρωτους εχθρους παντι τροπω βλαψωμεν, σφοδρα αγεννων και ανοητων ανθρωπων. Φαμεν γαρ τον ευκαταφρονητον, νοεισθαι μεν και κατα το δυνατον ειναι βλαψαι. Αλλα πολυ μαλλον νοειται κατα το δυνατον ειναι ωφελειν.

This is the Whole of the Fragment: of which only the firſt Part, which is too good to be omitted, is tranſlated. The reſt I do not underſtand.

anointed (*c*) him, and, after his Body was anointed, he traced his Figures upon *that*.

LXX.

When *Lampis*, the Sea Commander, was aſked how he acquired Riches: "A great deal," ſaid he, "without Difficulty, but a little with Labour."

LXXI.

Solon, when he was ſilent at an Entertainment, being aſked by *Periander*, whether he was ſilent for want of Words, or from Folly; "No Fool," anſwered he, "can be ſilent at a Feaſt."

LXXII.

Conſult nothing ſo much, upon every Occaſion, as Safety. Now it is ſafer to be ſilent, than to ſpeak: and omit ſpeaking whatever is not accompanied with Senſe and Reaſon.

LXXIII.

As Light-houſes in Havens, by kindling a great Flame from a few Faggots, afford a conſiderable Aſſiſtance to Ships wandering on the Sea: ſo an illuſtrious Perſon, in a State harraſſed by Storms, while he is contented with little himſelf, confers great Benefits on his Fellow-Citizens.

LXXIV.

——As you would certainly, if you undertook to ſteer a Ship, learn the Steerſman's Art. For it will be in your Power, as in that Caſe, to ſteer the whole Ship: ſo, in this, the whole State.

(*c*) The Ancients anointed the Body every Day.

LXXV.

If you have a mind to adorn your City by conſecrated Monuments, firſt conſecrate in yourſelf the moſt beautiful Monument of Gentleneſs, and Juſtice, and Benevolence.

LXXVI.

You will confer the greateſt Benefits on your City, not by raiſing the Roofs, but by exalting the Souls [of your Fellow-Citizens]. For it is better, that great Souls ſhould live in ſmall Habitations, than that abject Slaves ſhould burrow in great Houſes.

LXXVII.

Do not variegate the Structure of your Walls with *Eubœan* and *Spartan* Stone: but adorn both the Minds of the Citizens, and of thoſe who govern them, by the *Grecian* Education. For Cities are made good Habitations by the Sentiments of thoſe who live in them; not by Wood or Stone.

LXXVIII.

As, if you were to breed Lions, you would not be ſolicitous about the Magnificence of their Dens, but the Qualities of the Animals [themſelves]: ſo, if you undertake to preſide over your Fellow-Citizens, be not ſo ſolicitous about the Magnificence of the Buildings, as careful of the Fortitude of thoſe who inhabit them.

LXXIX.

LXXIX.

As a ſkilful Manager of Horſes doth not feed the good Colts, and ſuffer the unruly ones to ſtarve; but feeds them both alike; only whips one more, to make him draw equally with his Fellow: ſo a Man of Care, and Skill in the Art of Civil Government, endeavours to do (*d*) Good to the well-diſpoſed Citizens, but not at once to deſtroy thoſe that are otherwiſe. He by no means denies Subſiſtence to either of them: only he diſciplines and urges on, with the greater Vehemence, him who reſiſts Reaſon and the Laws.

LXXX.

As neither a Gooſe is alarmed by Gaggling; nor a Sheep by Bleating: ſo neither be you terrified by the Voice of a ſenſeleſs Multitude.

LXXXI.

As you do not comply with a Multitude, when it injudiciouſly aſks of you any Part of your own Property: ſo neither be diſconcerted by a Mob, when it endeavours to force you to any unjuſt Compliance.

(*d*) The *Latin* Verſion ſuppoſes that ωσιν ſhould be ωφελειν. This the Senſe ſeems to require; and it is ſo tranſlated.

LXXXII.

Pay in, before you are called upon, what is due to the Public, and you will never be aſked for what is not due.

LXXXIII.

As the Sun doth not wait for Prayers and Incantations, to be prevailed on to riſe, but immediately ſhines forth, and is received with univerſal Salutation; ſo neither do you wait for Applauſes, and Shouts, and Praiſes, in order to do Good; but be a voluntary Benefactor; and you will be beloved like the Sun (*e*).

LXXXIV.

A Ship ought not to be fixed by one Anchor; nor Life on a ſingle Hope (*f*).

LXXXV.

We ought not to ſtretch either our Legs or our Hopes to a Point they cannot reach.

LXXXVI.

Thales, being aſked, what was the moſt univerſally enjoyed of all Things, anſwered, "Hope: "for they have it, who have nothing elſe."

LXXXVII.

It is more neceſſary for the Soul to be cured, than the Body: for it is better to die, than to live ill.

LXXXVIII.

(*e*) This Simile is peculiarly beautiful; and hath the Force of an Argument in the Diſcourſe of a Stoic, who held the Sun to be animated, and intelligent.

(*f*) This Fragment, in *Stobæus*, is aſcribed to *Socrates*.

LXXXVIII.

Pyrrho uſed to ſay, There is is no Difference "between living and dying." A Perſon aſked him, Why then do not you die? "Becauſe," anſwered *Pyrrho*, "there is no Difference (*g*)."

LXXXIX.

Nature is admirable, and, as *Xenophon* ſays, fond of Life. Hence we love, and take Care of the Body, which is of all Things the moſt unpleaſant and ſqualid. For if we were obliged, only for five Days, to take care of our Neighbour's Body, we could not ſupport it. For only conſider what it would be, when we get up in a Morning, to waſh the Teeth of others, and do all requiſite Offices beſides. In reality, it is wonderful we ſhould love a Thing, which every Day demands ſo much Attendance. I ſtuff this Sack, and then I empty it again. What is more troubleſome? But I muſt obey God. Therefore I ſtay, and bear to waſh, and feed, and clothe this paultry, miſerable Body. When I was younger, he commanded me ſomething ſtill more, and I bore it. And will you not, when Nature, which gave the Body, takes it away, bear that? "I "love it;" ſay you. Well: this is what I have juſt been obſerving: and this very Love hath Nature given you: but ſhe alſo ſays, "Now let it "go, and have no farther Trouble."

(*g*) See Diſcourſes, B. I. c. 27. Note (*a*).

XC.

When a young Man dies, [an old one] accuſes the Gods, that, at the Time when he ought to be at reſt, he is incumbered with the Troubles of Life. Yet, (*b*) nevertheleſs, when Death approaches, he wiſhes to live; and ſends for the Phyſician, and intreats him to omit no Care or Pains. It is marvellous, that Men ſhould not be willing either to live, or die.

XCI.

To a longer and worſe Life, a ſhorter and better is by all Means to be preferred by every one.

XCII.

When we are Children, our Parents deliver us to the Care of a Tutor: who is continually to watch over us, that we get no Hurt. When we are become Men, God delivers us to the Guardianſhip of an implanted Conſcience. We ought by no means then to deſpiſe this Guardian: for it will both diſpleaſe (*i*) God, and we ſhall be Enemies to our own conſcious Principle.

XCIII.

Riches ought to be uſed as the Materials of ſome Action; and not upon every Occaſion alike.

XCIV.

All Men ſhould rather wiſh for Virtue than Wealth; which is dangerous to the Fooliſh: for Vice

(*b*) Ηττον is dropt out of the Text, probably, by Reaſon of the Similitude of the next Word ὁταν.

(*i*) Απαρεσον, perhaps, ſhould be απαρεσοι.

Vice is increaſed by Riches. And in proportion as any one is deſtitute of Underſtanding, into the more injurious Exceſs he flies out, by having the Means of gratifying the Rage of his Pleaſures.

XCV.

What ought not to be done, be not even ſuſpected [or, entertain not even a Thought] of doing (*k*).

XCVI.

Deliberate much before you ſay and do any thing: for it will not be in your Power to recal what is ſaid or done.

XCVII.

Every Place is ſafe to him who lives with Juſtice.

XCVIII.

Crows pick out the Eyes of the Dead, when they are no longer of any Uſe. But Flatterers deſtroy the Soul of the Living, and blind its Eyes.

XCIX.

The Anger of a Monkey, and the Threats of a Flatterer, deſerve equal Regard.

C.

Kindly receive thoſe, who are willing to give good Advice: but not thoſe, who upon every Occaſion are eager to flatter. For the former truly ſee what is advantageous: but the latter conſider only the Opinions of their Superiors; and imitate the

(*k*) This Fragment is aſcribed to *Pythagoras*, STOB. *Serm.* I.

the Shadows of Bodies, by nodding Aſſent to what they ſay.

CI.

A Monitor ought, in the firſt Place, to have a Regard to the Delicacy and Senſe (*l*) of Shame of the Perſon admoniſhed. For they, who are hardened againſt a Bluſh, are incorrigible.

CII.

It is better to admoniſh than reproach: for the one is mild and friendly; the other, harſh and affronting: and the one corrects the Faulty; the other only convicts them.

CIII.

(*m*) Communicate to Strangers, and Perſons in Need, according to your Ability (*n*). For he who gives nothing to the Needy, ſhall receive nothing in his own Need.

CIV.

A Perſon once brought Clothes to a Pirate, who had been caſt aſhore, and almoſt killed by the Severity of the Weather; then carried him to his Houſe, and furniſhed him with other Conveniencies.

(*l*) Θημης in *Antonius* and *Maximus* is αισχυνης. And it is ſo tranſlated here.

(*m*) This and the following Fragment are from *Antonius* and *Maximus*, and in the Margin ſtand there, *Democriti, Iſocratis, & Epicteti*: ſo, probably, they ought to be put in the ſecond Claſs.

(*n*) The Expreſſion in the Original is the ſame with *Luke* xi. 41.

cies. Being reproached by ſome Perſon, for doing Good to bad People; "I have paid this Re-"gard," anſwered he, "not to the Man, but to "human Nature."

CV.

We ought not to chuſe every Pleaſure: but that, which tends to ſomething good.

CVI.

It is the Character of a wiſe Man, to reſiſt Pleaſure; and of a Fool, to be enſlaved by it.

CVII.

In all Vice, Pleaſure being preſented like a Bait, draws ſenſual Minds to the Hook of Perdition.

CVIII.

Chuſe rather to puniſh your Appetites, than to be puniſhed by them.

CIX.

No one is free, who doth not command himſelf.

CX.

The Vine bears three Cluſters. The firſt, of Pleaſure; the ſecond, of Intoxication; the third, of Outrage (*o*).

CXI.

Do not talk much over Wine, to ſhow your Learning: for your Diſcourſe will be loathſome.

CXII.

(*o*) This Saying is likewiſe aſcribed to *Pythagoras*.

CXII.

He is a Drunkard, who takes more than three Glaſſes: and though he be not drunk, he hath exceeded Moderation.

CXIII.

(*p*) Let Diſcourſe of God be renewed every Day, preferable to our Food.

CXIV.

Think oftener of God, than you breathe.

CXV.

If you always remember, that God ſtands by, an Inſpector of whatever you do, either in Soul or Body: you will never err, either in your Prayers or Actions; and you will have God abiding with you.

CXVI.

As it is pleaſant to view the Sea from the Shore: ſo it is pleaſant to one who hath eſcaped, to remember his paſt Labours.

CXVII.

The Intention of the Law is, to benefit human Life: but it cannot, when Men themſelves chuſe to ſuffer: for it diſcovers its proper Virtue in the Obedient.

CXVIII.

As Phyſicians are the Preſervers of the Sick; ſo are the Laws, of the Injured.

CXIX.

(*p*) See *Deut.* vi. 7. *Pſal.* lxxi. 15, 24. cv. 2.

CXIX.

The juſteſt Laws are the trueſt.

CXX.

It is decent to yield to a Law, to a Governor, and to a wiſer Man.

CXXI.

Things, done contrary to Law, are the ſame as if they were undone.

CXXII.

In Proſperity, it is very eaſy to find a Friend; in Adverſity, nothing is ſo difficult.

CXXIII.

Time delivers Fools from Grief: and Reaſon, wiſe Men.

CXXIV.

He is a Man of Senſe, who doth not grieve for what he hath not; but rejoices in what he hath.

CXXV.

Epictetus being aſked, how a Perſon might grieve his Enemy, anſwered, "By doing as well "as poſſible himſelf."

CXXVI.

Let no wiſe Man eſtrange himſelf from the Government of the State: for it is both impious to withdraw from being uſeful to thoſe that need it, and cowardly to give way to the Worthleſs. For it is fooliſh to chuſe rather to be governed ill, than to govern well.

CXXVII.

CXXVII.

Nothing is more (*q*) becoming a Governor, than to deſpiſe no one, nor be inſolent; but to preſide over all impartially.

CXXVIII.

Any Perſon may live happy in Poverty; but few, in Wealth and Power. So great is the Advantage of Poverty, that no (*r*) Man, obſervant of the Laws of Life, would change it for diſreputable Wealth: unleſs, indeed *Themiſtocles*, the Son of *Neocles*, the moſt wealthy of the *Athenians*, in a Poverty of Virtue, was better than *Ariſtides* and *Socrates*. But both himſelf and his Wealth are periſhed, and without a Name. For a bad Man loſes all in Death; but Virtue is eternal.

CXXIX.

[Remember] that ſuch is, and was, and will be, the Nature of the World; nor is it poſſible that Things ſhould be otherwiſe, than they now are: and that not only Men, and other Animals upon Earth, partake of this Change and Transformation, but the Divinities alſo. For indeed even the four Elements are transformed and changed up and down: and Earth becomes Water, and Water Air, and this again is transformed into other

(*q*) Αλλο ſeems a falſe Reading for μαλλον.

(*r*) If any one thinks this Senſe of νομιμος harſh, or unſuitable, he may read, φρονιμος, *prudent*.

other Things. And the ſame Manner of Tranſformation happens from Things above to thoſe below. Whoever endeavours to turn his Mind towards theſe Points, and perſuade himſelf to receive with Willingneſs what cannot be avoided, he will paſs his Life with Moderation and Harmony.

CXXX.

He who is diſcontented with Things preſent, and allotted by Fortune, is unſkilful in Life. But he who bears them, and the Conſequences ariſing from them, nobly and rationally, is worthy to be eſteemed a good Man.

CXXXI.

All Things obey, and are ſubſervient to, the World (*u*); the Earth, the Sea, the Sun, and other Stars, and the Plants and Animals of the Earth. Our Body likewiſe obeys it, in being ſick, and well, and young, and old, and paſſing thro' the other Changes, whenever That decrees. It is therefore reaſonable, that what depends on ourſelves, that is, our Judgment, ſhould not be the only Rebel to it. For the World is powerful, and ſuperior, and conſults the beſt for us, by governing us in Conjunction with the Whole. Farther: Oppoſition, beſides that it is unreaſonable, and produces nothing except a vain Struggle, throws us likewiſe into Pain and Sorrows.

The

(*u*) The Stoics often confound the Idea of God with that of the World.

(a) *The following* FRAGMENTS *are aſcribed jointly to* EPICTETUS *and other Authors.*

I.

CONTENTMENT, as it is a ſhort and delightful Way, hath much Graceſulneſs and little Trouble.

II.

Fortify yourſelf with Contentment: for this is an impregnable Fortreſs.

III.

Prefer nothing to Truth, not even the Choice of Friendſhip, lying within the Reach of the Paſſions: for by them Juſtice is both confounded and darkened.

IV.

Truth is an immortal and an eternal Thing. It beſtows, not a Beauty which Time will wither, nor a Boldneſs of which the Sentence of a Judge can (b) deprive us; but [the Knowledge of] what is juſt and lawful, diſtinguiſhing from them, and confuting what is unjuſt.

V. We

(a) I have followed Mr. *Upton*'s Diviſion: but many Fragments in the foregoing Claſs properly belong to this.

(b) Αφαιρει τιν, probably, ſhould be αφαιρετην, and is ſo tranſlated.

V.

We ſhould have neither a blunt Sword, nor an (*c*) ineffectual Boldneſs of Speech.

VI.

Nature hath given Man one Tongue, but two Ears, that we may hear twice as much as we ſpeak.

VII.

Nothing is in reality either pleaſant or unpleaſant by Nature; but all Things are effected by Cuſtom.

VIII.

Chuſe the beſt Life: for Cuſtom will make it pleaſant.

IX.

Chuſe rather to leave your Children well inſtructed, than rich. For the Hopes of the Learned are better than the Riches of the Ignorant.

X.

A Daughter is a Poſſeſſion to a Father; which is not his own.

XI.

The ſame Perſon adviſed the leaving Modeſty to Children, rather than Gold.

XII.

(*b*) This ſaying is aſcribed by *Stobæus* to *Socrates*. Ατακτον, diſorderly, is there ανεργαστον, ineffectual: which I have preferred.

XII.

The Reproach of a Father is an agreeable Medicine: for the Profit is greater than the Pain.

XIII.

He who ſucceeds in a Son-in-Law, finds a Son: he who fails in one, loſes likewiſe a Daughter.

XIV.

The Worth of Learning, like that of Gold, is eſteemed in every Place.

XV.

He who exerciſes Wiſdom, exerciſes the Knowledge of God.

XVI.

There is no Animal ſo beautiful, as a Man adorned by Learning.

XVII.

We ought to fly the Friendſhip of the Wicked, and the Enmity of the Good.

XVIII.

Neceſſitous Circumſtances prove Friends, and detect Enemies.

XIX.

We ought to do well by our Friends, when they are preſent; and ſpeak well of them, when they are abſent.

XX.

Let not him think he is loved by any, who loves none.

XXI.

XXI.

We ought to chuſe both a Phyſician and a Friend, not the moſt agreeable, but the moſt uſeful.

XXII.

If you would lead a Life without Sorrow, conſider Things which will happen, as if they had already happened.

XXIII.

Be exempt from Grief; not like irrational Creatures, from Inſenſibility; nor from Inconſiderateneſs, like Fools: but like a Man of Virtue, making Reaſon the Remedy for Grief.

XXIV.

They whoſe Minds are the leaſt grieved by Calamities, and whoſe Actions ſtruggle the moſt againſt them, are the greateſt both in public and in private Life.

XXV.

They who are well inſtructed, like thoſe who are exerciſed in the *Palæſtra*, if they happen to fall, quickly and dextrouſly riſe again from Misfortunes.

XXVI.

We ought to call in Reaſon, like a good Phyſician, to our Aſſiſtance in Misfortunes.

XXVII.

A Fool intoxicated by a long Courſe of good Fortune, as by one of Drinking, becomes more ſenſeleſs.

XXVIII.

XXVIII.

Envy is the Adverſary of the Fortunate.

XXIX.

He who remembers what Man is, is diſcontented at nothing which happens.

XXX.

A Pilot and a fair Wind are neceſſary to a happy Voyage: Reaſon and Art, to a happy Life.

XXXI.

Good Fortune, like ripe Fruit, ought to be enjoyed while it is preſent.

XXXII.

He is unreaſonable, who is diſpleaſed at Events, which happen from natural Neceſſity.

The following FRAGMENTS *are omitted by Mr.* UPTON: *but as they ſtand under the Name of* ARRIAN, *and ſeem to be in the Spirit of* EPICTETUS, *they are added here.*

(*a*) WHAT does it ſignify to me, ſays he, whether the Univerſe is compoſed of Atoms or (*b*) uncompounded Subſtances, or of Fire and Earth? Is it not ſufficient to know the Eſſence of Good and Evil, and the proper Bounds of the Deſires and Averſions; and, beſides thoſe, of the active Powers; and by the making uſe of theſe as ſo many certain Rules, to order the Conduct of Life, and bid theſe Things, which are above us, farewel: which, perhaps, are incomprehenſible to human Underſtanding: but, if one ſhould ſuppoſe them ever ſo comprehenſible, ſtill, what is the Benefit of them, when comprehended? And muſt it not be ſaid, that He gives Himſelf

(*a*) *Stob. de Diis & Phyſiol. Serm.* 211. p. 714. Ed. *Francof.* 1581.

(*b*) I have tranſlated αμερων as it ſtands in the Text; but, poſſibly, it might originally be no more than a marginal Interpretation of ατομων, changing the Full Point into a Comma; or, according to *Geſner*'s Tranſlation, a Corruption of ομοιομερειων.

Trouble to no Purpoſe, who allots theſe Things as neceſſary to the Character of a Philoſopher.— "What then, is the *Delphic* Admonition, *Know* "*Thyſelf*, ſuperfluous?"—"No, ſurely, ſays "he."—"What then doth it mean?" If any one ſhould admoniſh a Performer in a Chorus to *know himſelf*, would not he attend to it as a Direction about his (*c*) Motions—

II.

(*d*) The ſame Perſon being aſked, Wherein the Diligent have the Advantage of the Slothful? anſwered, Wherein the Pious have the Advantage of the Impious; in good Hopes.

III.

(*e*) Walls give to Cities, and Cultivation of the Underſtanding to Minds, Ornament and Security.

IV.

(*f*) When a young Man was giving himſelf Airs in a public Place; and ſaying, that he was grown wiſe, by converſing with many wiſe Men; I have converſed too, anſwered ſomebody, with many rich Men, but I am not grown rich.

V.

(*c*) The Sentence ſeems imperfect.
(*d*) *Maximus*, περι φιλοπονιας. *Serm.* 118. p. 374.
(*e*) *Ant. & Max. de diſciplinâ. Serm.* 210. p. 704.
(*f*) Ibid.

V.

(*g*) *Socrates*, being ſent for by (*h*) *Archelaus*, as deſigning to make him a rich Man, returned him this Anſwer: "Four Quarts of Meal are ſold "at *Athens* for five Farthings, and the Fountains "run with Water. If what I have is not ſuf- "ficient for me, yet I am ſufficiently able to "make a ſhift with that; and thus it becomes "ſufficient for me. Do not you perceive, that "it makes no Difference in the Goodneſs of "*Polus* [the Player's] Voice, whether he per- "forms the Part of *Oedipus* in his regal State, or "when he is a Wanderer, and a Beggar at "*Colonus?* And ſhall a brave Man appear worſe "than *Polus*, and not perform well in whatever "Perſonage is impoſed upon him by the Deity? "Shall he not imitate *Ulyſſes*, who made no "worſe Figure in Rags than in a fine purple "Robe (*i*)?"

(*g*) *Stobæus, Compar. Paupertatis & Divitiarum. Serm.* 237. p. 778.

(*h*) *Archelaus*, the Philoſopher, was the Maſter of *Socrates*: but the Perſon here mentioned was King of *Macedon*, who vainly endeavoured to get *Socrates* to his Court. The Envy of *Ariſtophanes* upon this Occaſion is ſaid to have produced that infamous Piece of Scurrility and Buffoonery his *Comedy of the Clouds*. See *Bayle*, in the Article *Archelaus*.

(*i*) *Stobæus. Quod Eventus*, &c. p. 324, 329.

VI.

There are ſome Perſons who are calmly of a high Spirit, and do all the ſame Things quietly, and as it were without Anger, which thoſe do who are hurried with ſtrong Paſſion. We are to guard, therefore, againſt the Faults of ſuch Perſons, as being much worſe than that of violent Anger. For People of the latter Character are quickly ſatiated with Vengeance; whereas the others extend it to a longer Time, like Perſons in a ſlow Fever.

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APPENDIX.

THE learned Dr. TAYLOR, Editor of *Lyſias* and *Demoſthenes*, having honoured me with his Opinion, concerning ſome Paſſages, about which he was conſulted, I am enabled by his Obſervations to make the following Improvements to this Work.

Vol. I. Page 45. Add to Note (*b*)—It ſeems probable, that a great deal is wanting; and that ὅτι ἀνθρωπίνα belongs to one Story, and τί οὖν, ἔφη, to another.

P. 93. But how then came any ſuch Suſpicions . . . Perhaps the Senſe is, Whence ariſe our Suſpicions, Jealouſies, and Fears, concerning our Children, if we have no natural Affection towards them?

P. 121. Add to Note (*d*)—Or, perhaps, μαθὼν ſhould be μαθεῖς.

P. 141. This your Victory, this your Concluſion .... Perhaps *Victory* and *Concluſion* ſhould change Places.

P. 173. To note (*b*) add—But, as διατιλλω occurs not elſewhere, and reading it here will make an improper Repetition of nearly the ſame Senſe, and διαθεναι τινα ſignifies, to do ſomething to another, L. 4. c. 7. p. 628. edit. *Upt.* and in *Lyſias*, *Apol. in. Sim.* p. 79. *contra Agorat.* p. 235, it will be beſt to preſerve the preſent Reading, and to tranſlate it—What doth he loſe, who makes him ſuch?

P. 205. To Note (*i*) add—*Prov.* viii. 34. and *Eccluſ* xiv. 23. ſpeak of *waiting and hearkening at the Doors of*

of Wiſdom. Yet the Paſſage, to which Mr. *Upton* refers, p. 577, of his Edition, and Vol. II. p. 180, of this Tranſlation, favours the received Reading.

P. 207. To Note (*l*) add—Probably there is an Alluſion to the Proverb, cited by *Wolfius*, επι βυρσης καθιζεσθαι, of which ſee *Suidas*.

P. 222. To Note (*c*) add—Yet poſſibly the Senſe of ουδεν may be couched under υδι.

Vol. II. P. 22. To Note (*b*) add—But a much better, and almoſt certain Conjecture is, to read απαλλαττομενους inſtead of απολλυμενους. And then the Tranſlation will be—Concerning thoſe, who return, or, were returning home, on account of Sickneſs.

P. 41. To Note (*b*) add—But, on farther Conſideration, the Senſe of returning or departing, which αναλυω hath, *Luke* xii. 36. *Phil.* i. 23. and αναλυσις, 2 *Tim.* iv. 6. ſeems proper here: and the Tranſlation may be—You go to the Theatre, or thence to ſome other Place. For Perſons often move from one Place to another, merely becauſe they are amuſed in none.

P. 44. To Note (*f*) add—But probably it ſhould be changed into ωθου, and the Tranſlation be—What Occaſion for Anger, for Deſire.... Theſe two *Greek* Words are confounded elſewhere. And the ſame Alterations ſeem needful in *Porphyr. de Abſt.* L. I. § 2.

P. 47. To Note (*c*) add—He is ſenſible however, that αναπτοιχειν is not exactly to throw one's ſelf on *one* Side; and ſtands condemned by *Phrynicus*, as a low Expreſſion.

P. 67. To Note (*a*) add—Or we may ſuppoſe απατην to be a Gloſs, or a caſual Repetition of the ſame Word occurring in the Line before: and ſo tranſlate, *there exiſts the Knowledge*, &c.

P.

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P. 102. To note (*d*) add—Or, perhaps, rather the former ουτος ſhould be left out.

P. 115. To Note (*b*) add—Yet, poſſibly, the preſent Reading may ſtand, and be tranſlated, *But your Life is a perpetual Magiſtracy.*

P. 141. To Note (*e*) add—Or τω φιλοσοφω may mean, *Of the philoſophic Principle.*

P. 150. To note (*b*) add—Or the latter ουτου θελω may be a Repetition of the Tranſcriber.

P. 176. To Note (*d*) add—For ολων I have taken the Reading of Mr. *Upton*'s Copy, αλλων.

P. 184. To Note (*b*) add—Yet I would not inſert a Negative unneceſſarily.

P. 188. Note (*c*). For, *rub themſelves with*, put *throw on their Antagoniſts.*

P. 200. To Note (*e*) add—Perhaps alſo what follows, and particularly εδε προσθατον, is corrupt.

P. 205. To Note (*a*) add—But this Omiſſion was probably owing to the Tranſcribers ſkipping from μαθων to the like Word μανθανειν. Poſſibly, inſtead of leaving out και, we ſhould rather ſuppoſe, that ſomething before it is left out. And in all Likelihood the true Tranſlation of νυν εχει ανω κατω, inſtead of *ſhould not you*, &c. is the following: *is not this, i. e.* undertaking to convince others inſtead of yourſelf, *inverting the Order of Things?*

P. 240. The Notes (*b*) and (*i*) ſhould change Places.

P. 244. Add to Note (*a*)—Or rather, after the next Word: and the Tranſlation ſhould be, *Yet now, without being ſenſible of it, you do ſomething like this, even in the preſent Caſe. Conſider your Body*, &c. But ſtill the Separation of ουν from και νυν is ſomewhat unnatural, and takes off from the Spirit and Quickneſs of the Repartee.

P. 245. Squalid .... The original Word ſignifies, in general, pale. And, probably, *Ariſtophanes*

meant the Paleneſs, which proceeds from a ſedentary ſtudious Life. But *Epictetus* plainly underſtood him, of that unwholeſome Look, which Want of Cleanlineſs gives.

P. 249. To Note (*a*) add—Or, as *Caſaubon* conjectures, απαθειν. Or, perhaps, as Mr. *Upton* propoſes, υπερτιθεμενον ſhould be υπερτιθεμενος.

P. 251. Is he my Conſcience . . . . Κριμα ſignifies, p. 652. l. 6. and p. 660. l. 5. of Mr. *Upton*'s Edition, the Judgment, which any one paſſes in his own Mind.

P. 270. To Note (*b*) add—For nothing appears, to ſupport ſo great an Encomium of that Philoſopher: whereas *Hercules* and *Diogenes* were Favourites of the Stoics, and particularly of our Author; and the latter profeſſed himſelf an Imitator of the former. But then he was never deified. And therefore may we not put in his ſtead, Διονυσος, *Bacchus?* They are joined by the Antients. See *Qu. Curt.* L. VIII. c. 5. and *Hor. Epiſt.* II. 1, 5, 10. And they will ſtand here in their proper Order. But this may be thought too licentious a Change. And, to ſay nothing of *Hercules*, *Bacchus* was by no means remarkable for Abſtemiouſneſs.

P. 284. To Note (*u*) add—This Reading he hath taken from an Edition in 1554, ſaid to be made from a better Manuſcript than the common Editions. He underſtands it to mean, *ſtruck and affected over ſtrongly by Externals.* Διαστελλομενος means averſe from, L. II. c. 26. in the Beginning, and *Philoſtrat. vit. Apollon.* VIII. 7, 3. But from the vulgar Senſe, *calumniated*, it may mean here, one to whom Externals have been miſrepreſented, who hath a Miſconception of the World.

P. 301. And Vice, by Money . . . . Perhaps for η κακια ſhould be read ευτυχια, a Turn of good Fortune.

FINIS.